93Notes: (1) Modern historians have used the terms ‘checks and balances’ in the context of their discussion of the theory and the functioning of the Mughal government. Cf. Ibn Hasan, The Central Structure of the Mughal Empire, reprint, New Delhi, 1970, pp. 291–301; P. Saran, The Provincial Government of the Mughals, reprint, Bombay, 1973, pp. 157–9, 174–7 and 183–91; Satish Chandra, Medieval India: Society, the Jagirdari Crisis and the Village, Delhi, 1982, p. 63. The use of the terms is intended to highlight the accountability of the Mughal officials, which Abul Fazl repeatedly emphasizes. Indeed, the terms are almost the literal translation of the words Abul Fazl uses. However, the terms may not be taken to suggest any bureaucratic formalism in its modern sense.
(2) Almost every good modern research work on the Mughal state-structure has taken note of the problems which the early Mughal Emperors, Humayun and Akbar, had to face with the Turani nobles. The measures and the policies adopted by Akbar to meet these problems and build his empire are also now widely known. For a pioneering major work on the nobility, however, see S. Nurul Hasan, ‘New Light on the Relations of Early Mughal Rulers with their Nobility’, PIHC, 1944. The problem has been examined in detail by Iqtidar Alam Khan in his Mirza Kamran, A Biographical Study, Bombay, 1964, and Political Biography of a Mughal Noble: Mun‘im Khan, Khan-i Khanan, 1497–1575, New Delhi, 1973, Introduction, pp. ix–xx. See also his ‘The Turko-Mongol Theory of Kingship’, Medieval India—A Miscellany, Bombay, 1972, Vol. II, pp. 8–18. How the Mughals accommodated the local potentates has been examined by Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 136–89, S. Nurul Hasan, ‘Zamindars under the Mughals’ in R.E. Frykenberg, Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History, Madison, 1969, pp. 17–31 and A.R. Khan, Chieftains in the Mughal Empire during the Reign of Akbar, Simla, 1977, passim. For the position of the madad-i ma‘ash holders who were no less a significant local element and their relationship with the Mughal state see Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 298– 316; N.A. Siddiqi, Land Revenue Administration under the Mughals, 1700–1750, Bombay, 1970, pp. 123–34 and Shaikh Abd-ur-Rashid, ‘Suyurghal Lands under the Mughals’, in H.R. Gupta (ed.) Essays Presented to Sir Jadu Nath Sarkar, Punjab University, 1958, pp. 313–22.
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(3) Compare Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, passim; N. A. Siddiqi, Land Revenue Administration, pp. 65–72, 96–101 and 115–23; Z. U. Malik, The Reign of Muhammad Shah, pp. 56–115.
(4) Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 4; J. F. Richards, Mughal Administration in Golconda, pp. 224–5 and 233; see also Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzeb, Calcutta, 1924, Vol. V, pp. 68 and 74 for disaffection of some Deccani nobles.
(5) Compare Ahkam-i Alamgiri, edited and translated by Jadunath Sarkar, pp. 81 and 116–18. For an account of the prerogatives of the emperor see Jadunath Sarkar, Mughal Administration, reprint, Bombay, 1972, pp. 89–98.
(6) Compare K.K., II, p. 600; Kamwar, pp. 16–36 entries of the 1st and the early 2nd r. ys.
(7) K.K., II, pp. 677–8; M.U., II, pp. 98, 831, 504.
(8) Compare Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami’s explanation for Chin Qilich Khan’s resignation from the subadari of Awadh. Ma’asir-ul-Kiram, II, p. 174. Though the evidence of Ma’asir-ul-Kiram is a little late, it may be noted that Azad Bilgrami had close links with the family of Nizam-ul-Mulk around the middle of the eighteenth century. In this connection, Khafi Khan’s account may also be taken into consideration. Khafi Khan was an associate of Nizam-ul-Mulk. He therefore characterizes Bahadur Shah’s policy of favouring the non-khanazads as a result of the emperor’s weakness and ignorance. Similarly Khafi Khan describes with utter contempt certain steps taken by Mun‘im Khan. In actuality, Khafi Khan and a number of other eighteenth-century historians such as Mirza Muhammad and Muhammad Bakhsh ‘Ashub’ believed the rise of the new nobles to be a major cause of the decline of the Mughal empire. Since Bahadur Shah granted high mansabs even to petty officials and clerks (cf. Bhimsen, Nuskha-i Dilkusha, Ms., Br. M. Or. 23, f. 167a) he is described by these historians as the first Mughal Emperor responsible for having set in the process of the decline. Their explanation may be taken as an illustration of their treatment of history. Cf. K.K., II, pp. 628 and 675–6. The word ‘new nobles’ (umra-i jadid) is apparently intended by these historians to indicate that section of Mughal officials who did not belong to the dominant Irani and Turani clans and yet moved to higher positions, e.g., wazir and mir bakhshi.
