65The Zamindars, the Jagirdars and Imperial Decline

A close examination of the Persian sources brings to light a large number of rebel zamindars besides the well-known categories of so-called mufsids (disturbers) of the early-eighteenth century: Sikhs, Jats, Marathas and Afghans. Zamindars of different denominations mounted the rural uprisings (each with its own logic) but all sought greater share in power over, and thus in the revenues of, their region. In some cases, it was a strong land-holding community seeking to establish some form of dominance over its region. In several cases in Awadh rural pressure took the form of the zamindar beseiging a fortress (ihdas-i qilacha) and mobilizing his kinsfolk and an armed retinue (jami‘at-o-sipah). One or more zamindars would thus proclaim the central position of their clans and villages in the area—pargana or a group of parganas—where they had zamindaris.

These revolts were organized and led by powerful zamindars. But their goals were limited. The scale of their mobilization against imperial power could not transcend the divisions of their caste and community. The Mughals could handle the Awadhi zamindars either by a show of strength, using the other local elements against them or by extending concessions to the powerful rebels. Rural resistance in the Punjab, however, was less tractable. This difference has been examined in terms of the history of the two regions, including the nature of their relationships with the centre.

Even though not always directed against the state, these uprisings corroded the basis of imperial authority, sometimes through linkages with imperial court politics. In the emerging political situation, service and loyalty to imperial authority ceased to count, for it was not the emperor but the nobles in the region who began to dictate state actions. Thus, the imperial assistance available to provincial nobles and the local officials for coping with local problems depended more on their individual influence with powerful nobles at the centre, and less (p.14) on their loyalty to the emperor. Thus were the beginnings of the new subadari in Awadh and the Punjab made.

In the context of rapidly diminishing imperial authority at local levels, I have examined certain administrative developments which had originated with a view to enabling the nobles to meet local challenges effectively. Among such developments were the jagir-i mahal-i watan and the long-term jagir holdings aimed at augmenting the strength of the nobility. These developments violated the classical Mughal concept of imperial authority, as seen in the seventeenth century, undermined the prospects of its survival, and reinforced the course of provincial autonomy.

Social and Political Base of Eighteenth Century Provincial States

As the play of various factors is examined the period of my study separates into four phases, 1707–1713, 1713–c. 1722, c. 1722–1739 and 1739–1748. In the first

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66Introduction

two phases, the issues are those of imperial authority vis-á-vis the governors and the local potentates, and the slow pull to provincial independence; in the latter two phases, the issues relate to the working of the new subadari, sometimes called the ‘successor state’, the extent of its independence from the imperial centre and its relations with the emerging system of regional powers.

The period of our study appears to have witnessed an emerging sense of regional identity which buttressed both political and, to a degree, economic decentralization. This sense of identity or provincial obduracy followed and accompanied economic prosperity in the regions. Different regions of the empire gained in strength in the wake of relative peace and political stability under the Mughal system in the seventeenth century. Intra-region as well as inter-region trade in local goods, artifacts and foodgrains sustained a network of towns and money markets of varying sizes throughout the empire, linking some of the regions together with strong ties of economic interdependence. Conditions were thus generated for economic unity among these areas, irrespective of their political and military relations with each other. In a measure, the economic developments of the regions took a course independent of their political detour, even though their political unification under the Mughals had a bearing on this course.

(p.15) The provinces of Awadh and the Punjab were among such regions. Economic developments in these provinces, as we shall see later, resulted in not only a rise in the revenue figures but also in the emergence and affluence of a number of towns, with a chain of routes to link them to the long-distance trade. The prosperity of these regions was to the obvious advantage of the zamindars who enjoyed a dominance in rural production; it also benefited the merchants who controlled and regulated the markets. The zamindars in our period, as ‘local despots’, were in an almost uncompromising conflict with the imperial authorities. They had allied with the Mughals and accepted their subordinate position either in the face of the fear of the invincible Mughal or with an objective of protecting and promoting their individual interests vis-á-vis the others within the region. Since they now found themselves strong enough, they were up in arms. But as their goal was narrow and parochial, they failed to incorporate the interests of other regional groups in their programmes and thus fight the imperial power. They relied on support from peasants and smaller zamindars of their own castes and in many cases their interest remained limited to their kinsfolk in the villages; the townsmen and traders also became victims of their fury.

In addition, the enrichment of the region generated conflict among the various local groups, as they each tried to maximize their profits at the expense of the other. The madad-i ma‘ash holders made a bid to turn their grants into zamindaris, without forefeiting their existing privileges and perquisites. The

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jagirdar too aspired to a permanent holding so that he could build his own base in the region.

Conflict and absence of coordination between the local elements enabled the Mughal nobles to establish their hegemony over them and to mobilize the regional resources to emerge as a focus of power in the region. The political formations in these areas remained within the Mughal institutional framework.

However, it would appear that Awadh and the Punjab differed radically from each other in the social and economic bases of the problems in the period under review. In fact even earlier the leaders of the agrarian uprisings in these two provinces did not have the same programmes, slogans and perspectives. Besides, the jagir holdings in the Punjab were (p.16) large in size and the jagirdars were powerful nobles who were unwilling to accept the authority of the governor. Further, the location of the Punjab—exposing it to developments in and invasions from Persia and Afghanistan—did much to shape the course of its history. These factors in combination with the nature of its relations with the centre and the interest of the wazir and a number of his Turani associates in the province constricted the growth of the new subadari in the Punjab. In contrast, the governor of Awadh was able to make fresh arrangements both with the local potentates and the petty jagir holders in the province, providing a new social basis for his rule, and thus establish the new subadari on firm ground.

Governorship during this period was consolidated at the initiative of the then incumbent; the office became hereditary ultimately and the province began to be designated as the ‘home province’ (suba-i mulki and dar-ul-mulk) of the governor. It, however, remained a suba (province), part of empire, replete with imperial symbols. The governor, despite his attempt, was unable to shake off the Mughal centre completely. These powerful new subadars continued to seek links with one or the other group at the court.