243(p.207) The Jagir Administration

The jagirdars and their agents seem to have posed a number of problems for the governor. Some of these accrued from the irregularities committed by the amils and other local officials, while the control of the powerful jagirdar over his jagir mahals imposed certain checks on the political ambition of the governor. The amils, in principle, belonged to the personal staff of the jagirdars while in a number of cases the big jagirdars had faujdari rights over their jagir mahals. In certain cases, the jagirdars sub-assigned parts of their jagirs to their troopers and officials in their service.1 All this implied obvious outside interference in the provincial administration. It can therefore be presumed that immediately after a turn in his relations with the centre,2 Burhan-ul-Mulk gave full attention to fiscal and financial questions, as well as to the problems of jagir administration in Awadh.

It appears that he began his drive to rectify the finances of the province by sending his men to the parganas to assess the yield anew. But he soon realized that landed magnates apart, some local officials even would not welcome his effort to change the existing situation. The amils and the gumashtas (agents) of the powerful jagirdars, for instance, tried to obstruct the implementation of the proposed scheme.3 No exact assessment of the prevailing levels of production nor of the actual revenue realized was possible till the working of the jagirdari system was modified to effect a change in the position of the amils.

The amil occupied an important place in the maintenance and administration of the jagir. In some cases, the amil seems to have been a local man with considerable power and prestige and some of the amils (p.208) managed to

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stick to their office in the same mahal, notwithstanding the changes and transfers of the jagirdars.4 The amil in a number of cases thus practically became a revenue contractor who assured the jagirdar his due amount and kept a part of the revenue himself. This he did on the strength of his influence and by offering a lucrative amount in advance (qabz) to the jagirdar.5 The revision of the revenue administration by Burhan-ul-Mulk implied a denial to the amils of their existing shares of the revenues.

The amils therefore viewed and presented to the jagirdars the whole procedure as an attempt by the governor to misappropriate their jagirs.6 The governor was alarmed, since he feared that the amils’ representation of his scheme would antagonize the nobles who had jagirs in Awadh and thus add to his difficulties in the province. The governor also recognized the futility of making efforts at reorganizing the existing pattern of revenue administration without an attempt to isolate the jagirdars from their amils in the province. Subsequently, the governor seems to have brought the amils under his own control and he imposed a discount on the jagir amount of the jagirdars, for the amils’ services in looking after the management of the jagirs. The arrangement was welcome to most of the mansabdars, since it was to the benefit of most of them who were hardly capable of managing their jagirs against the dangers of the turbulent zamindars. Moreover, for a number of them it was no less difficult to keep a check on the irregularities committed by their own amils.

(p.209) The arrangement is characterized by the author of the Imad-us-Sa‘adat as ijara.7 The nature of this ijara was, however, apparently different from the more familiar ijara of the eighteenth century. It was an administrative device to secure a uniform pattern in the management of the jagirs in the province. The arrangement, while ensuring the payment of their dues to the jagirdars, brought stability and regularity in provincial administration. The jagirdars no longer had to send their amils and gumashtas to their jagirs. The amils and the amins were henceforth appointed by the governor. It was the governor to whom they were now accountable for their acts. The local officials and the chaudhuris, the qanungos and the muqaddams were to approach the amils of the governor for matters relating to the revenue and their own customary perquisites. In other words, the administrative right that the jagirdars had over their jagir, namely, collection of land revenue and other authorized cesses, was taken over by the governor.

The amil on the governor’s instructions was to measure and separate from the paibaqi the revenue assigned to the jagirdar and then after having collected the peshkash from him to release the lands in his name. The additional revenue (taufir) was to be retained with the office of the amil and the jagirdar was to be helped in the matters referred to the amil.8

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For any trouble in his jagir, the jagirdar was now required to write to the governor and the latter was accordingly to direct the amil concerned. Samsamud-Daulah had his jagir in Bilgram and Bhutgam (Bhogaon?). On the pretext of disturbance by the zamindars, the amil who managed the jagir on behalf of the governor, evaded the despatch of revenue to Samsam-ud-Daulah. On the latter’s petition, the amil was reprimanded by Safdar Jang, the deputy governor. The amil was also directed to write the details of the jama and the hasil of the mahals, the strength of the (p.210) recalcitrant zamindars and whatever army was required to chastise them. ‘For there is no difference between us and the Nawab (Samsam-ud-Daulah) and in case it is not possible to make up for the Nawab’s loss, let us be informed in details.’9 This was how the governor tried to allay the apprehensions of the nobles posted in Delhi and other places outside Awadh. In another case, Badan Singh, the Jat chief who had his jagir in Awadh is reported to have complained to the deputy governor against the amil of the pargana where his jagir lay. The amil had withheld the revenue. He was accordingly directed to release the amount to Badan Singh and inform the governor if there was any difficulty over it.10

The arrangement seems to have, in general, been welcomed by the small jagirdars, since earlier even they, in most cases, were unable to collect the revenue from their jagirs through their own agents. They farmed out their territories to the local ijaradars.11 But the big jagirdars, however, strongly condemned Burhan-ul-Mulk’s action and demanded an immediate restoration of earlier regulations. Besides the fact that the arrangements implied a restriction of their patronage, they resented the peshkash and discount that the governor began to levy from the jagir. In one of his letters to the mir bakshi, Girdhar Bahadur, the governor of Malwa, urged him to restore his jagir in Awadh in accordance with the previous rule and characterized the governor’s measure as unprincipled interference.12 The same problem probably provoked Muzaffar Khan to quarrel with Burhan ul-Mulk in 1726–7.13

These complaints were not groundless. Burhan-ul-Mulk did exercise greater control over the jagirs of those jagirdars whom he feared would develop local ties through their long-term jagirs and thereby prove to be a potential threat to his ambition. We do not know what happened to Muzaffar Khan’s jagirs; Girdhar’s jagirs were, however, transferred to Malwa which he held in his governorship.14 Later (p.211) when Muhammad Khan Bangash was appointed governor of Malwa, Burhan-ul-Mulk managed to secure an order from the centre for the transfer of Muhammad Khan’s jagir from Shahabad and Nurpura in Awadh to Sironj and Bhilsa in Malwa. But owing to the repeated protests of Muhammad Khan, the order could not be implemented.15

Burhan-ul-Mulk tried to reduce to the minimum, the number of the jagirs of the mansabdars, especially the powerful ones, who were posted outside the province of Awadh. For in the case of any difficulty in the management of their jagirs and

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break or delay in payment the mansabdars would inevitably interfere. The case of the jagir of Raja Jai Singh illustrates this point. The vakil of Jai Singh at the court, had certain grievances about the raja’s jagir in Ibrahimabad in sarkar Lucknow. Initially he sought the permission of the governor to send, and then without the latter’s prior notice actually sent, his representative to supervise the settlement. The governor who had directly written to Jai Singh about it violently resented the nomination of the representative.16

