142PART TWO

QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

THE PROBLEMS reserved for discussion in Part Two are usually regarded as the exclusive do­ main of professors of philosophy. They include highly controversial issues of language philos­ ophy, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and other philosophic specialties. I can foresee some snide remarks such as "fools rush in where angels fear to tread"—though I shrink from the possible implication of philosophers as angels. I can also foresee some protests against my treating truth as a quality of knowl­ edge, but I can point to a precedent: Bertrand Russell, neither fool nor angel, has said that "truth is the quality of belief in facts."1 Truth is one of several qualities of knowledge to be dealt with in the three chapters of Part Two.

Chapter 5 Truth, Beauty, and Goodness Chapter 6 Other Standards of Quality Chapter 7 Notions of Negative Knowledge

1 Italics are mine. The qualification "in facts" after the

word "belief" is in turn qualified by the statement that

"when we entertain a correct belief, that which we believe

may be called a fact." Bertrand Russell, "On the Nature of

Truth," in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s., vol.

7 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1907), p. 45. Similarly,

Whitehead wrote that "truth is a generic quality with a

variety of degrees and modes." Alfred North Whitehead,

Adventures in Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 309.

144CHAPTER 5

TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS

DIFFERENT SCHOOLS of philosophy differ in essential ways in defin­ ing knowledge and relating it to cognate terms. The major problems concern the truth value and probability value of assertions or knowl­ edge claims and the logical relations among knowledge, belief, con­ jecture, hunch, promise, expectation, conviction, evidence, verifica­ tion, confirmation, verisimilitude, falsification, refutation, and other members of the family of notions that may come to mind when we hear someone—or rather a man of science or learning—say "I know."

KNOWLEDGE VERSUS BELIEF A large issue for philosophers, especially of the linguistic-analytic school, is whether knowledge is a particular kind of belief, whether belief is a particular kind of knowledge, or whether knowledge and belief are different things. Some philosophers taking the third of these positions declare that, when we reflect, "we cannot mistake belief for knowledge or vice versa."1 To others, however, knowledge is "warranted belief," "certified belief," or "justified true belief," where not only the truth of the predicated thing {event, situation, etc.) is certified (supported by generally accepted evidence) but also the knower (or believer) is sure of that truth, that is, feels sure that he is justified in feeling sure about the truth of what he predicates,2 Contrariwise, there are philosophers for whom belief is knowledge of which the believer (or knower) is not quite sure; it is uncertain knowledge or merely conjectured knowledge.3

1 Harold Arthur Pritchard, Knowledge and Perception (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1950), p. 88.

2 Several authors could be cited as holders of this view or of variants of it; two quo­

tations should suffice: "Knowledge is belief which not only is true but also is justified

in its believing attitude." Clarence Irving Lewis1An Analysis of Knowledge and Val­

uation (La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing, 1946), p. 9.—". .. the necessary and suf­

ficient conditions for knowing that something is the case are first that what one is

said to know be true, secondly that one be sure of it, and thirdly that one should have

the right to be sure." Alfred J. Ayer1 The ProbJem of Knowledge (Harmondsworth:

Penguin Books, 1956), p. 35.

3 At least one of the language philosophers made the helpful suggestion to distin-

145QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

114

The three semantic positions are mutually exclusive: in the first case, knowledge is one kind or species of belief; in the second, belief is one kind or species of knowledge; and in the third, knowledge and belief are different genera. The arguments behind these positions, merging philosophy of knowledge (epistemology) with philosophy of language, sound highly sophisticated but can be rather simply in­ terpreted as a fusion of the two meanings of the term knowledge: the known and the knowing. In my blunt simplemindedness I have re­ ferred to the double meaning as an equivocation. (See the first page of the previous chapter.) "Knowledge as that which is known" and "knowledge as the state of knowing" are two different things, and for most purposes it is of little help to rivet them together in a single definition and to make matters even more complex by fussing (a) about the knower's "right to be sure" and (b) about the "certified truth" of that which he knows. The truth of what people know (or think they know or believe) is a different story, which is told rather differently depending on the school of philosophy in which the storyteller has enrolled.

