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The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India:
Awadh and Punjab, 1707-48
Muzaffar Alam Print publication date: 2013 Print ISBN-13: 9780198077411 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077411.001.0001
Conclusion
Muzahpar Alam DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198077411.003.0009
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter discusses the final phase of the decline of the Mughal empire in the eighteenth century. It argues that this decline was manifested in Awadh and Punjab in a kind of political transformation, in the emergence and configuration of the elements of the new subadari. The Mughal centre had transformed from a stabilizing force to a destabilizing arena with the weakening of imperial authority, administration and wrangling at the court. However, as the beginnings of the new subadari are to be seen more in the context of the history of the region, the developments in and around Awadh and the Punjab provide explanation for its stability or weakness in these provinces. The alliances forged, between the Mughal state and the nobles on the one hand and the old zamindars and local elements had always been uneasy. Now with the weakening of the Mughal power, the provincial governors tried to strike alliances with the local elements. Now with the weakening of the Mughal power, the provincial governors tried to strike alliances with the local elements. While the alliance with the local elements was successful in Awadh, it failed in Punjab primarily because of the growing consolidation of the Sikh movement, which considered the Mughal system as such to be tyrannical. The genesis for the emergence of ‘the successor state’ was present in both provinces, but in the Punjab it ended in chaos while Awadh saw a stable, dynastic rule.
Keywords: Mughal empire, imperial power, governors, political transformation, new subadari, Awadh,
Punjab, successor state, local elements, Sikhs
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THE STRESSES RESULTING IN THE disintegration of the Mughal empire towards the last phase of the period of our study, were first reflected in the crisis of the relations between the emperor and the nobility. When the zamindars in the regions resisted the authority of the centre effectively, the nobles in control of provinces began to see this as a threat to their fortunes and sought more powers. The emperor did not view this as a systemic crisis but as a mere extension of the old problem of the entrenched position of dominant sections of the nobility and tried to counter this by encouraging the newer elements.
However, the problem of the nobility at this stage was no longer linked to one or other group of the nobles. It concerned the organization and the emoluments of the entire class of the nobility and percolated down to officials on lower rungs as well. It was closely linked to the challenges that the emperor and the state officials began to face in the regions. The emperor believed wrongly that by reasserting his position as the source of all power and patronage he could recover the waning prestige of the empire. While, on the one hand, the emperor was unable to evolve innovative solutions outside the well-established framework of the emperor-noble equations, the nobles’ urge for additional powers, on the other, indicated that the principle of the emperor as the source of all authority was no longer tenable.
The provincial governor’s attempt to combine his authority, ultimately, with all powers and offices in the province marked a virtual rejection of the authority of the imperial centre. The process of change (p.302) began when the old and established nobles (the khanazads) tried to make up for the loss of their prestige at the centre by seeking, additional powers in the provinces. They were allowed this privilege in consideration of their eminent position in the hierarchy of the nobility. But this did not represent the aspiration of the khanazads alone; it was part of a wider problem of the provincial administration, reflected in the second phase of our period in the changing position of the governor. At the beginning of this phase, the governors of Awadh enjoyed some additional authority, even though they could not claim the eminence and the influence of their predecessors. Soon the governor sought a major break from established Mughal convention in Farrukh Siyar’s reign when he made an effort to maintain a longer term of office, to extend his authority to a province in the neighbourhood and, above all, to control provincial finance. In 1716, the governor even resisted the conferment of executive and military powers by the imperial centre on the provincial diwan. This was obviously incompatible with the imperial control of the province and the Mughal system of ‘checks and balances’.
The appointment of Girdhar Bahadur in 1719 perhaps amply illustrates the change in the attitude of the nobles posted in the province towards imperial authority. Girdhar himself chose the province. This was in keeping with developments at the court where nobles and not the emperor had come to dictate the course of state action. It eroded the very basis of imperial authority.
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To such governorships we can trace the beginnings of the new subadari and provincial independence in the eighteenth century.