Burhan-ul-Mulk, however, could not succeed in bringing the jagir administration fully under his control. A jagirdar, for instance, realized the revenue unlawfully from a madad-i ma‘ash village in pargana Kakori for over three years. It was on the repeated, firm orders of the governor that the local amil could manage to restore the village to the a’immadars.17 Subsequent to such developments, Burhan-ul-Mulk might have thought of completely abolishing the jagir system in Awadh. But since it clashed with the interests of so many, he was not able to do it. His successor, Safdar Jang, seems to have achieved a little success in this direction. In 1745 when Awadh was in the grip of severe famine, Safdar Jang requested the emperor to resume the tankhwah jagirs of the imperial mansabdars in Awadh. Some big nobles like Qamar-ud-Din Khan and Amir Khan, however, continued to hold their jagirs in the province.18 Towards the end of our period only the nawab and his family members and close associates had big jagirs in Awadh. A jagir roll of the time of Muhammad Shah (1720–48) shows that Awadh was assigned to over 500 small jagirdars; of them a large number were officials and military commanders mentioned as the (p.212) companions (hamrahiyan) of Safdar Jang.19 This expression obviously indicated that they had been or were in the service of the nawab.

Initially, Burhan-ul-Mulk tried to reassess the jama of the jagir mahals, but when he realized the strength of the amils in foiling his plan, he brought them under his control and thus endeavoured to check the irregularities committed by the jagirdars’ agents. He imposed a levy on the jagir in lieu of the responsibility he undertook for the regular payment of the revenue to the jagirdar. These steps enabled him, in some measure, to build up his power and personal treasury in the province. His ambition for greater independence from the centre probably led him to aspire to totally liquidate the imperial jagir system. He was unable to achieve this, but his successor, Safdar Jang succeeded a great deal in eliminating from Awadh the big jagirdars from elsewhere.

The Faujdari Administration

In Awadh in the early-eighteenth century, there were eight faujdaris; five of these corresponded to the five sarkars of the province, namely, Lucknow, Awadh, Khairabad, Bahraich and Gorakhpur, while Baiswara, Bilgram and Sultanpur Bilehri to which we have occasional reference in our sources were in size small faujdaris.20 By 1722 all the faujdaris in the province as we have seen earlier, had come under the jurisdiction of the governor. Selection, appointment and security

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of the office of the faujdar who was now, for all practical purposes, a representative and deputy of the subadar in the sarkar and chakla came under the discretion of the governor.21 The faujdar’s appointment was made without any reference to the centre.22

(p.213) Since the faujdar represented the governor in a district of the province, he seems to have had control over the finance of his faujdari area as well. This is evident from a number of disputes which related to the diwani and revenue matters and were referred to the office (kachahri) of the faujdar.23 On some occasions, the faujdar’s assertion of authority seems to have brought him into direct clash with the qazi, whose judgement had conventionally been sought in disputes over diwani matters. The conflict between the faujdar and the qazi of the pargana of Bilgram which we shall discuss later, is a case in point.

The faujdar with new powers, especially when he had a wide area under his jurisdiction, also seems to have now been mentioned sometimes as nazim and naib or deputy (of the governor).24 It is also significant that in a few cases a chaudhuri or a qanungo held faujdari rights or for that matter niyabat (deputyship) and nizamat (governorship of the district) as well. The faujdars of pargana Bilgram and the naib faujdar of pargana Selak at the time of Safdar Jang, for instance, had chaudhurai and qanungoi rights over their respective parganas as well.25 Since it implied rights of diwani and thereby some monetary benefits, the new faujdari could also be farmed out. Some time in the reign of Muhammad Shah, the faujdari of Jaunpur is reported to have been taken on ijara by one Mir Abd-ur-Rahim of Qanauj.26 Though the case does not (p.214) relate strictly to Awadh, it highlights the development of a trend in the region of our study.

Our impression is that the institution of faujdari which symbolized imperial authority at the sarkar level was gradually decaying, even though our sources for the early 1740s occasionally refer to one or two faujdars and their deputies in central Awadh;27 and it was being mixed up with the new institution of nizamat and niyabat, representing the new subadar in the sarkar and parganas.

The Zamindars and the Provincial Government

No significant Baiswara zamindar, according to our sources, rose to serious armed revolt during the period after 1722. For this sudden change in their actions and relations with the state there is no explicit explanation in the existing documentary evidence. On the basis of some contemporary ballads, however, it can be presumed that Burhan-ul-Mulk, immediately after his arrival in Awadh, tried to make some arrangement with the zamindars of Baiswara. A personal tour through Baiswara and examination into the state of things seem to have convinced him of a wide gap between the revenue fixed on each peasant in the last assessment and the actual amount paid by the peasants to the zamindar. In recent years, the actual production in agriculture seems to have appreciably

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increased, but the benefits of improvement in land were enjoyed by the zamindars alone. Nothing reached the imperial coffers. Subsequently, on the basis of the details he obtained from the qanungos, Burhan-ul-Mulk seems to have substantially increased the assessment of Baiswara.28

The military superiority of the Mughal governor seems to have been a factor in making them accept the new arrangement. The (p.215) consistent drive of the imperial campaigns for about forty years seems to have broken the strength of the rebels in Baiswara.29 Apart from their encounters with the Mughals, they had to defend their zamindaris against the encroachments of the neighbouring zamindars as well.30

Besides, the arrangement was not without some gains for the zamindars. Mardan Singh, the zamindar of Dondia Khera, a prominent leader of the erstwhile rebel Bais, was received into high favour by (p.216) Burhan-ul-Mulk. Mardan Singh was accountable to the governor not only for the realization of the revenue in Baiswara but also seems to have had the same jurisdiction which formerly belonged to the Mughal faujdar. Later, his son, Achal Singh also enjoyed the same position under Safdar Jang,31 while Udat Singh, another son of Mardan Singh, who took a hostile attitude towards the Mughals, was crushed by the forces of the Bais zamindars themselves.32 The Mehrors who enjoyed hereditary protection of the Bais, improved their position in the parganas of Harha and Purwa. They acquired two tappas in Harha and eighteen villages in Purwa.33

Privileges were extended to the zamindars in proportion to their strength and the benefits that were expected from their support. Chait Rai, a zamindar of Baiswara was asked to pay only half the sum that had been fixed on his zamindari when he demonstrated his strength by offering a sham fight to Burhan-ul-Mulk.34 The Bisen zamindar of Gonda is reported to have been won over by Burhan-ul-Mulk on the condition that his territory would be independent of the jurisdiction of the nazim of Gorakhpur and Bahraich and subject only to the payment of a tribute to the governor.35

The policy of wooing powerful zamindars and with their support strengthening and broadening the social base for the Mughal governorship, was extended by Burhan-ul-Mulk and his successor, Safdar Jang, to smaller zamindars as well, some of them being given mansabs.36 (p.217) Ordinarily, however, no zamindar was allowed to accumulate so much power that he could aspire to a basic change in the character of his holding. The intermediary zamindar did not become an autonomous raja, even if he now had some additional privileges. An illustration of this is the case of the zamindar of Harha who was murdered by his eldest son, Kesari, in the wake of a dispute over the fragmentation and distribution of his zamindari among his eight sons. The incident was probably a logical follow-up of the wealth and strength the zamindar had recently acquired.