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

The range of views on the relationship between knowledge and truth is wide, but within the range the nuances which particular philoso­ phers wish to emphasize are sometimes difficult to distinguish. I shall try to point to some of the nuances but prefer to do so in the form of questions rather than affirmations. Some of the possible an­ swers may be gleaned from quotations or paraphrases supplied in footnotes. I see no need to commit myself to any particular philo­ sophical platform. Perhaps the questions are more important than the answers, though the philosophers who have taken a firm stand on these issues would probably not agree with this suspicion of mine. They may resent my neutrality—especially if they notice that I am not really neutral but merely noncommittal.

guish knowing "in the strong sense" from knowing "in the weak sense"; the latter

does "not absolutely exclude the possibility that something could prove it to be

false," that is, it allows "for the possibility of a refutation." Norman Malcolm, Knowl­

edge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 58-72, esp. p. 61.

Malcolm's essay is reproduced under the title "Knowledge and Belief' in Michael D.

Roth and Leon Galis, eds., Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge (New York:

Random House, 1970), pp. 17-32. This collection contains a good selection of perti­

nent literature from the point of view of language philosophy.

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TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS

Facts and Propositions Do we "know" propositions (statements, assertions, sentences) or do we "know" facts? Do the "known" propositions have to be about facts and do the facts have to be physical (observable, certifiable)?4 Should we accept as knowledge only propositions of unquestion­ able truth?5 Should we recognize that knowledge may be imper­ fect?6 Is not all knowledge uncertain and only partial?7

Verifiability, Confirmability, Falsifiability Is there a "truth" that is independent of the knowledge of it, so that "a fact remains unaffected by our awareness or lack of awareness of it"?8 Is "truth . . . a physical property of physical things, called sym-

4 Some neopositivists (logical empiricists) have insisted that only physical facts be

"admitted." In his earlier writings Carnap embraced (or at least suggested) a strong

physicalist position, for example in the following statement: "If, because of its charac­

ter as a universal language, we adopt the language of physics as the . . . language of

science, then all science turns into physics." Rudolf Carnap, "Psychologie in

physikalischer Sprache," Erkenntnis, vol. 3 (1932), p. 108. Later Carnap accepted

"observable facts" without insisting that they be physical. Thus he regarded a sen­

tence as confirmable if its confirmation . . . is reducible . . . to that of a class of

observable predicates." Rudolf Carnap, "Testability and Meaning," in Philosophy of

Science, vol. 3 (October 1936), p. 456. Other philosophers close to the Vienna Circle

distinguished "logical facts" from "object facts." Hans Reichenbach, Experience and

Prediction: An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 11. Reichenbach did not restrict the meaning of

"object facts" to physical facts. Philosophers of different persuasions, likewise, used

the term "object" in a wider sense. Whitehead, for example, spoke of "sense objects"

and "thought objects," and even the sense objects were not confined to those per­

ceived by any of the five senses but included "emotion objects." Alfred North

Whitehead, The Aims of Education (New York: Macmillan, 1929), pp. 180-201.

5 See above, Chapter 2, for the position of the astronomer Sir John Herschel.

6Joseph Agassi, "Imperfect Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenoiogical Re­

search, vol. 32 (June 1972), pp. 465-477.

7 "All human knowledge is uncertain, inexact, and partial." Bertrand Russell,

Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), p.

507. This is especially stressed with regard to "scientific truth." Einstein found it

"difficult even to attach a precise meaning to the term 'scientific truth'. So different is

the meaning of the word 'truth' according to whether we are dealing with a fact of

experience, a mathematical proposition, or a scientific theory." Albert Einstein, "On

Scientific Truth," Essays in Science (New York: Philosophical Library, 1934), p.