This change was, however, also conditioned by the nature of relations between the nobles in control of provinces and the central authorities. The emperor, during the first phase, saw the governors’ plea for extended powers as a threat to imperial power founded on their claims to high position as khanazads. He allowed them to govern the provinces with special privileges in order to keep them at a distance from the court. But the emperor was unable to resist the erosion of his power, since his authority rested on support from the nobles. The emperor was compelled to reconcile with one or the other faction of the nobility, whom he considered to be less ambitious and who, to him, appeared to be willing to help him keep, at least, the myth of the imperial aura intact. During the second phase in Farrukh Siyar’s time when the wazir aspired and threatened to take over the central (p.303) position from the emperor, the latter allowed the governor of Awadh to control provincial finance. The governor in this particular case was Chhabele Ram, a supporter of Farrukh Siyar in his battle against the wazir, and the purpose was simply to increase his strength vis-á-vis the wazir and his faction and not to enable him (the governor) to meet the extraordinary situation in the province. Chhabele Ram also sought the subadari for a long term in order to build a base in case of his and his master’s defeat against the wazir at the centre. The case of Chhabele Ram set a precedent. Yet in 1719 when Girdhar Bahadur, the governor of Allahabad, was allowed to take the charge of Awadh with extended powers, it was not in consideration of the problems of administration in the province. The wazir, at this stage, was keen that Girdhar should leave Allahabad where he had revolted and had thus threatened the passage from the eastern provinces to the centre.
The process is also illustrated from the case of the Punjab. As the governor did not belong to the faction of the wazir, he received little support from the centre. Instead, the wazir tried to replace him by a man of his own faction, incited the local chiefs to rise against him and, if possible, to eliminate him. The governor survived, in a large measure, due to his association with a kin group, opposed to the faction of the wazir, at the centre. In return, however, the governorship with extended powers in the Punjab came to be virtually shared with those leaders of his group who held offices at the centre.
In the governor’s struggle for additional powers there was a case for a political framework flexible enough to accommodate the interests and aspirations of the different components of the ruling class in the province together with a lose imperial unity. But with the centre unable to guarantee provincial security, the governor had to work it out himself in alliance with emerging local forces. In fact, the emperor and central authorities, vulnerable as they were to factional politics at the court, had become the channel for extending such politics to the
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provinces. The centre now acted as a force for destabilization rather than stabilization in the provinces.
***
Thus, there was a rapid decline in control of the centre over the various departments of local administration following invariably the governor’s estrangement with central authorities. Not only was the governor utterly (p. 304) disrespectful of the centre during the second phase, but the persons in charge of the provincial and local offices that he aspired to control had to encounter his hostility. On the other hand, the central authorities overlooked cases of dereliction, irregularities and even serious offences by those local officials who were intended or were posted in the province to be a check on the governor. Accordingly, the composition of the local officials kept changing to suit the interests of one or the other party in power at the centre, often in total disregard of the require?ments of the offices in the province.
Crippled imperial control over local administration manifested itself in the misappropriation of revenue by local officials which resulted in a conflict, for instance, with the agents of the jagirdars and the amils of khalisa. Again, the faujdar’s indifference to the difficulties of the news-writers, which posed a problem in obtaining details from the mahals, seriously affected the working of local administration. As a result, in a number of cases, the centre was either uninformed or ill-informed. Moreover, in a number of instances from the Punjab, the news-writers took the side of the governor in the latter’s clashes with the centre; they remained in office in spite of imperial orders to the contrary.
The office of the qazi operated until the end of our period, but it tended to become hereditary in Awadh from almost the beginning of the eighteenth century. In some cases, the qazis complied with the orders of their transfer, but they illegally retained the madad-i ma‘ash granted to them against their services.
The jagirdars became primarily concerned with the protection and promotion of their own interests. They resisted implemention of imperial regulations and defied the practice of frequent transfers. The extension of watan jagir to non-zamindar mansabdars created more difficulties for the functioning of the administration. Most of such mansabdars in Awadh obtained positions in or around their watans and they remained idle, hardly attending to their work. Some of them retained their jagirs and collected revenue even after they had become physically disabled and of no use to the state. It would appear that the jagirdars were not content with the terms and conditions of their service. Their resistance of imperial principles was evident in their attempt to hold on to their jagirs and treat them as hereditary rights. The tendency was seen at work not
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only in and (p.305) around the provinces under review but also in the areas dominated by the Marathas and the Rajputs.
***
The local and organized regional resistance against the centre expressed itself in widespread agrarian uprisings, mounted in Awadh by the dominant Rajput zamindars; while in the Punjab, socially and politically, an increasingly important community took over the leadership of these revolts. The agrarian risings were not a new phenomenon in our period. The zamindars who were in control of rural production and producers, had never welcomed the state extraction of almost the entire surplus from the villages, leaving them only a marginal share. There was always a lurking fear, as indeed often the reality, of the zamindars’ resistance to the local officials. But a notable feature of the zamindar risings in our period was the remarkable speed with which they recovered from a defeat and re-engaged themselves against the Mughals. In Farrukh Siyar’s reign a number of military expeditions against zamindars in Awadh reportedly ended in the victory of the Mughals. Yet the prime concern of Girdhar Bahadur and later of Burhan-ul-Mulk was to suppress the rebel zamindars or, at least, to seek a strategy to arrive at some kind of accommodation with the dominant landed communities in the province. This indicated the wide popular base of resistance and also the extent of the resources at the command of their leaders. The strength of the armed bands under their command and also the fortresses they had under their control is to be particularly noted in this connection.