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It is not unlikely that Kesari wanted to institute the practice of primogeniture in the family. This was an open violation of the existing rule. As a punishment, therefore, Kesari was deprived of his share in the zamindari.37

The new subadar also tried to consolidate his strength against the big rebellious zamindars by providing opportunities for the extension of power and influence of apparently non-Rajput elements over land. A number of cases of the purchase of zamindaris by chaudhuris and qanungos, especially in sarkar Khairabad and parts of Lucknow where the Rajputs still posed a serious threat probably bear this out.38 We have noticed earlier how Saroman Das of Sandi continued to acquire lands and riches under Burhan-ul-Mulk. In another instance, the Rajput zamindars of mauza Matun in pargana Sandila lost their entire zamindaris to chaudhuri Banwari Lal, because they failed to pay in the stipulated period the amount they owed to the chaudhuri.39 (p.218) It is to be noted that in all cases the lands were sold by the Rajput zamindars and the transactions were executed in accordance with Mughal regulations.

Again, we have some instances to show the governor’s special efforts to create and encourage certain zamindaris in these areas. For instance, Burhan-ul-Mulk obtained from the emperor the grant of a large estate for Mutahhir Ali Khan in Rasulabad. By 1740 Rasulabad was made a pargana wherein almost all the offices were held by the members of Mutahhir Ali’s family. Similarly, the Panwars of Safipur, an off-shoot of the Panwars of Etonja (in Lucknow district) obtained about 12 villages through the favour of Nawal Rai in 1740.40

Burhan-ul-Mulk’s policy of the extension of the power of the non-Rajputs was specially concentrated in and around sarkar Khairabad where the Rajputs, in particular, of Katesar and Nabigarh, unlike those in Baiswara, were still in a defiant mood.41 The policy, however, seems to have further intensified the caste zamindars’ resistance against the Mughals, even in the areas outside sarkar Khairabad.42

(p.219) The policy of creating and encouraging the non-Rajput zamindaris did not pay much dividends, as the Rajputs as such were very powerful in Awadh. It was thus the policy of extending favours and privileges to the powerful zamindars that proved of greater help and enabled Burhan-ul-Mulk to build a base in Awadh. Burhan-ul-Mulk, however could not resolve the problems of the other disturbed zamindaris or curtail the ambitions of the other big zamindars. All of them like the Bais were strong in their areas. Safdar Jang, therefore, extended the terms and conditions of his predecessor’s agreement with Mardan Singh and later his son, Achal Singh of Baiswara to the zamindar of Tiloi as well. As a result, Balbhadra Singh who succeeded Mohan Singh’s son Pem Singh as zamindar of Tiloi, though initially resisting the governor, is seen in his service in the latter’s campaigns against Bharatpur and the Marathas. A zamindar whose ancestors had been referred to in the Mughal official records as a mere

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malguzar was then to pay a fixed amount of 2½ lakh rupees as revenue. In addition, the zamindar’s army was to be maintained at the expense of Lucknow.43 The obvious explanation for this is that the zamindar under the new agreement held some administrative and military duties under the provincial government.

The re-establishment of the old powerful zamindars with certain new privileges was a new arrangement. In some cases, the arrangement was termed as ta‘ahhud according to which the zamindar had to pay a fixed amount for the contracted territory.44 Sometimes, a provincial (p.220) official also contracted a ta‘ahhud.45 In the case of the zamindars the arrangement was virtually an ijara contract which in some cases also involved some administrative and military responsibilities.46 In this we can presumably trace the origins of the formation of some of the ta‘alluqas of the eighteenth century.47

It is also to be noted that in our period in Awadh it was not merely greedy speculators who became ijaradars. The ijaradars included government officials and zamindars as well. Indeed, with the office of diwan and the jagirs under his control, the governor became a party to all the ijara contracts in the province.48 We can presume that the province of Awadh as part of the Mughal empire was practically held in ijara by its governor who further farmed out parts of it to other provincial government officials, the zamindars and to some others. So long as the governor paid the stipulated sum and showed due deference to the centre, he was free to act as independently in provincial matters as he could. (p. 221) This arrangement which implied money contracts at various levels of government obviously showed a very high degree of monetization.49

Some ijaradars might have been merchants and money-lenders (mahajans). Our sources, however, do not contain any positive evidence in this regard. Similarly, we know little of the details of the modalities, such as the period and the items of the ijara. From the cases of the neighbouring sarkars of Jaunpur, Ghazipur, Chunar and Benaras which were administratively a part of the province of Allahabad it can safely be presumed that the ijara contract by the zamindars and the government officials was for a relatively longer period. Renewal in such cases meant a revision and readjustment of the rate of ijara in accordance with prevailing prices and the actual revenue yield which in the four sarkars of Allahabad mentioned above showed an upward trend. At the beginning of Muhammad Shah’s reign, these sarkars were taken by the ijaradar on an annual payment of Rs 5,00,000. In the beginning of 1730s, the same ijaradar was required to pay Rs 8,00,000; in the late 1730s, the governor began to demand a bigger sum from the ijaradar which ended with the latter’s replacement by another ijaradar and eventually by the end of our period the amount was raised to Rs 16,00,000. Again, the greater part of the reigion of Moradabad and Bareilly was held on ijara by Ali Muhammad Khan Rohilla, the Afghan chief, for about the whole of the second quarter of the eighteenth century. It is interesting

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to note that these ijaras in our sources are characterized as hukumat and nizamat which denoted some kind of accountability and an administrative authority for the ijaradar.50

The Madad-i Ma‘ash Holders and the Provincial Government

The madad-i ma‘ash holders, as we have noticed earlier, had acquired a formidable position in Awadh and been responsible for a number (p.222) of problems of the provincial government. Initially Burhan-ul-Mulk therefore seems to have been very strict with the madad-i ma‘ash grantees. He seems to have begun with the resumption of the a’immas in the province and with a policy of subjecting the grants to assessment.51 This brought him in conflict with some powerful madad-i ma‘ash grantees. The faujdar and the diwan of the pargana of Bilgram for instance faced stiff resistance from the a’imma holders of the pargana. Under the leadership of the qazi, they fought several times against the army of the faujdar. While the others seem to have accepted the fait accompli, the qazi could not be subdued for seven years. The qazi then visited Delhi and presented his case to the emperor.52 The emperor ordered the diwan-i khalisa to look into the matter. Burhan-ul-Mulk appreciated the weight that a noble’s or a group of nobles’ support to the qazi’s case carried and also realized the consequences of such an eventuality for his plans of consolidating the new subadari in the province. The (p.223) vakil of Burhan-ul-Mulk at the court, therefore, hurried to bring the qazi to terms. As an exceptional favour to the qazi his madad-i-ma‘ash villages were released to him.53

For about eight years, 1722–30, as we know from the evidence of the Ma’asir-ul- Kiram and the Sharaif-i Usmani, Burhan-ul-Mulk seems to have struggled to maintain his policy of subjecting the large revenue grants to assessment. The new regulations might also have contributed to the reported increase in the revenue of Awadh immediately after Burhan-ul-Mulk’s assumption of the charge of the province.54 Soon, however, the conditions that came up due to the new regulations became unmanageable.