11.—According to Popper "We do not know: we can only guess . . . every scientific

statement remains tentative forever." Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Dis­

covery (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 278 and 280.

8 This question is answered in the negative by Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the

Social Sciences (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1944), p. 60. Kauf­

mann shows that the question is inconsistent with scientific procedure and that the

147QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

116

bols" and does it consist in the correspondence between these sym­ bols "and other things, the objects"?9 Should we insist that only verifiable propositions have meaning, and only meaningful propositions deserve the designation "knowl­ edge"?10 Does either the truth or the meaning of propositions de­ pend on their usefulness for decisions or actions?11 Do we test our knowledge by applying it for practical purposes or by trying to refute it?12 Should efforts to "verify" what we believe we know be replaced by [less demanding) attempts to "confirm" or by attempts to disconfirm or falsify?13 Should the concept of truth be replaced by the con­ ception of "degrees of verisimilitude"?14

word "true" has to be replaced by "verified" or even by "verifiable in principle" (pp.

61-63).

9 This question is discussed by Hans Reichenbach1 Experience and Prediction, p.

32. Reichenbach proceeds to an analysis of the statement that "truth is not a function

of meaning but of the physical signs; conversely, meaning is a function of truth."

Reichenbaeh distinguishes a "truth theory" of meaning, where physical truth and log­

ical truth have to be kept apart, and a "probability theory" of meaning, which always

refers to "physical meaning" only (pp. 37-57). However, he rejects the absolute "veri-

fiability theory" of meaning (p. 53). In a helpful ranking, in descending order of re­

spectability, he lists "physical truth meaning, probability meaning, and logical mean­

ing," and even "super-empirical meaning" (pp. 62-63). He does not join the majority

of logical positivists in denying meaning to propositions with only "super-empirical

meaning"; indeed, he concedes that statements for which "the truth-value . . . is

known, but by super-empirical methods," and even statements for which "we have no

means at all for kn9wing their truth-value" (p. 64) may have empirical meaning.

10 "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification," declared Lud-

wig Wittgenstein,Tractatus logico-philosophicus (London; K. Paul, Trench, Trubner,

1922). Although this sentence is not verbally contained in this work, "it expresses

[Wittgenstein's] ideas very adequately and has been used, with this intention, within

the 'Vienna Circle.' " Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, p. 49. His declaration

makes all nonverifiable propositions into "meaningless pseudo-propositions." Car-

nap in his early writings subscribed to this position and wrote that "a string of words"

has meaning only if "it is derived from 'protocol sentences' " (that is, observation re­

ports) and if "the way to verification . . . is known." Rudolf Carnap, " (Jberwindung

der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache [Overthrow of Metaphysics

through Logical Analysis of Language],"Erkenntnis, vol. 2 (1931), p. 224.

11 Various kinds of pragmatism and instrumentalism are associated with the names

of Charles S. Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and others.

t2Whexeas pragmatists point to testing through attempted application, Sir Karl

Popper emphasizes testing by attempts to refute. Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Ref­

utations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York: Basic Books, 1962), p. 112.

13 Popper presents powerful arguments against verificationism, and also confir-

mationism, and in favor of falsificationism. Ibid., esp. pp. 280-281.

14 Iliis is Popper's conclusion, at which he arrived after finding that "we simply

cannot do without something like the idea of a better or worse approximation to

truth." Ibid., pp. 232, 233.