The intensity of the zamindars’ resistance in our period followed economic growth and the prosperity in our regions in the seventeenth century together with an imperial decline. A number of old settlements in southern Awadh appear to have become notable for trade and artisanal production, while a number of others were emerging as new centres of important zamindaris. By the middle of the eighteenth century the central and southern districts of Awadh were apparently linked with the towns on the south banks of the Ganga in the provinces of Agra and Allahabad. The entire area was endowed with rich soil and good natural irrigation, favouring a particularly productive agriculture. The available jama figures suggest a remarkable rise in revenue from the end of the sixteenth century.
(p.306) There is a possibility that the swollen jama figures showed merely the magnitude of state demand and that they represented a readjustment following the increase in prices in the seventeenth century. There is, however, enough evidence to lead us to believe that the rise in jama figure in our region cannot be explained simply in terms of the price hike of the seventeenth century. We have reports that the intermediaries’ collections from the peasants had risen more
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substantially in proportion to their payments to the state. The jama seems to have borne some relationship with the performance of agriculture.
Two different processes which complemented and gained momentum from each other in the course of the seventeenth century proved to be of enormous profit to the suba of the Punjab and the adjoining areas. One was the impressive agriculture following the Jat settlements in the areas which combined regular rainfall, rich soil and extensive fields of river basins. These Jat settlements were connected with the great route which carried the trade of the country east and south of Delhi with the Punjab and beyond with Persia and Central Asia. The region also had an opening through the Indus to Lahari Bandar. The second process was the emergence in the Punjab on and around the trade routes of a number of towns with the merchants who specialized both in inland and foreign trade. All this resulted in the prosperity of the province in the seventeenth century which the contemporary Punjab historians speak of so boastfully and which is reflected in the fantastic increase in revenue, in particular, from the bazaar levies and tolls.
The growth in these regions led to a dislocation of existing agrarian relationships. In some cases, the dominant zamindar and the peasant castes emerged from their original settlements and began to make encroachments into the zamindari areas of the others, while in the others a zamindar-peasant clan struggled to bring under their control the entire territory around their area of residence. Their resistance in such cases was not necessarily directed against the state, but certainly against the rule, the order and the class positions the state protected and promoted. At any rate, the zamindar risings predominantly signified a challenge to the imperial power from regional and local communities.
The Mughal imperial power rested on a balance between the interests of different regional and local magnates on the one hand and (p.307) the ambitions of the Mughal emperor and his nobles and the other mansabdars on the other. This coordination or the alliance between the two with the emperor as the dominant partner was possible due to the social conditions of the country, which never allowed local and regional elements to act in unison. They were divided among themselves on caste, community and territorial lines and were perpetually at war with each other. Their strength was limited even though each of them tried to subjugate the other. There were certain traditions which guided and regulated their actions and inter-caste and community relationships, while most of them also had a history and memory of having served as intermediaries under the Sultans of Delhi. These factors minimized the possibility of rising above the narrow limits of their communities and territories. They were thus not only weak enough to be vanquished by a power above community and limited territorial considerations, but were also in need of a ‘paramount’ power under whose umbrella their individual positions were guaranteed.
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The Mughals on the other hand were not bound by any such considerations which prevented them from building an empire that allowed for these local loyalties. And, as they came from an area which had long social and trade contacts with the subcontinent, they could also appreciate the implications of and respond accordingly to an extraordinary phenomenon of the time, namely the expansion of India’s external trade following the advent of the Europeans with the precious white metal from the New World. The empire responded to the widening network of money and commerce connecting the peripheries with the heartland of Hindustan. The traders and the money dealers welcomed a system which could reinforce, augment and regulate the economic integration of the territories and the communities under the jurisdiction of their operations. Artisans and the producers also were in need of stable extended markets.
However, the same factors eventually provided nourishment to the process of political ‘decentralization’. The Mughal alliance with the local and the regional magnates had been uneasy. The conflict between the two had not been resolved entirely. Whenever the zamindar found an opportunity he raided and tried to demolish the bastions of imperial power in the region. In a highly differentiated society, the expansion of artisanal production, urban (p.308) development and the region’s integration into a wider market network in the seventeenth century was to the obvious benefit of the upper strata of the local communities. The strength acquired following the prosperity of their regions enabled them to challenge Mughal claims in the face of declining imperial authority. They were now rich enough to afford the weapons and the provisions necessary to wage a long war against the Mughals. The zamindar uprisings in the early-eighteenth century were widespread, demonstrating the breakdown of the alliance between them and the Mughals as well as the region’s resistance against control by the centre.