The madad-i ma‘ash grantees did not form an exclusive social category. A number of them, as we have seen earlier, were zamindars as well. To resist the new regulations, they did not hesitate to mobilize whatever force they had in the villages. In the case of the qazi of Bilgram, cited above, the ri‘aya seem to have supported him in his struggle against the governor. One of the measures that Burhan-ul-Mulk took was to round up the ri‘aya of villages of the qazi.55 Again, the madad-i ma‘ash grantees had close links with the Shaikhzadas who were in the imperial service,56 while a number of these grantees were related by marriage to the Shaikh zamindars of the province.57 These (p.224) Shaikhzadas, as we will see later, constituted a substantial local force. It was also not easy for Burhan-ul-Mulk to disregard the support of some eminent nobles for their cases. Sarbuland Khan who had long been associated with Burhan-ul-Mulk as the latter’s employer, made a special plea for the qazi of

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Bilgram in 1730.58 Zakariya Khan, the governor of the Punjab recommended the case of one Saiyid Muhammad Ghaus,59 while Muhammad Khan Bangash strongly disapproved of the policy and warned Burhan-ul-Mulk against the danger of ‘following the example of the zamindars’ and thus landing the Saiyids and the Shurafa in any more trouble.60

The new regulations were introduced to increase the revenue of the state so that the governor could organize a sufficiently big army to enforce his rule in the province. By 1730 almost all the powerful zamindars, barring the Gaurs and Kanhpurias of sarkar Khairabad, either by persuasion and diplomacy or through the demonstration of force were reconciled. The revenue must have gone up subsequently. The necessity to maintain strictness regarding the grants was now not so urgent, particularly when it tended to lead to opposition to the governor by the Shaikhazadas and a number of nobles. There is no evidence of any attempt by the administration to enforce these regulations again for the remaining years of the period under review. Instead, there are instances of directives from the governor to the local officials for the renewal and confirmation of the grants and for probes into daily allowances and disputes over the madad-i ma‘ash land. Most of the documents bearing these directives, that we have examined, relate to the period after the 10th R. Y. of Muhammad Shah (1729).61

(p.225) Yet there was no unconditional restoration of the pre-1722 position of the revenue grants. Intensive investigations into the claims to grants seem to have been carried out even after 1730.62 Revenue-free lands continued to be assessed, though very lightly. In the documents of the eighteenth century, the madad-i ma‘ash grant seems to be no longer treated as something held on loan (‘ariyat). The madad-i ma‘ash began to be bracketed with the zamindari and the milkiyat in such a way as to suggest their being identical in character. On occasions they seem to have been used interchangeably. A parwana of Safdar Jang dated 15 Ramzan 1153/23 November 1740, confirming the grant of an old pond in Kakori to the qazi of the pargana characterizes the latter’s possession of the pond as proprietary (malikana).63 A madad-i ma‘ash land dispute document of 9 Muharam 1158/31 January 1745, which bears the seals of the qazi, the mufti, the qanungo and the faujdar of Sandila describes the madad-i ma‘ash and the milkiyat interchangeably.64 In a mahzar document from the pargana of Laharpur, sarkar Khairabad, the revenue grant is mentioned as madad-i ma‘ash and zamindari. The Laharpur document is undated, but from the reference to the context the date can be worked out as some time in the late 1760s. The land in dispute belonged to the qanungo of the pargana who was a descendant of Shaikh Dost (p.226) Muhammad, the original recipient of the grant from Aurangzeb. The land had earlier been in possession of Gulab Rai Khatri and after being resumed in khalisa it was granted to Shaikh Dost Muhammad. In the document under review one of the descendants of Gulab Rai is stated to have been instigated by the local amil to forcibly seize the land.65 The incident also points

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to the circumstances in which the madad-i ma‘ash holders began to be finally recognized as a category of zamindars.

The practice of assessment, though light, might have appeased the zamindars who, as we have noticed earlier had resented the privileges enjoyed by the grantees. On the other hand, the grantees accepted it, for it was its assessment that gradually lent the madad-i ma‘ash the strength of a zamindari holding. From an unrelenting sternness to a compromise, Burhan-ul-Mulk thus tackled the problem of the madad-i ma‘ash holders in Awadh. In a measure, eventually he conceded to the aspirations of the madad-i ma‘ash holders who, in turn, constituted one of the chief props of the new subadari in Awadh.

Awadhi Communities in Imperial Service and Their Gradual Absorption in

Provincial Government

Awadh was probably one of those Mughal subas which supplied the rank and file of the Mughal imperial army. Lucknow, Bilgram, Gopamau, Rudauli, Kakori, Malihabad, Daryabad, Shahabad and Amethi were among the important towns of Mughal Awadh. A number of Indian Muslims in the Mughal imperial service hailed from one or other of these towns.66 For Muhammad Faiz Baksh, the author of the Tarikh-i Farh Baksh, ‘tales of the glory of Delhi related by the noble persons of (p.227) advanced years of Kakori who had been in their prime employed in Delhi’, constituted an important source of his history.67

Although our sources do not contain detailed references to the noble persons from Kakori, Muhammad Faiz Baksh’s statement is amply supported by a survey of the careers of some of the Awadhi elements in the Mughal service in the lateseventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. For instance, Shaikh Ilahyar of Bilgram better known as Rustam Zaman Khan joined the Mughal state service through Prince Muhammad Azim-ush-Shan some time during the last years of Aurangzeb’s reign. He was attached to Mirza Muhammad Rafi68 (later Sarbuland Khan) at the sarkar of the prince, to look after the latter’s jagir in Sahenda, in Bundelkhand. Later, in the reign of Farrukh Siyar, during the tenure of Sarbuland Khan’s governorship of Allahabad, Ilahyar is reported to have held the faujdari of sarkar Arail and Harhar. In 1715 when the province of Bihar was assigned to Sarbuland Khan with a direction to chastise the turbulent Ujjainiyas, he was ably assisted by Ilahyar. Ilahyar seems to have been generously rewarded for his services in the campaigns. He got a promotion of 3500 zat raising his zat rank to 6000 with the titles of Mubariz-ud-Daulah, Ashja-ul-Mulk, Hind Pehelwan, Rustam Zaman Khan, Shaikh Ilahyar Bahadur Nahtaman Jang.69