(9) Sharaif, pp. 255–7 and Hadiqat, p. 131.
(10) Sharaif, p. 232.
(11) Qasim, f. 41a. Bahadur Shah’s refusal to concede to the demands of Rajas Jai Singh and Ajit Singh as indeed his decision to take away the zamindari of Amer
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from Jai Singh and award it, though to no avail, to his younger brother, Bijay Singh perhaps acquire additional meaning when seen in this context.
For Jai Singh and Ajit Singh’s relations with Bahadur Shah, see Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 28–38.
(12) K.K., II, pp. 602–3; see also W. Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, reprint, New Delhi, 1962, pp. 20–2; Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 58– 9. For khurak-i dawab and other deductions from the pay of the nobles, see M. Athar Ali, Mugal Nobility, pp. 50–3.
(13) Cf. M. Athar Ali, Mughal Nobility, pp. 53–9.
(14) See also Irfan Habib, ‘The Mansab System 1595–1637’, PIHC, 29th Session, Patiala, 1967, pp. 221–42.
(15) See Chapters 3 and 7.
(16) Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 267–8.
(17) For example in 1711, the faujdars in the vicinity of Delhi realized an unlawful road toll (rahdari) from the dealers of foodgrains and oil. Subsequently, the prices of food grains and oil began to rise. In another instance they forced the Hindu and the Muslim traders to pay the cesses on their merchandise at the exorbitant rate of 15 per cent and 10 per cent respectively. In yet another case the deputy faujdar of Delhi exacted unlawful cesses from the banjaras and thus caused a scarcity of foodgrains in the city. Akhbarat BS. 5th R.Y., pp. 298 and 420 (18 August and 20 October 1711); 6th R.Y., II, p. 559 (11 January 1712). For similar cases in Jahandar Shah’s reign, see, ibid., JS, pp. 6, 8, 128, 275 and 318, 19 March and 30 October 1712.
(18) Akhbarat, BS, 6th R.Y., p. 592, 23 January 1712. Shamsher Khan the faujdar was immediately ordered to leave the court for Mathura.
(19) Qasim, f. 22a.
(20) According to Khush-hal Rai, the price-rate in Delhi in December 1707 was as follows:
In sers per rupee In rupees per man Wheat 8 sers 5.00 Barley 27 „ 1.48 Gram 25 „ 1.60 Sukhdas 10 „ 4.00
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In sers per rupee In rupees per man Mung 15 „ 2.67 Mash 18 „ 2.22 Moth 20 „ 2.00 Arhar 18 „ 2.22 Ghee 3 „ 13.33 Mustard oil 7 „ 5.71 Red sugar 12 „ 3.33
Cf. Khush-hal, p. 298. As we do not have the price figures of the previous years for the Delhi market, we are not in a position to make out the magnitude of the rise in the prices of these commodities. In 1702 at Lahore, the rates of some of these were, however, substantially low:
Wheat 1.4 per man-i Shahjahani Sukhdas 2.0 „ Mung 1.0 „ Moth 1.0 „
(Compare Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, p. 83). In relation to these three rates, the prices of wheat were over 4¼ times, of sukhdas two times, of mung nearly 2⅔ times and moth twice as high at Delhi in the end of 1707.
(21) Khush-hal, p. 298.
(22) Compare Yahya, f. 115a; Ahwal, f. 39a. For the two-fold rise in the prices of wheat, barley, gram, moth, urad and mung in certain parganas of eastern Rajasthan in 1708 compared to the immediate past years, see S. Nurul Hasan and S.P. Gupta, ‘Price of Food-grains in the Territories of Amer’, PIHC, Patiala, 1967, I, pp. 354–66.
