81Jagir, Ijara and the Economy Whatever the nature of zamindar uprisings and whosoever the target of their attack, these revolts threatened the social security which a stable government means in different degrees for state functionaries. In this event Mughal officials preferred to have their jagirs in and around their homelands, and also for a long, preferably, life term. In sharp contrast to the established Mughal practice, these two features, namely, a jagir in or around one’s own watan (homeland) and for a long tenure, became de facto a part of jagir administration in almost the whole of north India. This caused further damage to the imperial organization as it demonstrated the nobles’ distrust of the ability of the state to defend their interests.

It may however, be noted that the central authorities were still struggling to maintain the empire in the existing framework. In this context some reforms intended to satisfy the state functionaries are significant. As the jagirs in most of the disturbed regions especially for the mansabdars of lesser stature began to decline in value and as it became impossible for them to make payments in time to their contingents, Lutfullah Khan Sadiq, who was in charge of jagirs as a revenue minister at the centre, (diwan-i tan), converted the jagirs against the ranks indicating the strength of their armed contingents (sawar mansabs) into

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cash payments (naqd) with a fixed monthly pay of Rs 50 for each horseman (sawar). (p.37) This was applicable to the contingents of only those who held the rank of 200 to 900 zat. But the measure proved to be of little help. The regular contingents of the mansabdars began to break up and the practice of sihbandi came into vogue.44 ‘What provisions can a servant make and how can he take any initiative when he is paid Rs 50 only per mensem in both the situations when he is at home and also when he has set out for an expedition and is on a journey? What should he do with such a small amount? Should he meet family expenses or prepare for a fight? The army of Hindustan, thus, is suspended from the service of His Majesty and added to this is the calamity of the [soaring] prices of foodgrains.’45

The payment in cash ensured, even though only theoretically, regularity in the payment of emoluments. But it did not have the advantages of payment in jagir, namely, the prospects for defalcation and concealme9780198077411nt of excess receipts, especially when the cash payment was the same to all in all circumstances. It appears that the mansabdars did not approve of a uniform cash rate. Further, the cash payment did hot have the semblance of landed property as a jagir had. But even if it satisfied the mansabdars, its implementation was difficult for more than one reason. Its successful functioning required, in the first place, adequate arrangements for the collection of revenues in the lands reserved for the imperial treasury (khalisa); secondly, an unbroken flow of the bills of exchange (hundis) from the provinces and, thirdly, their immediate encashment at the capital. But there was little surety even of the khalisa sum, the proportion of which must have gone up following the change (p.38) in the mode of payment,46 reaching the imperial treasury. Whatever hundis for the amount were despatched from the khalisa, the money-changers in Delhi were reluctant to cash these and submit the sum to the office of the wazir. The moneychangers suppressed the news of their receipt of the hundis from the khalisa, possibly because they were not sure if the collection in the mahals had actually been made. The central government thus began to substantially expend the accumulated treasury.47 In 1707 the imperial treasury at the fort of Agra contained at least over nine crores of rupees in addition to valuables and unminted gold and silver. By 1720 the cash at the fort of Agra had been reduced to only one crore and eighty thousand rupees.48 Consequently in 1716, the contingents which were promised a monthly payment of Rs 50 per unit were ordered to be disbanded.49

(p.39) It is interesting, however, to note that in contrast to the general plight of the mansabdars and the crisis of the imperial treasury, some of the nobles’ personal coffers only were marginally affected by the financial difficulties of the court. The extravagant affluence of those who were in service of Husain Ali Khan, the mir bakhshi, is an example. ‘The purse [lit. the money belt] of each of his (Husain Ali Khan’s) troopers was full of gold and silver coins. Nay, the agents of his establishment [sarkar] at every stage insisted upon the soldiers coming to

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the court and collecting their emoluments. Most of them said in reply that ‘our houses [lit. resources] are replete with gold and silver. We have no room left [for any further amount]’.50 Again, the governors of the provinces were directed by Husain Ali Khan to make, on his behalf, offerings of Rs 111 and Rs 112 in the name of Saikh Abd-ul-Qadir Gilani and the Prophet on the eleventh and twelfth days of each lunar month in the towns all over the empire.51 Two bags full of gold coins (ashrafis) and a sum of Rs 1,800,000 were among the cash and the valuables captured by the loyalists following the assassination of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan in 1719. In contrast, only Rs 200,000 out of Rs 600,000 sanctioned could be paid by the imperial treasury to Saiyid Muzaffar Ali Khan when he was appointed governor of Ajmer replacing Ajit Singh in 1726. The amount was too big for the exchequer to pay in one instalment.52 The factions of the nobles like Husain Ali Khan had large followings among the state functionaries, at times even larger than the emperor could singly muster up on his own. It is not surprising that a strong alliance of these nobles dethroned the emperor in 1719 and emerged as king makers.