Shaikh Murtaza Husain, son of Shaikh Ilahyar, entered into the service of Sarbuland Khan during the latter’s second term of governorship of Allahabad in the early 1730s. After his dismissal, Murtaza Husain accompanied him to Delhi where he was honoured with a rank of 2500 zat and the title of Khan. Murtaza Husain served under him till the latter’s death. Then he joined the service of

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Safdar Jang in response to the latter’s parwana, with a contingent of 200 sowars and piyadas.70

(p.228) The process can be further illustrated by a detailed reference to the careers of Ruh-ul-Amin Khan and Shaikh Pir Muhammad. Ruh-ul-Amin Khan, another Shaikhzada from Bilgram joined the Mughal service through Mun‘im Khan, the wazir of Bahadur Shah. He entered into the service of Mun‘im Khan along with sixty sawars and piyadas from Bilgram. Soon he rose to a rank of 6000/2000. After Mun‘im Khan’s death in 1710, Ruh-ul-Amin associated himself with Sipahdar Khan, the governor of Allahabad and acted as his deputy in Allahabad. After Sipahdar Khan’s transfer from Allahabad, Ruh-ul-Amin, very likely on the persuasion of Shaikh Ilahyar, joined Sarbuland Khan who then held the faujdari of Kara. Shortly afterwards, Sarbuland Khan sent him to the Punjab to administer his jagirs in the parganas of Sialkot and Jalandhar. Sometime in the reign of Farrukh Siyar, he joined the service of Muzaffar Khan, brother of Samsam-ud-Daulah. In the time of the governorship of Saiyid Muzaffar Ali Khan in Awadh, Ruh-ul-Amin acted as his deputy in the province.71

He was among the eminent Shaikhzadas of Awadh who resisted Burhan-ul- Mulk’s new regulations. After a few years of service under the faujdar and ijaradar in Moradabad and Sambhal he left for Delhi around 1725 and made all possible but vain efforts to regain his earlier position by allying himself with the opponents of Burhan-ul-Mulk at the court. Again, with a hope of rehabilitating himself in Awadh he joined Qaim Khan, son of Muhammad Khan Bangash and fought with him against the Bundelas.72 Later Muhammad Khan Bangash took him to Delhi to recommend his case to the emperor. In Delhi, however, on the question of the dues of the fawazil (excess amounts) he came into conflict with the Bangash Nawab. Tired and dejected, he finally decided to lead a quiet life in his hometown. At this juncture, on the recommendation of Sarbuland Khan, Burhan-ul-Mulk invited him to join his service in Awadh. He responded to the invitation and joined the nawab with a contingent of 2000 sawars and piyadas.73

Shaikh Pir Muhammad, again a Shaikhzada from Bilgram, was initially in the service of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan sometime in the (p.229) reign of Farrukh Siyar. He, along with Mir Musharraf, an Afghan from Malihabad, Lucknow, was promoted to the rank of 6000 zat.74 Shaikh Abd-us-Samad, yet another Shaikhzada from Bilgram, is mentioned as an associate of the Barha Saiyids. He held a rank of 2500 zat and is reported to have been killed fighting with his nephew, Alam Ali Khan against Nizam-ul-Mulk.75 After his death, his son, Shaikh Ahmadullah was given the same mansab and jagir along with an additional jagir in the suburbs of Delhi.76

Apart from these, who rose to eminence, a number of other Shaikhzadas from Awadh are reported to have been in the service of one or other prince or noble.77 The Saiyids and the Shaikhzadas of Awadh were among those few who

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remained with Saiyid Abdullah and lost their lives in the battle of Hasanpur in 1721.78

The Afghans comprised the second important group of Awadhis in Mughal service. Ma’ali Khan and his son, Alavi Khan and a number of other Afghans from Lucknow are mentioned among those who sided with Prince Azim-ush-Shan in the Civil War at Lahore in 1712.79 Jalal Khan Bazid Khail of Malihabad was among the chief associates of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan. He was seriously wounded in the encounter between Farrukh Siyar and Jahandar Shah. Later, he was suitably rewarded with a rank of 2000/1000 and a jagir in Awadh.80 A large number of Afghans joined Mir Jumla at Kora, Kara, Allahabad, Benaras and Sahsaram on the latter’s way to Patna.81 One Tarin Khan of Damla was among those who died fighting with Sarbuland Khan in Gujarat.82

Mir Musharraf and his brother Mir Ashraf, Samsher Khan and Sanjar Khan were among those Afghans who gained prominence in (p.230) our period. Mir Musharraf, who according to Shivdas ultimately rose to a rank of 7000/7000, is mentioned among those Afghans who joined the contingents of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan in 1712 during the latter’s march against Jahandar Shah. Mir Musharraf and Mir Ashraf came to the camp of Farrukh Siyar at the head of three or four thousand horsemen of their clan (biradari).83 Immediately after ascending the throne, Farrukh Siyar appointed him governor of Allahabad with a mansab of 4000/4000.84 In 1715 he accompanied Husain Ali Khan to the Deccan and fought with him in the latter’s encounter against Daud Khan Panni in Burhanpur.85 He was also involved in the Saiyid Brothers’ intrigue against Chhabele Ram, the governor of Awadh in 1714–15.86 He remained a close associate of the Saiyids till the final eclipse of their power. In the confusion that followed the death of Saiyid Husain Ali Khan in 1720, Mir Musharraf received minor injuries. At this juncture, he held a mansab of 5000/5000. Later in the wake of reconciliation and compromise, Muhammad Shah not only retained his existing rank and the jagir, but further honoured him with a promotion to 7000/7000.87 What happened to him after that is not known.