But shortages in the military camp did not necessarily always indicate nonavailability of foodgrains. In 1761, the Marathas in Karnal encountered a severe food crisis mainly because over 4,00,000 oxen loaded with provisions for them from
Kalpi could not reach them. The man in charge of the caravan was overpowered and killed by an Afghan sardar and the oxen were driven away to the Afghan Camp. Cf. Ghulam Qadir Khan Jaisi, Tarikh-i Imad-ul-Mulk, I. 0.4000, f. 27a.
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(23) Miscellaneous Papers on Administration, I, Sitamau transcripts, p. 245. Financial difficulties were also probably a factor which prompted the emperor to make a compromise with the Rajputs in 1710. When Bahadur Shah knew of the Sikh revolts, he rushed towards the Punjab, having summarily dealt with the Rajput question. With the existing resources, the Mughals were probably not in a position to fight on two major fronts.
The terms of settlement with the rajas were ‘far above their status’ and ‘inconsistent with good policy as well as the dignity of the sovereign. Since the Rajputs were old allies of the Mughals and had been used to obey [the Mughal Emperor] for generations, Bahadur Shah did not consider it likely that they would commit further aggression if left in possession of their hereditary lands.’ Cf. M.M., 58b.
(24) Akhbarat, BS, 4th R.Y., p. 200; 5th R.Y., p. 292. See also Chapter 4.
(25) Ibid., BS, 3rd r. y., p. 166 (16 September 1709); 5th R.Y., p. 363 (18 September 1711); Imad-ud-Din Khan whose name was Mir Murtaza Husaini was an Iranian noble. He died in 1712. For him and his relatives in the Mughal service see T. Muhammadi, pp. 31 and 122.
(26) Ibid., 4th R.Y., p. 98. Hidayat Kesh Khan (Bhola Nath) a neo-Muslim held a rank of 700/100 under Bahadur Shah. He retained his position in Jahandar Shah’s reign. He caught Prince Muhammad Karim who had run away after the death of his father, Azim-ush-Shan in 1712 and the prince was later killed at the instance of Khan Jahan Kokaltash. Farrukh Siyar, therefore, ordered him to be strangled to death. Kamwar, 337a, 341b and 342a; M.U., II, p. 507; T. Muhammadi, p. 32.
For bakhshis, mir bakhshi and the rule and procedure of the grant of mansab, see, W. Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls, pp. 36–44.
(27) Ibid., BS, 4th R.Y., p. 51 (8 April 1710) and JS, pp. 36, 60.
(28) Qasim, ff. 45b, 46b and 47a.
(29) Iradat, ff. 31b and 32a; Mubarak, f. 47a.
(30) Contrary to common Sunni custom, he wanted to have the word ‘wasi’ (heir) inserted after the name of Ali in the sermon preceding the Friday prayers (khutba). He called the ulama at Lahore for the purpose and asserted his right as king and, like Akbar, as a mujtahid (interpreter of Islamic law and theology), not confining himself to the tenets of any one of the schools of Sharia. Cf. Ahwal, f. 37b; Iradat, f. 32a. For the khutba incident see also W. Irvine, Later Moghuls, I, pp. 129–31.
(31) Yahya, f. 122b.
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(32) Ahwal, ff. 62b–63a.
(33) Kanwar, f. 340a.
(34) Ahwal, f. 63a.
(35) Wheat had so far been sold in Delhi at the rate of about 7 to 8 sers a rupee. At the beginning of Farrukh Siyar’s reign, even 4 sers of wheat were not easily available for one rupee. Cf. Kamwar, f. 344a. According to Yahya (f. 122b) only 3 sers of wheat could be had for a rupee and rice, gram, moth and mash all were sold at the same rate. According to the Ahwal (f. 63a), the nan of wheat, nay even of barley disappeared from the market and the stingy and small wheat was rated at no more than four sers a rupee. Khar-muhra, black-til, white and red rice were to be seen only in the imperial stores and in the establishments of big nobles who had excellent jagirs or in the shops of big sahukars.