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TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS

Relevancefor the Purposes of this Study Scores of questions of this sort have been asked, and the proposed answers have been thoroughly analyzed and heatedly debated. My own positions on most of these philosophical issues need not be spelled out; it will suffice to explain why they are not really relevant for the purposes of this book on the production and distribution of knowledge. For much of the knowledge (in the weak and wide sense) pro­ duced (acquired, disseminated) in our society, the requirements of verifiability or falsifiability would be quite unmanageable. This can be readily seen with regard to spiritual knowledge. If knowledge is warranted belief, what kinds of warranty are accepted, or "ought" to be required, in order to decide whether belief in God and salvation can reasonably be accepted as "knowledge" of God and salvation? For the purposes of our study of the production (dissemination) of knowledge, there is no need to enter into epistemological discus­ sions of this sort. Sermons and Sunday-school classes have to be in­ cluded in our study no matter what one holds concerning the truth value of the contents taught. There are ways of making it all true knowledge regardless of the strength of belief in it or warranty for it. For example, whether or not I believe what the minister told me from the pulpit, I know that he said it, and thus I have full knowledge, verified by witnesses and documents, of what he and others have said about God and salvation. There may be less sophistical ways of accomplishing our purpose; in any case, the concept of knowledge used here must not be limited by positivistic restrictions.

A requirement that knowledge be "true," tested, verified would not be much less embarrassing with regard to other classes of knowledge, so-called scientific knowledge not excluded. It is one of the postulates of a scientific attitude that one is willing on good evi­ dence to reject or correct at any time what today is considered ver­ ified or "not yet falsified" knowledge. The possibility that our pres­ ent knowledge, say of statistical mechanics or cytology, might in the future be shown to be largely erroneous does not mean that what we now believe to be true in these fields cannot qualify as "knowledge." Conflicting hypotheses are often equally good explanations of the same set of events, and only one of them, at best, may eventually turn out to be correct. Yet all the competing hypotheses are part of ovir knowledge. The cosmogonists and the earth scientists have no tested knowledge of the origin of the universe or the earth, but they have knowledge of what has been written about it and of the com­ parative merits of the competing hypotheses. Similarly, the fact that

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QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

most of what Copernicus or Newton taught has later proved to be in need of correction, and thus was not "true knowledge," should not mislead anybody to deny that he possessed knowledge. "Knowl­ edge" need not be knowledge of certified events and tested theories; it may be knowledge of statements and pronouncements, conjec­ tures and hypotheses, no matter what their status of verification may be. The history of past errors in science is a highly important part of our knowledge today.15

The Wrong Fifty Per Cent The idea that most of our knowledge, even so-called scientific knowledge (in the wider sense permitted in the last two hundred years), is uncertain knowledge, was charmingly expressed by Sir William Osier of the Medical School at The Johns Hopkins Univer­ sity, around 1900, when he warned his students of that uncertainty: "Fifty per cent of everything I've told you is wrong. The trouble is, I don't know which 50 per cent."16 I shall later return to "wrong sci­ entific knowledge" when I speak of the notion "negative knowl­ edge."

Pastime and Artistic Knowledge The problem of truth is least bothersome in the case of what I have called "small-talk and pastime knowledge." The knowledge of a rape and murder which the newspapers disseminate in all gory de­ tails should, of course, be "possibly" true if it is to be effective, but the eager readers—and there must be many or the papers would not give so much space to such stories—do not care very much whether it is really true. They would read with almost equal interest a fiction story about the same rape and murder if it were equally brief and equally selective with regard to the details described. The main ele­ ment is probably the possibility of identification with the criminal, the victim, the detective, or someone close to any one of them: "It

15 Compare these statements with Popper's remarks on the subject: "Even Newton's

theory was in the end refuted; and indeed, we hope that we shall in this way succeed

in refuting, and improving upon, every new theory. And if it is refuted in the end,

why not in the beginning? One might well say that it is merely a historical accident if

a theory is refuted after six months rather than after six years, or six hundred years.

Refutations have often been regarded as establishing the failure of a scientist, or at

least of his theory. It should be stressed that this is an inductivist error. Every refuta­

tion should be regarded as a great success; not merely a success of the scientist who

refuted the theory, but also of the scientist who created the refuted theory and who

thus in the first instance suggested, if only indirectly, the refuting experiment." Ibid.,

pp. 242-243.