Samsher Khan and Sanjar Khan, who hailed from Malihabad, were associated with Samsam-ud-Daulah. Samsher Khan, whose real name was Dilawar Khan, is said to have proclaimed the rule of Farrukh Siyar in Awadh while the latter was still on his way to Agra.88 He arrived at the court of Farrukh Siyar in 1712 with a sufficiently large contingent ( jami’at-i shaista). He was presented to the emperor by Samsam-ud-Daulah. Subsequently a rank of 2500/2200 with the title of Samsher Khan was conferred upon him.89

Sanjar Khan is first mentioned in the context of those eminent Afghan leaders of Awadh who joined Mir Jumla in 1715 on the latter’s way to Patna. He along with his two sons, Abd-un-Nabi and Diler Khan, came to the camp of Mir Jumla with a contingent ( jami‘at) of over 4000 sawars (p.231) and piyadas.90 Mir Jumla, as

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we know, could not handle the problems of the subadari in Bihar and returned to Delhi. In 1716, he was reproved for his sudden arrival at Delhi and was ordered to withdraw to Sirhind. Sanjar Khan, however, managed to escape the punishment. Eventually, through the mediation of Samsam-ud-Daulah, he presented himself before the emperor and received a rank of 3000/2000, together with appropriate mansabs for a large number of his attendant clansfolk.91 Both Samsher Khan and Sanjar Khan were among the important commanders of the walashahi troopers. In April 1716, they were involved in a clash between the contingents of Samsam-ud-Daulah and Muhammad Amin Khan.92 Later when Jai Singh was deputed to lead the campaigns to subdue Churaman Jat, Samsher Khan and Sanjar Khan along with 1200 mansabdars of their clansmen were directed to guard the road at Palwal.93 The last reference to them is found in the context of the Agra tumult of 1719 under the leadership of Neku Siyar and Mitr Sen Brahman. They were sent with Saiyid Ghairat Khan to quell the disturbance and were directed to reach Agra before the reported arrival of Nizam-ul-Mulk.94

It may be noted that the Awadhi elements in imperial service—big and small— associated themselves with either the Saiyid Brothers or Sarbuland Khan or Samsam-ud-Daulah. The Afghans with the sole exception of Mir Musharraf formed an important part of the contingent of Samsam-ud-Daulah while the Shaikhzadas with the possible exception of one or two seem to have been allied either with the Saiyids or were in the employ of Sarbuland Khan. The elegy that Mir Abd-ul-Jalil of Bilgram95 composed on the assassination of Saiyid (p.232) Husain Ali Khan in 1720 shows how far the Awadh Shaikhzadas, and for that matter the Indian Shaikhzadas, were allied with the Saiyid Brothers. The death of Husain Ali Khan reminded the poet of the great martyrdom of Karbala when the world of the descendants of the Prophet of Islam was overclouded with agony and distress. Husain Ali Khan was identified by the poet with the great martyr, Husain, the Prophet’s grandson while his assassins, according to him, represented the ingratitude, inclemency and faithlessness of Yazid, Ziyad and Shimr, the enemies of Husain.96

After 1722 when Burhan-ul-Mulk took charge of the suba of Awadh, not a single eminent Shaikhzada or Afghan of Awadh is found associated with Samsam-ud- Daulah or with any other noble in Delhi who was or could be considered as a possible enemy of Burhan-ul-Mulk. Samsam-ud-Daulah made a vain effort to keep Murtaza Husain Khan with himself.97 Ruh-ul-Amin Khan could not get ahead with Muzaffar Khan after 1725. His relations with the Bangash chief whom he had served against the Bundelas were marred with suspicion which, but for the timely intervention of some nobles, might have erupted into an open fight. Sarbuland Khan seems to be the sole person who enjoyed the confidence, and benefited from the support, of the Awadh Shaikhzadas in this period. Murtaza Husain remained with him till his death in 1742. We know that after 1730 Sarbuland Khan, apart from certain occasional administrative assignments,

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was no longer in active service.98 What did they then get from their association with him in this period? An analysis of the relations between Sarbuland Khan and Burhan-ul-Mulk and the initial difficulties that the latter faced while settling Awadh affairs would possibly explain this and other relevant developments at the Mughal centre.

Before we go into the period of Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang, the following points may also be taken into account. First, those nobles with whom the Awadhis were associated proved an effective check on (p.233) the governor of Awadh. During the reign of Jahandar Shah, Qilich Muhammad Khan held the subadari of Awadh. Apparently he had accepted the legitimacy of the claim of the emperor. But he could not prevent Shamsher Khan and Sanjar Khan and the others from proclaiming the rule of Farrukh Siyar in Awadh while the latter was still far from occupying the throne.99 Secondly, if the governor was unable to form an alliance with the nobles, it would have been extremely difficult for him to administer the province successfully. The Saiyid Brothers could manage to remove Chhabele Ram from Awadh also because they had the support of Mir Musharraf, a powerful local Afghan. Thirdly, in view of the imperial delay leading to the decline in employment opportunities at the centre and the gradual shrinkage of better prospects outside Awadh, the Awadhis could aspire for the highest possible office only in the province itself. Mir Musharraf obviously aspired for the subadari while Ruh-ul-Amin Khan contented himself with no less than the deputy governorship. Ruh-ul-Amin’s opposition to Burhan-ul-Mulk, as we shall see, owed largely to his failure in securing at least the same position under the new governor in 1722. Fourthly, since the Awadhis had close family ties with the local zamindars and the revenue grantees, the latter’s resistance to any political or administrative measures that affected the fortunes of the local potentates thus acquired added strength. Again, a number of Awadhis seem to have held their jagirs in Awadh which involved obvious difficulties for the internal administration.

From the last years of the seventeenth century, the subadar and the faujdar had begun to appreciate the fact that without an adequate participation of local elements, administration in the province would be unwieldy. The complaints made by Rad Andaz Khan, the faujdar of Baiswara, against the Shaikhzadas suggest the magnitude of the problems that their alienation from administration resulted in. His recommendation for the incorporation of some local people in the administration may be considered against this background. Muzaffar Ali Khan had the wisdom of selecting a local man, Ruh-ul-Amin Khan, as his naib. (p.234) And probably it was in recognition of these difficulties that Aziz Khan Chaghta, an Afghan from Shahabad, was chosen in 1716 as the subadar of Awadh. The involvement of one or two individuals, however, represented a partial remedy. Moreover they had relations with the growing Afghan powers—

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the Rohillas and the Bangash—in the neighbourhood as well which further complicated the problem.

Burhan-ul-Mulk’s rise to 7000/7000 and the subadari of Awadh owed much to the help he had given to Muhammad Amin Khan and the emperor in their bid to dislodge the Saiyids from power. He had been associated with the opponents of the Saiyids. The Shaikhzadas of Lucknow100 who had mostly supported, and been encouraged by, the Saiyids thus logically resisted his subadari in Awadh. Besides, he was still an ally of the enemies of their patrons and was of course, an outsider. Burhan-ul-Mulk had probably anticipated this challenge. He was also aware of the fact that the strength of the Lucknow Shaikhzadas lay more in their relations in the qasbas around Lucknow than in their links within the town of Lucknow. To meet the threat of the Shaikhzadas of Lucknow, he is reported to have sought the support of the Shaikhzadas of Kakori and thus tried to alienate them from their relations in the country around.101

Significantly the petition of the qazi of Bilgram who represented the interests of the madad-i ma‘ash holders and the manoeuvrings of Ruh-ul-Amin who embodied the ambition of the Shaikhzadas coincided at the imperial court. Muhammad Khan Bangash who was never seen by Burhan-ul-Mulk as a friend was approached by both parties to recommend their case to the emperor. Again, there was every likelihood that Burhan-uI-Mulk’s rivals at the centre would exploit the local potentates to their own advantage. Under the circumstances, (p.235) he could not afford to alienate them. An effort to conciliate these elements and encourage them to join the provincial service thus marked the beginning of a new pattern of administration in Awadh.