But the zamindars fought for a very limited cause, and their strength was often impaired by their internal social differences. The agrarian revolts were often organized on caste and community lines and were a threat to those rural sections which did not belong to the caste or creed of the rebels. A large number of the zamindars and peasants were constrained to seek help from the Mughals. There is also evidence of the support of some zamindars and peasants to the Mughals in their military expeditions against the rebels. This is amply illustrated from the case of Mansa Ram, a Bhumihar zamindar of Gangapur, who mobilized his community behind the Mughals against the turbulent Rajputs to eventually found a raj in Benaras. It is also not unlikely that the rebels in Awadh, for instance, submitted after they won some privileges from the nawab. Their social conditions did not allow them to fight beyond a point, lest the others join hands with the Mughals and crush them and take over the leadership of the locality.
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Again, within the village and the zamindari centres there were social groups, namely the madad-i ma‘ash holders, with interests, attitudes and objectives sharply different from those of the rebel zamindars. The madad-i ma‘ash holders were the ideologues and traditional supporters of the Mughal state and subsisted in principle on the revenues alienated from the states’ share in the produce. By the beginning of the eighteenth century they constituted a considerably strong social force, being in control of large land-holdings and sometimes were assertively present in local zamindari and money transactions. By the virtue of their ideological position they were in conflict with the zamindars, but now that they had become rich and powerful while also enjoying the full support of the state, their position was anomalous. They not only provoked but also (p.309) restrained the strength of the rebels. As symbols and representatives of imperial power, they became victims of the wrath of the zamindar. The madad-i ma‘ash holders were, however, a local social group and were vulnerable to the shifting fortunes of the region. For instance, they were a source of trouble for the imperial authority in Awadh in the early-eighteenth century.
The merchants and the other urban sections also suffered at the hands of the rebel zamindars. Long distance trade and money transactions were closely linked with political stability which, in the prevailing circumstances when economic integration had followed the political unification, could be thought of only through the maintenance of imperial authority. The traders and also some artisans sided with the Mughals and thus invited the hostility of the rebels. Trade and urban properties like the offices of the qazi and kotwal became targets of their raids since they were believed to represent the Mughal power in the region.
The zamindars thus could rarely think beyond the limited goal of a greater share in political power and revenues for themselves and their communities, even if their actions became part of a larger regional endeavour to become independent of the political control of the centre.
The feeling of uncertainty and apprehension among the officials posted in the region was inevitable. As the support from the centre, if available, was of little value, most of them rejected imperial authority and in some cases even colluded with the rebels.
***
In these circumstances, the Mughal governor sought additional powers and as he earned these through a course of confrontation with the central authorities, his success depended more on his ability to meet the demands of the region, including the zamindars, the madad-i ma‘ash holders and the local and provincial officials. The governor aspired to establish his dominance over them which often
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led to virtual rebellion against the centre. By bringing the powers of the diwan and the faujdars under his control, the governor tried to strengthen himself to tackle the problems of local administration. And as he could arrive at some (p. 310) arrangement with the leaders of the rebels, and protected and promoted with some success the interests of the different local elements, he saw the possibility of refurbishing the Mughal power in the region through some changes in the existing political alignments including his own relations with the centre. This meant a longer if not a permanent tenure of his office, which was denied to him as the centre still insisted on the old pattern of its relations with the province.
The governor thus defied the directives from the centre and refused to leave the province, as he built and mobilized the resources of the region which enabled him to survive independently of the centre. Burhan-ul-Mulk remained in Awadh in spite of the emperor’s order of his transfer to Malwa. Later, after his death, Safdar Jang succeeded him by the virtue of his blood relations with the deceased. In the Punjab Abd-us-Samad Khan, the governor, appropriated the revenues of the khalisa mahals earmarked for the maintenance of the army on the borders. Abd-us-Samad Khan refused to leave Lahore to take over his assignment in Kabul. Instead, he and his son, Zakariya Khan, together managed to control the Mughal Punjab and the suba of Multan towards the third phase of our period. This, in a measure, indicated their appreciation of the social and commercial links of the two provinces. Later, after his father’s death, Zakariya Khan combined the governorship of both the provinces virtually on account of hereditary rights.