(36) Akhbarat, FS, 1st R.Y., I, p. 55, 2nd R.Y., II, p. 30.
(37) According to Yahya (f. 122a) within one or two years the situation was under control and one could get wheat and rice of good quality in open market at the rate of 8 sers a rupee.
(38) Mubarak, ff.89; Kamwar, ff. 354b and 355b. While the severity of the drought was limited to Delhi and the surrounding parganas, the famines of 1712 and 1717 seem to have been widespread and extend to quite a large part of northern India. Our assumption is based on the available prices of foodgrains in Delhi, Allahabad and eastern Rajasthan. Prices in Delhi in 1712 and 1717 were much higher than those of the earlier years. In Chatsu, for instance, in eastern Rajasthan in the same years, the prices were again unusually high while the prices of certain commodities at Allahabad in the 7th R.Y. of Farrukh Siyar (1718–19) which are fortunately available to us were the least flattering.
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Prices in Rupees for Man of 40 Sers Delhi Allahabad Chatsu Chatsu 1717 1717–18 1712 1717 Wheat 6.67 – 2.98 3.18 Gram 5.33 – 2.83 3.20 Mash 6.15 – – – Mung – 5.00 2.34 4.66 Urad – – 2.01 2.66 Arhar – 2.86 – – Ghee 26.67 8.69 – –
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(Compare Khush-hal, p. 406 for Delhi; Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, f. 135b for Allahabad, and S. Nurul Hasan and S. P. Gupta, ‘Price of Food-grains’ pp. 354, 357 and 363– 5, for Chatsu. We have picked up Chatsu for our purpose because only Chatsu out of the six parganas listed in the table contains the price figures of these commodities for 1712 and 1717. Since we have no information about the seasons, let alone the months, of these prices, they are not comparable. But they do show a trend.
(39) Cf. Warid, p. 315.
(40) Akhbarat, FS, 3rd R.Y., II, p. 125, 26 November 1713 for Nahar Rohilla’s revolt. Subsequently an army of 4000 under the command of the younger brother of the faujdar could force the Rohilla rebel to retire to one of his other fortresses; p. 140, 15 December 1713, for the development of an army of 4000 sawars under Mardan Ali Khan and Nasir Khan to chastise the recalcitrant zamindars in the vicinity of Etawah town.
A chakla was a territorial division and was often identical with a sarkar, but in general a chakla was a smaller unit than a sarkar. In Bengal, however, a chakla consisted of a group of sarkars in the eighteenth century.
(41) Ibid., FS, 3rd R.Y., pp. 213 and 275 (3 December 1713 and 3 March 1714). See also Chapters 3 and 4.
(42) Compare Muzaffar Alam, ‘Sikh Uprisings under Banda Bahadur, 1709–1712’, Studies in History, Vol. I, No. 2, July-December, 1979, pp. 197–213; R.P. Rana, ‘Agrarian Revolts in Northern India during the late 17th and early 18th Century’, IESHR, Vol. XVIII, Nos 3 and 4, July-December, 1981, pp. 287–326; Andre Wink, ‘Land and Sovereignty in India under the Eighteenth Century Maratha Swarajya’.
(43) Cf. Shivdas, English translation by S. Hasan Askari, Patna, 1980, pp. 21–2.
(44) Cf. Khush-hal, p. 373–4; The passages in K.K., II, p. 769 and T. Muzaffari, f. 118a who copies K.K. are confusing and may be read along with Khush-hal’s account. Sih-bandi was the name for the armed men hired for the occasion by local officials for enforcing revenue-collection. This was to be distinguished from the troops permanently employed and the regular contingents of the mansabdars. The practice of sih-bandi was an old one. Babur characterized the Indian levies of Ibrahim Lodi as sih-bandis. We have evidence for the employment of sih-bandis by the khalisa officials in the seventeenth century. (Cf. W. Irvine, Army of the Indian Moghuls, p. 166; Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, p. 276 and n.) Khush-hal bewails the fact that even permanently employed troops were practically turned into sih-bandis.
(45) Khush-hal, p. 374.