The provincial army was subsequently reinforced by a number of contingents composed of the local people under the command of the Shaikhzadas.102 Our sources also record a number of local Shaikhzadas holding different administrative assignments in the province.103 Burhan-ul-Mulk’s effort also expressed itself sometimes through the personal friendship between the Shaikhzadas and the family of the governor.104

It was in the context of the absorption of the Shaikhzadas in provincial government that an armed resistance by a Shaikh zamindar in Amethi, in the wake of the disturbances that followed the invasion of Nadir Shah, was characterized by a chronicler as a disgraceful act of (p.236) ingratitude.105 To the chronicler, the Shaikh zamindar’s insubordination especially in the circumstances when the other zamindars took to revolt did not augur well for the changed atmosphere of mutual trust and friendship between the Shaikhzadas and Burhan-ul-Mulk.

Burhan-ul-Mulk’s successor, Safdar Jang keenly followed and further advanced these measures during his regime. Indeed, under Burhan-ul-Mulk, the policy of

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compromise and conciliation with the local people seems to have been taken largely under Safdar Jang’s initiative. The restoration of the madad-i ma’ash and the task of inviting and persuading the Shaikhzadas to join the army and the administration of the province were undertaken by Safdar Jang.106 Safdar Jang also used to regularly visit different qasbas to meet the important Shaikhzada families of the province.107

The fortunes of an important section of the local magnates were thus gradually tied up with the new subadari in Awadh. A large number of the local people formed a substantial part of the army of Burhan-ul-Mulk in 1739. Over a hundred persons from Bilgram alone died fighting for him in the battle of Karnal.108 In 1751 when Bangash Afghans occupied Lucknow, Shaikh Mu‘izz-ud- Din organized the Shaikhzadas and forced the Afghans to vacate the town.109 Around Lucknow in the qasbas also (p.237) the Shaikhzadas reportedly defended the nawabi rule against the Afghan invaders.110 According to Ghulam Ali Azad Bilgrami, in this historic defence of Awadh against the Afghan inroads ‘scores of the noble-born (shurafa-o-nujaba) of the province specially the Saiyids and the Shaikhs of Bilgram laid their lives’.111 After their victory over the Bangash, the Shaikhzadas sent a letter (arzdasht) to Safdar Jang expressing their loyalty and dedication to the nawab. The nawab’s letter in reply to their arzdasht significantly reveals how they had been accommodated in the new provincial administration. Safdar Jang expected much more than this from the Shaikhzadas, for he, as he wrote back, always considered them much more than his ‘mere servants and raiyat’.112

The Awadh people took maximum advantage of the stable imperial political order as long as there remained the possibility of making a bigger fortune outside the home territory. With the weakening of central authority, the chances of moving up in the imperial services gradually diminished. Some of them, notwithstanding their existing imperial services, accepted the provincial services with alacrity while some others preferred to remain jobless despite offers outside the province. Still others expressly sought to obtain offices or at least to regain their hereditary family position in their hometowns.113 In this context is to be seen the fact that in 1732 a large number of the (p.238) Shaikhzadas from the contingent of Sarbuland Khan joined the army of Burhan-ul-Mulk.114 This obviously indicates a trend.

The resentment and the resistance that the Shaikhzadas showed over the occupation of Lucknow by the Bangash Afghans in 1751 and the tendency among the local people to refrain from taking service outside Awadh, along with a desire to obtain office within the province can be safely construed as stages of the development of a definite attitude towards the new regime in the province. This attitude found much more ruthless expression in their continued support and battle for the reestablishment of the rule of Safdar Jang in Awadh even after the emperor in Delhi had ordered the confiscation of his properties (khana-o-

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amwal) following the nawab’s defeat at the hands of the Afghans.115 This implied a blatant defiance of the imperial directive by a powerful section of the ruling class in the suba. It also showed their active appreciation of the prevalent social and political conditions which had resulted in the new subadari in Awadh.

In the prevailing political circumstances, they had no other alternative. The Marathas had exposed the vulnerability of the Mughal might. They had inundated almost all the major provinces of the empire. The threat to the Shaikhzadas which the Maratha occupation of Awadh posed can be conjectured from the following passage of the Khizana-i Amira where Azad Bilgrami assessed the consequences of the Maratha dominance in the Deccan.

During this short period of ten years when the Marathas had their

government over the land between the two seas so much distress befell the

Muslims of that area that even if the water of the Ganga and the Yamuna is

used as the ink it cannot exhaust the details. The madad-i ma‘ash lands and

the villages of the Saiyids, the Shaikhs and the ulama which had been

granted to them by the Kings of Islam and upon which sustained their

economy were in a moment all confiscated. They were reduced to beggary.

Even that was not available to them, for to give alms to the Muslim

beggars is a sinful act in the religion of the Brahmans. On account of

starvation in which to eat the dead body is permissible, if any one of them

wants to take to employment to fill up his stomach, that too is difficult

under the regime of the Brahmans. For, besides the people (p.239) of

their own stock the Brahmans do not employ anyone else. The Muslims are

particularly discriminated against. If supposedly they are employed they

are kept as mere soldiers and in wretched condition. That they would

invest the Muslims with any authority, is impossible.116

Azad’s observation is exaggerated, prejudiced and obviously subjective. This much is, however, beyond any controversy that the statement represented at least the fear of a particular section of the Mughal ruling class in north India. Burhan-ul-Mulk saved Awadh from the Marathas. His diplomatic manoeuvring and even occasional display of force kept the Marathas away from the province. This was not all, Burhan-ul-Mulk’s achievements in restoring political stability and order were by no means meagre. He chastised and contained the turbulent zamindars; effected new arrangements with them and converted a number of them into pillars of the new provincial administration. All this implied for the Shaikhzadas the security of their honour and property.

We do not have any evidence for the presence of Awadhi Hindus in the Mughal imperial service in the early years of the eighteenth century. Small or moderate mansabs for one or two local Hindu chiefs cannot be ruled out. Apart from these few, the Shaikhzadas and the Afghans seem to have been the only Awadhis in the employment of the empire. A number of Hindus, however, were in the army and

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the administration of Burhan-ul-Mulk. Most of them must have been local people and the incorporation of these Hindus in the provincial administration must have been actuated by the same motives that governed the inclusion of other local elements. Unfortunately on the basis of the evidence at our disposal we cannot ascertain, with the sole exceptions of Saroman Das and Tika Ram, the family or the house of the Hindu officials.