In all matters relating to the province, the governor did what he thought would further his interests in the region. Burhan-ul-Mulk showed no regard for the legitimate possession of the office of governorship of Allahabad, since he aspired to hold the province as a buffer zone between Awadh and the Baghela and Bundela chieftaincies. He added to the difficulties of Muhammad Khan Bangash against the Bundelas, as the Bangash chief had a base in the neighbourhood. The governor of Awadh was friendly towards the Bundelas even when they had entered into an offensive alliance with the Marathas against the Mughals. Relations between Awadh and the Marathas were independent of any regard for the centre. Political alignments in the region came to be guided by the factors which threatened or were believed to promote the position of the governor. Safdar Jang thus financed an imperial campaign against Ali Muhammad Khan of Anola, his potential rival in the region, while (p.311) the wazir of the empire, who also had his jagirs in the area, was kept in the dark about the objectives of the expedition.
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Yet, it was not possible for the governor to be completely free from the centre. The imperial tradition was not totally forgotten. The emperor was the source of all claims to authority, even though he himself was effectively divested of power. The nobles, including those in control of virtually independent provinces, defended him, provided he did not imperil their interests in the regions. As late as 1739, Burhan-ul-Mulk and Nizam-ul-Mulk arrived at the centre from Awadh and the Deccan respectively to defend the emperor against Nadir Shah. Safdar Jang refused to act on an imperial order to defend the Raja of Jaipur against the Marathas; he went half-heartedly to Patna to help Ali Vardi Khan of Bengal; but he could not avoid taking active interest in court politics.
Again, the jagirs of the nobles posted at the centre or in any other provinces, restricted the freedom of the governor. Together with the agents of their jagirs, these nobles also had their associates among the local rural and urban gentry. Indeed, the jagir system had added considerably to the problems of the governor in the earlier phases of our period. The practice of the jagirdar having faujdari right over his jagir mahal had amounted to legitimizing dual authority in the province. It had imposed limitations on the exercise of powers by the regular provincial officials. Similarly the recently modified jagir set-up encouraging and creating a long-term interest of the nobles in their jagirs jeopardized the governor’s endeavour to build a base in the province.
The governor thus had to be in touch with the developments at the centre. Burhan-ul-Mulk developed and maintained political equations with some nobles at the court, whose response to his overtures showed little concern for the damage he had caused to the emperor’s authority in Awadh. His attempt to establish links with one or the other faction at the centre was evidently because he appreciated that it was necessary for his independence in the province. When the road passing through Allahabad, Bindki, Kora to Delhi was disturbed, he readily undertook the responsibility of the safe passage of the Bengal treasury through Awadh to the centre. This, he hoped, would compensate for (p.312) his defiance of the imperial order, increase his prospects of bargaining for greater power and also enable him to show formal obeisance to the emperor. Burhan-ul- Mulk also envisaged an increase in the financial base of the nawabi rule when the imperial highway between Buxar and Delhi was diverted from the Allahabad- Bindki route to the one that passed through Lucknow and Bareilly.
The cases of the attempts of the new governor to continue his association with the centre highlighted the necessity of maintaining the imperial frame. The semblance of empire had to be sustained, for it suited the individuals and the groups who had hitherto constituted the empire and were now in power in the regions. He who had greater ambitions in the regions aspired to a higher and stronger position at the court. This brought the regional powers including the Marathas and later the British into direct contact with court politics.
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The kind of power politics that emerged in different parts of the Mughal empire in the eighteenth century explains in part the need of emphasizing the imperial symbols. In order to survive and thrive in the absence of the long accepted legitimate and fairly effective imperial organization of the Mughals, each of the newly emerged regional powers looked for and seized the opportunities to subordinate the others, at least, in its neighbourhood. But each of them also resisted, or, at least, had the ambition or ability to fight any such endeavour of the other. To the victorious among them when they sought institutional arrangement of their spoils, it was convenient to accept and maintain the legitimizing authority of the Mughal centre which had in fact collapsed and come to coexist with their ambitions and positions in the regions.
The necessity of maintaining the symbols of the political unity of the regions of the erstwhile empire may perhaps be sought more in the realm of the economy of the period. By the 1720s when the symptoms of political disintegration were all too evident, the different parts of the empire were economically integrated by inter-regional trade along the coastal as well as the inland routes. The economic and monetary institutions of the seventeenth century which had led to the expanded network of commerce and the distant credit markets survived the collapse of the Mughal empire, and amid the political (p.313) turmoils of the eighteenth century, kept a large part of the erstwhile empire inter-connected.
