Abstract and Keywords
This chapter outlines developments in and around the centre in the post- Aurangzeb period to set the scene for discussing the problems of imperial power, political formations in the regions and the changing economic scenario. By examining these developments, analysing the links with the factional politics, and the administrative relapse at the centre in four phases, the chapter highlights the gradual but steady alienation of the nobles, the smaller government officials, and the local magnates from the Mughal state, both at the centre and in the provinces. The chronological order of these events reflects the problems and the shifts of social and political alignments in the provinces, leading to their virtual breakaway from the imperial centre. Simultaneously, the chapter delves on the interlinkages of the political breakdown and the economic collapse of the imperial centre, the paucity of jagir(s) and the consequent breakdown of the jagirdari system, and the emergence of ijaradars. It deals with the financial effects of continuous wars, uprisings of zamindar(s), as well as the impact of droughts and famines. The result is a composite picture of the breakdown of the politico-economic order of the Mughal imperial organization.
Keywords: Mughal empire, imperial power, political formation, political order, nobles, government
officials, local magnates, ijara, jagir, jagirdar, zamindar, famine, uprising
POLITICAL UNIFICATION IN MUGHAL TIMES signified the successful working of a range of offices and institutions meant to be a mechanism of ‘checks and balances’.1 The Mughal imperial system in operation not only delimited the spheres of activity of the various social groups but also ensured a balance of their interests for the maintenance and promotion of political integration. This
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imperial principle was, in a very large measure, the result of particular patterns of relationships between the emperor, the nobility, minor officials, local potentates and petty assignees of land revenue, specially the madad-i ma‘ash holders. Through a series of conflicts and adjustments under the Sultans of Delhi and the early Mughals these patterns were worked out and were finally evolved during the reign of Akbar (1556–1605). Akbar had (p.19) ruthlessly rejected the high pretensions of the Chaghtai nobles and the Mirzas (princes claiming descent from Timur). He also tackled the threat from the local potentates who were entrenched throughout the empire with tact and determination. He was able, however, to provide enough opportunity to the nobility to feel reasonably satisfied by a system of lavish jagir assignments and other symbols of rank and authority. He also tried to accommodate the claims of the local magnates from the village headmen to the chieftains by integrating them, in different degrees, into the imperial framework.2 Thus a sort of equilibrium to contain conflicts and promote interdependence between the emperor, the nobility and the local elements was established on some kind of institutional basis. The coordination of all these complex relationships determined the existence of the imperial structure and political stability in Mughal India.
In the given power structure, however, the norms and the institutions governing the relationship between the emperor and the nobility were crucial for the imperial organization. In the actual working of Mughal polity the valour, the vigour, the courage, the morale and the efficiency of the individual nobles carried no value, unless they were made to act in unison (p.20) conforming to the imperial system. The Mughals, therefore, made special efforts to achieve and maintain some kind of unity in the nobility. They devised numerous restrictions on the tendencies of the heterogeneous, and also conflicting, elements of the nobility to dislocate the equilibrium that secured and reinforced the overriding authority of the emperor.
Thus, the emperor in the Mughal system was placed in a position of supreme awe, buttressed by an elaborate paraphernalia of court etiquette and royal prerogative. Central authority came to be identified ultimately with the person of the emperor. In order to make the central government work, the emperor was expected to be able to resolve the conflicts of these sections. Factional strife among the nobles and the emperor’s inability to be, or at least to appear to be, above these factions meant (as actually happened in our period) a grave danger to imperial unity. Such a situation threatened not only the balance in the relationship between the emperors and the nobility, but also acted upon, as it was determined by, their relations with the different regional and local elements. Satish Chandra has discussed at length the problem of the nobility in the eighteenth century. N. A. Siddiqi in the context of his study of the revenue system of the first half of the eighteenth century and Z.U. Malik as a background to his comprehensive history of the reign of Muhammad Shah, have also examined factional politics at the court and its consequences for the Mughal
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administration.3 In the following pages which set the scene for discussing the problems of imperial power and political formations in the regions under review, I notice some more evidence of such developments at and around the centre in the post-Aurangzeb period. By examining these developments, analysing their interaction with factional politics and the administrative relapse at the centre in four phases, I intend to highlight the gradual but steady alienation of the nobles, the smaller government officials and the local magnates from the Mughal state, both at the centre and in the provinces. The problems and the shifts of social and political alignments in the provinces leading finally to their virtual breakaway from the imperial centre followed closely the chronological order of these developments.