16 Quoted from Johns Hopkins Magazine, July 1977, p. 31.

150TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS

119

could have been me!" Since every true story has elements of fiction, and all pure fiction has elements of truth, they both should be re­ garded as objects of knowledge—not necessarily as knowledge of events that have actually taken place but, nevertheless, knowledge of reports of events. All this refers, with small or no modifications, to many kinds of intellectual knowledge. Knowledge of the IJiad or of the Nibelungen Saga is knowledge of works of art—poetry, fiction—which, in the opinion of almost all who possess it, enriches them. It is partly for this reason that we call it intellectual rather than pastime knowl­ edge. Other great literary works may contain more "historical truth," but this does not necessarily add to the amount of knowledge the knower of these works possesses. The reader of King Richard the Second does not acquire more knowledge than the reader of King Lear just because the former play is closer to history than the latter.

To know a play, a novel, or a poem qualifies as knowledge, no mat­ ter whether this work of literary art represents pure fiction or is partly based on bits of historical truth or perhaps contains references to general-abstract knowledge or even unrefuted scientific truth. There is no need, however, to rely completely on the subterfuge of having knowledge of, or being acquainted with, the particular liter­ ary work of art, for there is usually much more involved in the total mental experience it affords. A different kind of knowledge is im­ plied in a work of art, a message it conveys to the understanding reader—a knowledge which can be said to be true in a sense not ap­ proved under the standards of "scientific method"; it is what Her­ mann Broch called "heart-truth" and placed above "body-truth."17 Thus, besides the knowledge of the work, there is the knowledge of the heart-truth it conveys. In a similar vein, Whitehead taught us that "truth is various in its extent, its modes, and its relevance." Speaking of truth in art, he said this: "Appearance summons up new resources of feeling from the depths of Reality. It is a Truth of feel­ ing, and not a Truth of verbalization."18

Practical Knowledge Had Better Be True Perhaps one might say that the questions of confirmed truth, accu­ racy, verifiability, and falsifiability matter only for practical knowl-

17 Hermann Broch, Der Versucher [The Tempter] (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 1953). The

statement that "heart-truth is greater than body-truth" is made by the main character

of the novel, Mother Gisson, whose name is an anagram of Gnosis in the sense of posi­

tive knowledge.

18Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p.

343.

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120

edge, not for the other types of knowledge. Inaccuracy may have serious consequences in the application of practical knowledge. For example, misinformation about the time schedule of the railroad may cause me to miss my train; misinformation on the ingredients of a pharmaceutical product may cause my untimely death. There is a reason why "pragmatism," or rather one of the thirteen philosophi­ cal systems that go under that name, is understood as a theory of truth: lack of truth has no consequences in the case of nonpragmatic knowledge; when it has, the knowledge in question is pragmatic. If intellectual knowledge or pastime knowledge is told by somebody to impress others, but proves false and causes the teller to lose face, it is because he has actually used his knowledge in a practical way. Intel­ lectual knowledge stops being intellectual when it is exhibited by the show-off.

KNOWLEDGE AND BEAUTY

As we proceed to a discussion of knowledge and beauty, we should, before all, try to separate different aspects of the relation between the two notions. Knowledge in the sense of an individual's state of knowing or his (her) act of acquiring knowledge may give him (her) a pleasant feeling that some call (in rather metaphoric language) beautiful. "It is beautiful" to know and to learn. This sense of satis­ faction or exhilaration does not concern us in a discussion of the quality of knowledge, which surely refers to that which is known (or learned), that is, to the object or contents of knowledge. Even in the sense, however, at least two aspects have to be kept apart: (1) the known thing, thought, or image may itself be judged to be beautiful; (2) the way in which it is presented, the form in which the knowl­ edge is expressed or conveyed, may strike its recipient as beautiful.