***
The decline of the Mughal empire was thus manifested in our regions in a kind of political transformation, in the emergence and configuration of the elements of the new subadari. However, as the beginnings of the new subadari are to be seen more in the context of the history of the region, the devlopments in and around Awadh and the Punjab provide explanation for its stability or weakness in these provinces. The genesis for the emergence of ‘the successor state’ was present in both the provinces, but in the Punjab it ended with chaos at the close of our period while Awadh saw a stable dynastic rule.
Geographical continguity of the Punjab with the frontier province and the emergence of a strong power beyond Kabul in the face of the rapidly collapsing Mughal centre together with the actuality and the lurking dangers of foreign invasions influenced the political developments in the province. Zakariya Khan’s special equation with the centre also mattered considerably. Almost the entire ‘Turani’ kin group had a claim to whatever independence and stability these provinces had acquired under Abd-us-Samad Khan and Zakariya Khan.
Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang, however, did not allow the interests of any court party to determine the course of the developments in Awadh, even though they were involved in court politics in varying measures during their tenures as governors. In this they were facilitated also by the fact that they were not
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ethnically tied with any dominant faction at the court. They assessed the problems of the province and experimented with solutions almost independently.
Since the nobles influenced provincial politics and administration through the local agents in their jagirs in the province, an attempt to change the jagir administration was among the first measures Burhan-ul-Mulk took to establish his rule in Awadh. Even though jagir was still a symbol of imperial control over the region, it had in actuality come to signify the extent of the nobles’ strength, sometimes threatening to emerge as a quasi zamindari. Due to the pecuniary benefits and influence that their position and continued association with the noble (p.314) jagirdars implied, these agents, not infrequently local people, often endangered the strength of the governor. To convert the entire jagir into khalisa was not possible, for it amounted to inviting the hostility of the nobility. Burhan-ul-Mulk therefore brought their agents under his control by taking over the right of collection of revenue of the jagirs from the jagirdars, and he minimized interference in his schemes by non-Awadhi sections of the nobility. He was now able to distribute patronage to the local service gentry and also to hold in check revenue defalcators. An important feature of the new subadari in Awadh was thus realization of the revenues and then payment to the jagirdars by the officials who were in direct control of the governor. By the end of our period, the governor in Awadh also succeeded in reducing to the minimum the number of the large sized jagirs of outside nobles; quite a considerable number of the officials and military men who had jagirs in Awadh were in the service of the governor himself.
On the other hand, the jagirs in the Punjab remained very large in size, assigned to the powerful nobles including those belonging to the governor’s kin group. In addition, a considerable amount from the revenues of the Punjab was earmarked for the imperial hospitals, imperial food houses and, above all, for the imperial armed forces posted on the north-west frontiers. This implied constant outside interference, even when the centre was weak and the governor had virtual control over the finance of the province.
The governor in Awadh also integrated local groups into the provincial administration and army. There is sufficient evidence to suggest the emergence of regional elements in various positions in the Awadh administration and army. A large number of Awadhis, specially from urban areas, were in Mughal service, posted in different regions of the empire. With the decline of imperial authority in these regions and the inevitable decrease of avenues of promotion in the empire, we can legitimately presume, that these Awadhis sought their fortunes at home. Our sources convincingly show their reluctance and even refusal to accept offers outside Awadh. There is also evidence to suggest a definite and positive response from local groups to the political stability and opportunities that nawabi rule in Awadh ensured. This the Shaikhzadas demonstrated effectively in their defence of the nawabi (p.315) against the invasion of the
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Farrukhabad Afghans and, subsequently, in their invitation to Safdar Jang, to come and take possession of Lucknow despite an imperial farman to the contrary. The Shaikhzadas, the Afghans and certain sections of the Hindus can be said to have formed a very loosely organized ‘regional ruling group’ in Awadh. But we must note that Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang were outsiders and that the Qazilbash formed substantial part of the Awadh army in the middle of the eighteenth century.
In providing a firm foundation to the new subadari in Awadh, equally important was the governor’s success in reducing, if not totally removing, the rural tension that ensued with the changes in the position of the madad-i ma‘ash holders. The strength and the impact of the madad-i ma‘ash holders are indicated in the shifts in Burhan-ul-Mulk’s policy towards the madad-i-ma‘ash holding. He began with an uncompromising sternness, but ended with nominal assessment, lending legitimacy to their behaviour as virtual zamindars. The insignificance of the size of their shares in the revenues notwithstanding, they had close social links with the Shaikhzadas in imperial service and thus with the nobility and the imperial court. The new subadar perhaps eventually recognized the necessity of using their influence in the furtherance of the state’s interests. Even though we have not discussed it, the context of the foundation and the configuration in Awadh in our period of the Sunni madrasa syllabi (Dars-i Nizami) which was to bring to its fold the future madrasa system in India needs careful analysis. The claims of the madad-i ma‘ash holders in the late-seventeenth and eighteenth centuries may be seen in the light of their authority and ability to legitimize or otherwise social and political actions. Azad Bilgrami’s observation (which typified their reaction) on the rise of Maratha power indicated their enthusiasm to contribute, as also their response, to the stability implied by nawabi rule in Awadh.