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(46) According to K.K., II, p. 769 the order for the payment in cash (at the rate of Rs 50 per unit) was also applicable to the wala shahi mansabdars. The wala shahis, according to W. Irvine (Army of the Indian Moghuls, pp. 40 and 43–4) comprised the personal and household troops of the emperor, paid by him out of his privy-purse (khalisa). This definition which seems to have been uncritically accepted, however, needs re-examination. For the evidence of K.K. conclusively proves that the wala shahis were paid in jagir as well and that the arrangement of the payment in cash was simply for a period when they were not provided with jagirs.
(47) Akhbarat, FS, 3rd R.Y., II, p. 73. The incident indicates that perhaps the bankers were necessary to the state organization and also the consequences for the state of their non-cooperation. But it is difficult to make any generalization about their political role in Mughal India. Karen Leonard however, contends that the stability and decline of Mughal state, may be explained in terms of its relationships with the banking firms. Karen Leonard, ‘The “Great Firm” Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire’.
Significantly the network of the money transactions remained apparently unimpaired throughout the empire in our period. Evidence for the hundi transactions for the latter half of the eighteenth century even through regions, politically different and sometimes hostile to each other, is available in I‘jaz-i Arsalani, a collection in two volumes of Persian letters of Polier, dated 1187– 1193 A.H./1773–1779, Blochet, Nos. 713 and 714. For western India’s contact with Agra see G.T. Kulkarni, ‘Banking in the 18th Century: A Case Study of a Pune Banker’, Artha Vijnan, XV, 2 June 1973, pp. 180–200.
(48) Cf. K.K., II, pp. 568 and 837; Risala, f. 59a; Mubarak, f. 108b. According to K.K. the cash at Agra fort in 1707 was nine crore while Risala, says ‘at least over nine crore’.
(49) Cf. K.K., II, p. 769 and T. Muzaffari, f. 118a.
(50) T. Hindi, ff. 235b–236a.
(51) Ibid., f. 236a.
(52) Shivdas; for some details of the wealth of the Saiyid brothers, see also Saiyid Roshan Ali Khan Barha, Saiyid-ut-Tawarikh (a mid-nineteenth century Urdu family history) 1.0., 423, ff. 48a–40a. From Lauh-i Tarikh of Munawwar Ali Khan Farrukhabadi (1.0 U134, ff. 54a, 62b–63a) glimpses can be had of the wealth of Muhammad Khan Bangash who founded Farrukhabad, a major commercial and industrial centre of eighteenth-century north India, together with a number of other ganjs in upper India.
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(53) Compare N.A. Siddiqi, Land Revenue Administration, pp. 96–101; Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, pp. 81, 109 and 174. But recently Dilbagh Singh (‘Ijarah System in Eastern Rajasthan (1750–1800)’, Proceedings of Rajasthan History Congress, 6, 1973, pp. 60–9); Richard Barnett, North India between Empires, Awadh, the Mughals and the British, 1720–1801 and André Wink, ‘Maratha Revenue Farming’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1983, pp. 591–628 have tried to demonstrate the ijara as an oganizational means of agrarian restoration and expansion.
(54) Compare Irfan Habib, ‘Potentialities of Capitalistic Development in the Economy of Mughal India’, Enquiry, Winter 1971, pp. 1–56; Satish Chandra, ‘Some Aspects of the Growth of a Money Economy in India during the Seventeenth Century’, IESHR, Vol. III, No. 4, 1966, pp. 321–31.
(55) Compare S. Bhattacharya’s Review of Tapan Raychaudhuri and Irfan Habib (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, I, Economic and Political Weekly, 1 October 1983.