The Object and the Form The difference between these two aspects can be most readily per­ ceived in the cases of literary or visual works of art that may be beau­ tiful presentations of beautiful, plain, or ugly objects. Thus, the plot of a beautiful novel, drama, or poem may be gruesome, gory, or dis­ gusting, whereas the form in which it is expressed may be beautiful by accepted standards. The images and shapes shown in paintings or sculptures may be unattractive, ugly, or terrifying though the be­ holder may be impressed by the exceptional beauty of the work of art. Botticelli's Venus (The Birth of Venus) is a beautiful painting of a beautiful woman, but Caravaggio's Medusa (The Head of Medusa) is a beautiful painting of a hideous woman. The monsters in the fan­ tastic pictures by Hieronymus Bosch are frightening or ridiculous,

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but usually quite ugly; yet the paintings are rightfully acclaimed for their beauty. The contrary relationship occurs too: many beautiful women have been shown in mediocre, bad, or awfully tasteless paintings. The connoisseur regards them as cheap art, or kitsch.

Performing Arts In the performing arts we may be confronted with a third dimension of the beautiful. In a stage play, for example, this attribute may apply, first, to a character in the play, second, to the way the play­ wright has succeeded in shaping this character in his drama or com­ edy, and, third, to the way in which the actor succeeds in making the character alive for us to see and to hear. Think of Cleopatra, the beau­ tiful queen of Egypt, of Cleopatra in Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra or of Cleopatra in Shaw's Caesar and Cleopatra, and of Cleopatra as played by Peggy Ashcroft, Maggie Smith, Vivian Leigh, Ingrid Bergman, Elizabeth Taylor, Elizabeth Ashley, some of the ac­ tresses best remembered in that role. Our knowledge of history's Cleopatra, of the author's Cleopatra, and of the actress's Cleopatra may give us the feeling of beholding a beautiful object of thought or sight in all three manifestations. Any reader whose interests include history, literature, and the theater will be able to think of examples where the attribute "beautiful" cannot reasonably be awarded to all three objects of his knowledge. I can easily imagine that Shake­ speare's beautiful characterization of King Richard the Third, ugly in physical shape and odious in his personal qualities, receives on some stage a performance that is, or is not, beautiful.

In music, another performing art, only two awards for beauty can be given: for the composition and for the performance. It is possible, of course, to judge different aspects of each. In a symphony, for example, we may find the tunefulness, the melodic lines, beautiful, but the orchestration not beautiful at all. In the performance of a sonata, we may find the display of the instrumentalist's technical skill beautiful, but the conception of the entire work deficient. In another type of the performing arts, the ballet, we may find beauty or lack of beauty in the music, in the orchestra's performance, in the choreography, in the scenery, in the costumes, in the dancing, and in the acting; this is not surprising in an art form that calls for the collaboration of so many producers of artistic knowledge.

Beautiful Theories, Beautiful Exposition The problem of knowledge and beauty is not, as one may think at first blush, related only to artistic work; it is pertinent to most other types of knowledge as well, especially knowledge expressed in words, including scientific knowledge. Again, we must distinguish QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

153122

substance (contents) and form. A scientific proposition (conjecture, hypothesis, theory) may be regarded as beautiful in its grandeur, its inherent elegance, its harmony with other scientific propo­ sitions—observation reports, generalizations, models, hypotheses, theories. On the other hand, its formulation may be awkward, clumsy, pedestrian, without grace or it may be elegant, sparkling, graceful, charming. It was in the former sense that Popper spoke of the beauty of a theory, even a refuted one.19 Many examples of the second sense of beauty in knowledge—beautiful exposition—can be found in all sciences, formal (logico-mathematical) as well as empir­ ical, natural as well as social and humanistic.20 Even the driest bits and pieces of scientific knowledge may, by a master of stylistic taste, be presented in a way that elicits the reader's acclaim: "beautiful!" By the style of his exposition, a scientist becomes an artist.