The arrangement with the zamindars, however, was a singular achievement of the Awadh government. Until the end of our period, the provincial government was opposed by one or the other zamindar, nevertheless its victory over the local problems was, in a large measure, due to the support of the zamindars. Baiswara, a centre of constant threat to Mughal power, appears to have turned into a base of nawabi (p.316) power in Awadh. The zamindars were reconciled through a contract (ta‘ahhud) which empowered them to engage in the collection of revenue and the payment of the stipulated sum to the government together with some kind of military and administrative authority over the territories under their jurisdiction. The contract combined in it the elements of the earlier Mughal attempt of both conceding some autonomy to the zamindars as well as absorbing them in the imperial service. To such ta‘ahhuds can be traced the rise of some of the rich ta‘alluqadaris of eighteenth-century Awadh.
Such ta‘ahhud also contributed, in a certain measure, to the decay of the institution of faujdari. The decay of the faujdari as a bulwark of imperial authority had set in with the new subadar’s acquisition of faujdari rights over the
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province. The new subadar began to appoint his own men as his deputies, not infrequently from among the local elements in different areas of the province. These deputies, often referred to as naibs and nazims, were different from the Mughal faujdars in that they combined both executive and financial powers.
The governor of the Punjab, unlike Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang, could not reach accommodations with any section of the rural magnates. His failure stemmed, to a great extent, from the nature of the problems in the province. The problems in Awadh emanated from the movement and uprisings of the regional and quasi-regional magnates to secure, at least, a greater share in political power and revenues. The governors in Awadh made use of their weaknesses and planned to take over the leadership of the resistance against the centre. In this they were helped a great deal by the continued growth in and around Awadh from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. Not only did the revenues of the province almost double in our period, but the governor was also able to augment his strength by adding to his domain a large rich area of the neighbouring provinces of Allahabad and Agra.
Indeed, the entire region of Awadh and the adjoining districts experienced remarkable growth in the eighteenth century. In the Benaras region, Benaras city was particularly noted for its wealth and money. Azamgarh, Bhadohi and Mirzapur flourished in this region amidst a number of bazaars and ganjs. The jama in the region rose (p.317) by over 107 per cent and continued to rise under the Benaras raj in the mid-eighteenth century. In the early 1730s, Burhanul-Mulk collected twenty-five to thirty lakh rupees in sarkar Kora which had earlier seen one of the severest rural uprisings in the Gangetic plain under Bhagwant Udaru. No governor or faujdar could subjugate Bhagwant Udaru and realize state dues from the zamindars. In 1745 the Mughal emperor demanded one crore rupees from Ali Muhammad Khan, an ijaradar-cum-zamindar of a few parganas in the Moradabad-Bareilly region. Ali Muhammad Khan did not pay the amount on the strength of the wazir’s support to him, but the sum demanded of him indicated his capacity and the riches he had accumulated from ijara and his military adventures in the region. The rise in jama in this region was almost incredible—over 247 per cent. In 1745 when Amir Khan, the erstwhile governor of Allahabad, died his assets were assessed at fifty to sixty lakh rupees. In the same year, Safdar Jang is reported to have spent forty lakh rupees on the marriage of his son, Shuja-ud-Daulah, while according to one report he paid more than three crore rupees to Nadir Shah from the Awadh treasury to obtain the subadari in 1739–40 and to prevent him from attacking Lucknow.
In a measure, the problems in Awadh represented administrative breakdown and a dislocation of the political and social balance at the local level. The legend that on Burhan-ul-Mulk’s query, the qanungo indicated the gap between what the
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zamindars actually collected from the peasants and what they paid to the state is significant.
The Sikh uprisings, on the contrary, which spearheaded the local and regional resistance to the Mughal rule in the Punjab, were fraught with weaknesses. The Sikh movement reflected a deep-rooted antagonism between the Mughal state and its beneficiaries on the one hand and the various categories of smaller zamindars and the peasants on the other at a stage where any attempt at reconciliation and compromise failed to operate effectively. The Sikhs had also begun to put forward a claim to rulership and were not to be contented with less than the total overthrow of Mughal rule and the establishment of their power in the province. The high sounding title of Sachcha Badshah and the symbols of degh, tegh and fath, therefore, continued to inspire the (p.318) Sikh leaders even after the ruthless execution of Banda and his seven hundred comrades in 1715. The chiefs of the Punjab also looked for an opportunity, which they seized in the wake of foreign invasions, to totally throw off their obeisance to Mughal authority. The new subadar in the Punjab was, thus, unable to make any arrangements with the zamindars, nor there is any evidence to suggest that he could effect any changes in the administrative set-up of the province.