(56) Cf. B.M. or. 9876 (a collection of Shah Alam II’s letters to the nobles and the officials of the East India Company), ff. 39b–40, 48b, 54a–61b for Benaras, Allahabad and Kora’s links with Agra and Delhi. I‘jaz-i Arsalani, I, ff. 53a, 119b, 123a, f. 180a, 288a; II, ff. 67a, 140b; 173b, 177a, for trade and monetary links between Delhi, Agra, Etawah. Farrukhabad, Faizabad, Kheir (Aligarh), Lucknow and Benaras and of these northern Indian towns with Hugly and Calcutta. See also Makrand Mehta, ‘Indian Bankers and Political Change: A Case Study of the Travadis of Surat, c. 1720–c. 1820’, Studies in History, Vol. IV, No. 1, January- June 1982, pp. 41–55 for the connection between, Benaras in north India and Ahmedabad in western India through the Travadis; Tapan Raychaudhuri’s article in Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of India, II, Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 3–35; Frank Perlin makes a good analysis of the recent writings on the subject in his articles, ‘Proto- Industrialization and Pre-Colonial South Asia’, Past and Present, No. 98, February 1983, pp. 30–95, and ‘The Pre-Colonial Indian State in History and Epistemology: A Reconstruction of Societal Formation in the Western Deccan from the 15th to the Early 19th Century’, in H. J. M., Classen and Peter Skalnik (eds), The Study of the State, the Hague, Mouton, 1981, pp. 275–302.
(57) Despite a backward farming technology and obvious shortcomings in agricultural prices, yield per acre was very high. Cf. Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds), The Cambridge Economic History, II, pp. 15–17.
(58) According to Khafi Khan the people of the country belonging to every class hated the Saiyid Brothers and Ratan Chand as they patronized only the Saiyids of Barha and the baqqals (shopkeepers), K.K., II, p. 902.
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(59) Khafi Khan reports that whenever Saiyid Abdullah Khan appointed an amil he took from the appointee an undertaking and realized money from his banker and that Saiyid Abdullah’s diwan, Ratan Chand leased out even the khalisa lands in ijara, and that this practice accentuated the rift between the wazir and the emperor. K.K., II, p. 773. See also N.A. Siddiqi, Land-Revenue Administration, p. 96; Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics, p. 109.
(60) Akhbarat, FS, 6th R.Y., II, p. 212 (8 January 1718).
(61) K.K., II, p. 773.
(62) Cf. Kamwar, pp. 159 and 181; K.K., II, p. 732; Yahya, f. 121b. See also W. Irvine, Later Moghuls, I, pp. 275–80. For the Mughal emperors’ approach to their nobles see M. Athar Ali, ‘Mughal Empire in History’, PIHC, 33rd Session, Muzaffarpur, 1972, pp. 175–88.
(63) In 1713 when Amir-ul-Umara, Husain Ali Khan, was deputed to lead an expedition against Ajit Singh, the emperor is reported to have written to the raja to kill the Amir-ul-Umara. Again in 1715 when Husain Ali Khan, after a kind of compromise with Mir Jumla and the emperor, left for the Deccan, Daud Khan Panni, the deputy governor of the Deccan, was allegedly instigated by the emperor to eliminate the Amir-ul-Umara. Subsequently in a battle with Husain Ali Khan, near Burhanpur, Daud Khan was killed. For details see W. Irvine, Later Moghuls, I, pp. 285–6 and 303.
(64) T. Muzaffari f. 112a.
(65) Compare Shakir, f. 25a for farmans to the governors and faujdars in the name of the emperor and Sahifa-i Iqbal, f. 35a, for the emperor’s routine and court etiquette in the early 1720s. Describing the routine of the emperor, the author of the Sahifa-i Iqbal notes that a large number of the people (lit. slaves) received mansabs, promotions and the other favours through the bakhshis in the Diwan-i ‘Am (audience hall); while the ambassadors from the neighbouring countries were given audience and the officials in the provincial service were sent off in the same place (Diwan-i ‘Am). And at night, after the recitation (of the Qur’an) and the fulfilment of the ends of the people the emperor put his seal and signature on the papers relating to the governors.
(66) Cf. Ashub, ff. 45, 47 and 48; Shakir, f. 38b; Warid, p. 383.
(67) T. Muzaffari, f. 123a. No further details, apart from a general statement are available in the sources. It seems that after the last year of Farrukh Siyar’s reign (1718–19) prices began to fall. According to Yahya, wheat in Delhi at the end of Farrukh Siyar’s reign was sold at 10 to 11 sers a rupee.
(68) Cf. K.K., II, p. 936; T. Muzaffari, f. 171a; Kamwar, f. 376.