KNOWLEDGE AND GOODNESS

Having treated truth and beauty as qualities of knowledge, one is tempted to do likewise with the third member of the triad: goodness. The True and the Beautiful are commonly seen in company of the Good, and this suggests that we probe whether knowledge can have the quality of goodness. We do not, of course, mean good in the sense of "good for somebody" or "good for something"—which would refer to utility or usefulness—but good in an ethical sense, say, virtuous or in accord with moral precepts, the opposite of wicked or immoral. Can we reasonably attribute this quality of goodness to any kind of knowledge?

Ethics Neither knowledge of the Good nor knowledge about goodness jus­ tifies attributing goodness to such knowledge. A volume of ethical precepts or the knowledge it conveys may be useful, interesting, beautiful, but I cannot see any sense in calling that knowledge good in the ethical sense. Whether such knowledge of ethical precepts can be true or false depends on whether we regard it as empirical rather than normative. If it is interpreted as empirical knowledge—for example, assertions that particular valuations are in fact entertained by many people—truth or falsity can be attributed to it. On the other

19 "Even if a new theory . . . should meet an early death, it should not be forgotten;

rather its beauty should be remembered and history should record our gratitude to it."

Popper, Con/ectures and Refutations, p. 243.

20 On the notion of "humanistic sciences," see above, Chapter 3 in this volume and

Chapter 6 in Volume II, especially where I discuss Camap's thoughts on "unified sci­

ence."

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TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS

hand, interpreted as a code of conduct, a set of norms promulgated by churchmen, peers, or other moralists, ethical (value) judgments would be excluded by neopositivist and analytic philosophers from the universe of verifiable knowledge—and, by orthodox exponents of these schools, excluded altogether from the universe of knowl­ edge.21 But even if the category of normative statements is accepted as knowledge, and even if normative judgments are translated into empirical judgments, this does not carry with it a justification for at­ tributing goodness to the statements and judgments in question. In other words, neither ethical knowledge nor knowledge of ethics (the science of ethics) can be judged to be good or wicked. (Par­ enthetically it may be added that a possessor or asserter of ethical knowledge—or of knowledge of any sort—may of course be found good or wicked, but, though the "knower" can be good or bad, the "known" cannot.22

Normative and Empirical Statements I have spoken about the possibility of translating normative state­ ments into empirical ones. For some philosophers there is no need for such a translation; they hold that "valuation is a form of empiri­ cal knowledge."23 For others, however, transformation of a norma­ tive or evaluative statement into an empirical one, or of a sentence in the imperative mood into one in the indicative mood or, better still, in a conditional form, may be reassuring. Thus, "stealing is bad" or "thou shalt not steal!" can be translated into "if you steal, you will be despised by many." Likewise, "helping the poor is good" or "help the poor!" can be translated into "if you help the poor, you will feel good."

Moral Education My denial of the attributes good or bad to particular pieces of knowl­ edge, including ethical knowledge, was perhaps too rash. We con-

21 For Carnap1 "a value statement is nothing else than a command in a misleading

grammatical form. It may have effects upon the actions of men, and these effects may

either be in accordance with our wishes or not; but it is neither true nor false. It does

not assert anything and can neither be proved nor disproved." Rudolf Carnap, Philos­

ophy and Logical Syntax (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1935), p. 24.

22 This statement is not the same as—but may remind us of—the famous line in

Hamlet: "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" William

Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act 2, line 259.

23Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. vii. Regarding aesthetic

judgments, Lewis holds that "the value found in the experience is evidence of value

in the object," though "it is always subject to possible correction by later experience"

(p. 457). Of course this principle of permanent control (revisability) holds for all em­

pirical propositions.