Rai Saroman Das, probably a qanungo, had begun to rise since the time of Farrukh Siyar. We have seen how he had gradually increased his land-holdings. Sandi, a qasba in the sarkar of Khairabad is mentioned as his hometown. By the time Burhan-ul-Mulk assumed the charge of Awadh, Saroman Das had risen to considerable power and eminence. What exact office he held under Burhan-ul- Mulk is not known. But two documents dated 17 Shawwal 1141/5 May 1729 and 22 Shawwal 1144/7 April 1732, from the Allahabad Archives record one Mir Muhammad Taqi, a (p.240) mansabdar, as his agent. The documents show the Mir as acting on behalf of Saroman Das in two cases of purchase of land.117 That a mansabdar was accredited by Saroman to deputize for him indicates his status in the hierarchy of Mughal service. For, in the normal circumstances no other than a Mughal noble could have directed a mansabdar to act, even temporarily, as his deputy. Agair the way in which Saroman is mentioned in the documents speaks of his status in the Mughal official heirarchy.

Tika Ram was initially a qanungo. A sale document dated 4 Safar 1144/23 July 1731, relating to Sandila contains his signature and seal as Tika Ram Qanungo. A mahzar document which bears the names of twenty respectable persons of Sandila, of whom ten were chaudhuris and ten qanungos, also includes Tika Ram among the latter.118 His name occurs in the context of a dispute over a madad-i ma‘ash orchard in Sandila.119 Two more names of Hindu officials—Diwan Nawal Singh as the faujdar of Malihabad and Lala Parsottam Rai—are also mentioned in this document. The case of Tika Ram is probably an example to indicate the class from which Hindu officials largely originated.

We can obtain an idea of the position and the nature of the powers Hindu officials exercised in Awadh in the period from the context in which their names occur in our sources. It is not known if they were local Hindus. This may however be noted that a Hindu official, even if he was not strictly a local man, had some link with local Hindu zamindars and qanungos.

We do not know whether these names included or were in addition to those Khatris and Kayasthas who enjoyed benefits from the patronage of Diwan Atma Ram and Maharaja Nawal Rai. Atma Ram was a Punjabi Khatri and had been associated with Burhan-ul-Mulk since the days of his governorship of Agra. He was eventually made the diwan of Awadh. He had three sons, Har Narain, Ram Narain and Pratap Narain. All three of them held important offices. Har Narain was Burhan-ul-Mulk’s vakil at the court of Delhi. According to the author of the

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Tarikh-i Farh Bakhsh, Atma Ram’s sons laid out a long bazaar with rows of shops outside the enclosure in the town of Faizabad (p.241)

Name Context Source Ballabh Led an expedition against the Zamindars of

Akhbarat-i sarkar Khairabad in July 1723. Was directed

Ram Muhammad Shah, to resolve a dispute between the qazi and

pp. 19–20; the muhtasib over the claims to road-toll

Allahabad 1321. (chungi) on 29 July, 1731. Mehta Ram A land-dispute case in pargana Sidhora was

Allahabad 1562. Singh referred to him. Mentioned in a parwana of Burhan-ul-Mulk Gulab Rai Muhammad Raza with complimentary addresses (izzat-o- Ansari Bani-e ikhlas dargah). Was directed to release to

Dars-i Nizami, p. Shaikh Muhammad Sa‘id, a revenue 178. grantee, the village Shyampur Nandona in sarkar Bahraich. Rai Fateh Friend of Safdar Jang. Deputed to explain to

Maktubat, p. 69. Chand Sarbuland Khan, the governor of Allahabad,

in 1732 the conditions of the khalisa mahals

in sarkar Jaunpur which had been handed over to the charge of the governor of Awadh. His name occurs in the context of the jagir

Hari Chand Allahabad 1322. Rai of Isma‘il Khan, the naib of Bahraich. Probably held the office of the diwan in Bahraich. Pratap Rai Took three letters to the Maharana of Gahadwala from Safdar Jang giving details

of the expedition to Patna and about the Marathas. Directed to release the madad-i ma‘ash Raghunath Ibid., pp. 182–3. Singh village in tappa Kedar to one Shaikh Ruh-ul-

Amin. Mentioned as faujdar of Bahraich under Bhaiya Ibid., p. 216. Madan Burhan-ul-Mulk. Mohan (p.242) which Burhan-ul-Mulk had laid out and Safdar Jang had expanded.120 Lachhmi Narain, Shiv Narain and Jagat Narain, the three sons of Har Narain also held important posts under Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang. Lachhmi Narain was their

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vakil at Delhi. The family of Atma Ram retained an eminent position throughout the eighteenth century.121 Nawal Rai’s story is well known. In the 1740s it was he who virtually ruled Awadh. How many of his family members and associates gained eminence under Safdar Jang is not known. He is, however, accredited by a Kayastha chronicler of the early-nineteenth century as ‘the promoter and supporter of his community (biradari) and friends … who elevated his associates to high position’.122

Although-Burhan ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang, the new subadars of Awadh, retained almost the entire machinery of Mughal administration, the institution of the faujdari and the working of the jagir system seem to have, however, undergone certain modifications. Burhan-ul-Mulk took over to himself the duty of the agents of the jagirdars. Owing to the mounting pressure of jagirs, Burhan-ul-Mulk could not, as did Murshid Quli Khan in Bengal, cut the size of the jagir lands, but Safdar Jang succeeded in reducing to the minimum the outside interference in the provincial administration by allowing only his relations and close associates to have big jagirs in Awadh. Thus, they managed to introduce certain changes in the working of the jagir system in the province which established their fuller control over the jagir administration and also enabled them to extend their patronage to the local people. The office of the faujdar continued till about the end of our period. The stature of the faujdar was, however, steadily diminishing and the size of a faujdari area was almost invariably limited to a pargana while the faujdars of sarkars, chaklas or a group of parganas began to give place to naibs or nazims whose power included executive, military and fiscal matters. The decay of the institution of faujdari may possibly be partly explained (p.243) in terms of the development of ijara with some zamindars and government officials. In this ijara arrangement which has also been termed as hukumat and nizamat in our sources, the ijaradar had some administrative authority over the territory of his contract. With the spread of such ijaras among other zamindars and government officials, the importance of faujdari correspondingly decayed.

In the context of Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang’s relations with the zamindars it may be noted that it was not a policy of creating and encouraging new zamindaris in the clan strongholds of the old zamindars that paid richer dividends but favours and privileges to the latter. This had a precedent in the history of the Great Mughals. The Mughals had tried to reduce their conflict with some powerful zamindars through a show of favours and the policy of absorbing them in the state service while some others were cowed down through a forceful demonstration of military might. They insisted on their suzerain authority over all kinds of local potentates and saw to it that the latter paid the revenue regularly in the form of either peshkash or mal collected from the lower categories of zamindars and the ri‘aya. In a measure, however, the new subadars’ arrangement with the zamindars was different. Some powerful intermediaries seem to have been engaged to pay a fixed annual revenue for the territories under their jurisdiction, and their ta‘ahhud vested them with some

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