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(69) According to Shakir around 1723, wheat in Delhi was sold at the rate of 2 to 3 sers a rupee. Within a year of two, however, the price of wheat fell to 7 to 8 sers a rupee. The relief is ascribed by the chronicler to the mystic influence of Shah Bhika. Shakir Khan states that Roshan-ud-Daulah, Zafar Khan who was a devoted follower of Shah Bhika asked the emperor to make an offering of Rs 1,00,000 in the name of the Shah. The emperor did accordingly and then the rain came. Compare Shakir, ff. 74b and 75a.
(70) Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, f. 139a where the author states that prices in Bengal and Bihar were rising and gives the prices of certain commodities at Agra in 1137/1724–25 as follows:
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per man Rice (basmati) 5 sees per rupee = Rs 8.00 Rice [sondi(?)] 6 „ „ = Rs 6.67 „ Rice [dosiali(?)] 7 „ „ = Rs 5.71 „ Gram 7½ „ „ = Rs 5.33 „ Flour (wheat) 7 „ „ = Rs 5.71 „ Mung 6½ „ „ = Rs 6.15 „ Ghee 4 „ „ = Rs 10.00 „ White sugar 2½ „ „ = Rs 16.00 „ Red sugar 5½ „ „ = Rs 7.27 „ Black sugar candy (fine 6 „ „ = Rs 6.67 „ variety) Black sugar candy (lower 7 „ „ = Rs 5.71 „ variety)
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For the prices of some of these commodities at Agra in the seventeenth century see Irfan Habib, Agrarian System, pp. 83–6.
The statement of the Mirat-ul-Haqaiq is also supported by a list of the price of coarse rice which Brij Narain quotes: One could have only 35 sers for a rupee in 1722 and 1723, while the situation was little better when the price fell down only marginally to 40 and 45 sers a rupee in 1724 and 1725 respectively. Cf. Brij Narain, Indian Economic Life Past and Present, Lahore, 1929, p. 96.
(71) Mirat-ul-Haqaiq, f. 209b.
(72) T. Muzaffari, f.154a.
(73) In 1740, Mir Munnu, the governor of Ajmer, for instance, farmed out the suba to Raja Jai Singh. Mir Munnu, son of Qamar-ud-Din Khan, the wazir, was appointed the governor of Ajmer in the same year. Due to the discontented and rebellious rajas, however; he was unable to control the suba. This unusual case of ijara was as per the instruction of the wazir. Cf. T. Hind, f. 295b.
(74) Ashub, f. 79a. As it was difficult to translate it literally, I have taken some liberty in translating the passage.
(75) Ashub, f. 79b.
(76) See Chapter 6 for Awadh.
(77) Ashub, ff. 171.
(78) According to the Tarikh-i Ali (f. 88b) one could obtain only one ser of ordinary rice (shali and sathi) for Rs. 5.00 and that, too, was not available to most of the people. According to the Tazkira Mukhlis the price of flour rose to Rs 4.00 a ser. A letter of the Maratha vakil at the court probably narrates the plight of the camp most vividly. Five or six days passed and then no food could be had in the camp. Grain could not be had even at six or seven rupees the ser. The country was desert, nothing could be had (from the neighbouring villages). For five days the men went without food.’ Quoted by Jadunath Sarkar in W. Irvine, Later Moghuls, II, p. 357.
(79) Tarikh-i-Ali, f. 88b.
(80) Risala, f. 146a. The evidence of Risala regarding the jama is interesting, but is certainly to be accepted with reservations. The jama figures of the provinces as given in different sources of our period do not support so high a jama as over 40 crore of rupees at any point of time in the earlier half of the eighteenth century. Compare N.A. Siddiqi, Land Revenue Administration, Appendix E, pp. 164–71.
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107Breakdown of Imperial Organization
(81) Tazkira Mukhlis, pp. 104–6.
(82) T. Muzaffari, f. 270b.
(83) Shakir, f. 36b.
(84) Compare, A.L. Srivastava, First Two Nawabs of Awadh, second edn, Agra,
1954, p. 112.
(85) Chahar Gulzar, ff. 373a, 375a and 382b; Siyar, III, p. 856.
(86) Ruqa-i Mutafarriqat, Patna MS., ff. 43b–44a.
(87) See for details Chapter 7. See also Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal
Empire, I, pp. 1–25.
(88) Siyar, III, p. 868.
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