Zakariya Khan did try to build a base for the new subadari by associating the Khatris, a dominant trading community of the Punjab, with the provincial government. The Khatris and the Turanis, the faction to which the governor of the Punjab belonged, seem to have been in association with each other even at the centre. But the Khatris themselves suffered heavily in the wake of the decline of trade and urban centres in the Punjab by the middle of the eighteenth century. Trade had contributed a great deal to the prosperity of the Punjab in the seventeenth century. The trading centres and towns concentrated on and around the great land route which linked the Mughal empire through Kabul and Qandahar with Persia and Central Asia. These towns were, in turn, connected with the rich agricultural settlements in the Indo-Gangetic plains and the sub- Himalayan zones of the province. The trade of the Punjab also had an opening through the Indus to Lahari Bandar.
The trade with the countries beyond the north-western frontiers was brisk and made up for the loss of what may have accrued to the economy of the region due to the silting of the Indus in the seventeenth century. The Punjab appears to be in a flourishing state even in the early eighteenth century. Banda’s concentration on the townsfolk showed the wealth in the cities for which our sources contain incontrovertible evidence. The Sikhs under Banda could plunder Rs 60,000 from Garhi Pathanan. In 1714, the deputy faujdar of Jammu misappropriated Rs 33,000 of the collection of the mahals of the walashahis in the chakia. In 1716, the rabi collection of pargana Sialkot amounted to Rs 6,00,000 out of which Rs 2,50,000 were reportedly misappropriated by the faujdar. The Shalharias of the pargana readily offered to pay Rs 5,000 for the release of two of their zamindars
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who had been imprisoned by the local amil for non-payment of revenue. Mirza Muhammad’s evidence for the end of Farrukh Siyar’s reign clearly (p.319) shows that the office of the amini faujdari in Jalandhar was keenly sought and was still profitable, but, of course, only for those who could muster sufficient strength to collect the revenue.
However, political developments beyond the north-west frontiers, as well as the Maratha inroads into western and upper India, disturbed this trade. The revenues of the province fell sharply in Muhammad Shah’s reign, the decline being the heaviest in the income from the bazaar levies and tolls. The dislocation of the economy led to great sufferings to the urban communities including the Khatris and thus shattered one source of social support for the new subadari in the Punjab. The governor did not possess enough resources to make arrangements with any other groups of local magnates. The Sikh movement continued to challenge the Mughal power, now, greatly reinforced by the dipossessed zamindars, impoverished peasants and the pauperized lower urban classes.
There were variations in the regions of our study in the nature and growth of the conditions in which set in the process of the formation of the new subadari in the early-eighteenth century. Conditions emerged in Awadh favouring the foundation and consolidation of a regional state under the aegis of a Mughal noble. On the other hand, the dislocation of the economy of the Punjab led to a change in the character of popular uprisings against the Mughals in the province, with the liquidation of all prospects, whatsoever, of accommodation between the provincial government and the Sikhs. One can speculate that the narrow religious and caste bond of the Sikh movement, absence of a positive political programme and hostility to urban communities must have also had their own share in the political chaos in the Punjab in the mid-eighteenth-century.
It is therefore difficult to find a single explanation commonly applicable to the problems of the Mughal empire in all its regions and provinces. It is also difficult to accept the view that by the end of the seventeenth century the Mughal empire was faced with an insurmountable crisis owing to the very nature of the Mughal mechanism of administration. We may perhaps look more profitably to the conditions in the early-eighteenth century in which the empire disintegrated into the regional principalities in north India. In some regions the land still yielded riches if it was collected either by show of strength or tactful dealings with the (p.320) intermediaries. The growing tendency among the nobles and officials to hold jagirs on a permanent/ quasi-permanent basis, the struggle to convert the madad-i ma‘ash holding into milkiyat, the emergence of the ta‘alluqa, ta‘ahhud and ijara contract as the most acceptable forms of government, and the consensus among the regional powers to maintain the Mughal imperial symbols to obtain legitimacy and thus stability and security of their spoils—all indicated
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the eighteenth-century endeavour to make use of the possibilities for growth within existing social structures.
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