The question of how a section of the nobility both at the centre and in the provinces, as we shall see later, continued to thrive in spite (p.40) of the increasing difficulties of the empire, is worth considering. No answer to this question can be given in definitive terms till the production conditions of the areas under the control of such nobles are fully investigated. But it is significant to note that the prosperity or decay of a number of areas coincided with the transfer of the persons who controlled these areas. The political and economic position of the nobles perhaps depended on a demonstrated ability to live with the practice of ijara (revenue farming). As ijara implied involvement of a new man in the collection of the revenue, it tended to increase support for the state. In the case of the zamindar himself being the ijaradar it meant his autonomy and also the third man’s share for him in the surplus produce, while if a merchant or moneylender (mahajan) contracted an ijara, it associated a new social group with the government. By generating profits for these two major social classes, ijara, thus, reduced the magnitude of the problems of the jagirdars.

The growth of the ijara practice in our period has been seen in the perspective of the decline and decay of the Mughal administration. It has been suggested that ijara came to be a major factor in the excessive and unbridled exploitation of the peasantry and thus the ruination of the country. The ijara practice, has also been seen to have caused dislocation in agrarian relations, with many ancient hereditary zamindaris having been dislodged by bankers and speculators from the cities.53 While it is not possible to comment on how drastic a change in the land relations the countryside witnessed in the wake of the extension of ijara in the early-eighteenth century, the extension of this practice cannot be fully explained in terms of mere laxity in the rules and regulations of the Mughal revenue administration and the greed of Ratan Chand and the Saiyid Brothers. The extension of this practice indicated a very high level of monetization in

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which everything, including (p.41) a government office, came to be regarded as a saleable commodity. This is to be seen against the background of the developments under the Great Mughals.

Even if the growth of the money economy in Mughal India followed upon state taxation,54 economic development appears to have gradually taken an almost independent course during the seventeenth century. The processes of monetization implied the development of extensive commodity production in the countryside and of markets to which the peasants had access. Influx of silver and the rising prices helped the merchant to strengthen his position. It has been suggested that the decline in value of silver ‘discouraged hoarding and encouraged lending at interest, thus increasing the supply of money capital and cheapening credit for the merchant.’ The differential impact of price inflation on the agricultural and industrial sectors might have also augmented the ‘mercantile capitalist operations and “putting out” enterprises.’55 Several sophisticated monetary and financial institutions developed in the wake of new peasant settlements and accelerated urban growth at all levels, from the small market towns to major cities. These institutions, and together with them the merchant, had come to be part of a general development of the society, no longer tied so closely to the Mughal imperial edifice.

By the 1720s when the symptoms of political disintegration were all too evident, the different parts of the empire were economically integrated by inter-regional trade along the coastal as well as the inland routes. These economic links and the monetary institutions that evolved in earlier times survived the collapse of the Mughal empire. Distant credit markets remain connected despite political turmoil during the eighteenth century.56

(p.42) In addition to the merchants, the intermediaries and the bigger peasants or small zamindars were also among the beneficiaries of the growth in the seventeenth century. With their wealth and strength, the merchants now perhaps endeavoured to control government offices, while on the other hand, the zamindars aspired to a greater share in the revenues as well as in the administration of their holdings. The increasing ijara practice did not, thus, imply a drying up of trade prospects. It showed that investment in land was still profitable.57 While in certain areas, as in Awadh, the zamindars had sufficient wealth and political strength to establish their dominance and acquire new powers through ijara, in certain other regions traders and money changers were strong enough to stand surety for payment in time, of the stipulated revenue, from the jagir. The challenges to the Mughal system thus appear to have been in connection with the pattern of collection and distribution of the revenue resources. When the land grew in profitability why should the bulk of its produce go only to the jagirdars. This was perhaps how the local magnates argued. Ijara was to form part of a broader process of ‘localization’ in the distribution and organization of power. In a large measure, therefore, the state could have

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