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stantly read and hear about accusations that our educational system fails to instill in the minds of our youth an adequate appreciation of moral values, sufficient knowledge of what is right or wrong, good or bad. If moral education is called deficient, does this not mean that more knowledge of what is morally right would be "good"? Would this not, after all, justify our judging knowledge of moral values as morally good? Such knowledge of widely accepted moral values can be disseminated in a variety of ways, for example, in the teaching of religion, philosophy, history, social studies, literature, and other humanistic areas of knowledge. There are many beautiful stories, in literature and in history, which can impress the student not only through their relevance to his own life experiences and interests but also through their ethical connotations, and which can have effec­ tive and lasting influence on his actions and reactions. If education succeeded in giving most of the people a firm knowledge of right and wrong, it would surely be "a good thing." It would be good for the majority of the people; without hesitation one would consider it useful, beneficial to society. Still, I must leave it to the professors of ethics to decide whether their science24 is "good" in a moral sense.

A Special Class of Knowledge? With all this talk about ethical knowledge, one must wonder whether ethical knowledge should not have been given a place on the list I proposed as appropriate for the purposes of this book. Should it be regarded as a class of knowledge separate from the five that were enumerated? I do not think so. To the extent that ethical knowledge serves as a guide to action, it qualifies as practical knowledge. To the extent that it is knowledge of values actually recognized by others, but does not form a basis on which the knower judges his or their actions, it qualifies as intellectual knowledge. A treatise on ethics would be regarded by most of those who read it as conveying intel­ lectual knowledge, though it may have a lasting influence on the value systems of some readers and thus contribute to the production of practical knowledge. Thus, as ethical knowledge is either intellec­ tual or practical, it falls into either of two of the five classes included in the proposed scheme, and there is no place for a separate box labeled "ethical knowledge."

24 "Nor is there good reason for refusing the adjective scientific to such works as

Aristotle's Politics or Spinoza's Ethics and applying it to statistical 'investigations' or

'researches' that do not advance the understanding of anything." Morris R. Cohen,

Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method (Glencoe, 111.: Free

Press, 1931), p. 89. (I have quoted this statement on an earlier occasion.)

156CHAPTER 6

OTHER STANDARDS OF QUALITY

TRUTH, BEAUTY, AND GOODNESS, the triad of qualities more or less applicable to knowledge (in the sense of what is or may be known or conjectured), command the stage of philosophical discourse; but in less sophisticated, everyday parlance, a few additional qualities re­ ceive casual attention. These refer chiefly to knowledge dissemi­ nated by print media and electronic media of communication. I propose to examine a few pairs of opposites—serious versus light­ weight knowledge, workmanlike versus shoddy knowledge, wanted versus unwanted knowledge—and a few special qualities, such as noncomprehended knowledge, forbidden knowledge, dangerous knowledge, and supposedly unwholesome knowledge.

HIGH-GRADE AND LOW-GRADE KNOWLEDGE

Two pairs of opposites can be distinguished under this heading: serious versus lightweight knowledge, and superior, workmanlike versus inferior, shoddy knowledge. The difference between these pairs of opposites is that the first refers to the level of intellective ef­ fort required, the second to the level of workmanship and care de­ voted to the product.

Serious versus Lightweight Knowledge The distinction between serious knowledge and lightweight knowl­ edge impressed me as so important that I incorporated it into the five-class scheme I adopted for inquiries needed in various parts of this book. The distinction between intellectual knowledge and pastime knowledge is meant to correspond to that between serious and lightweight knowledge. Readers of books and sellers of books commonly contrast "light" reading with difficult or "heavy" reading; catalogues of phonograph records are divided into popular and classical music; opera houses in large cities refuse to include light operettas and musicals in their repertoires; museums and art galleries want to exhibit only "genuine" art to the exclusion of fake and cheap art; and so forth. These examples should clear me of possible charges that I am trying

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to impose my personal taste or an elitist standard of excellence upon a public that does not really care. To be sure, there are many audi­ ences indifferent to the fare offered by the media (publishers, editors, theatrical producers, broadcasters, etc.) as knowledge de­ signed to satisfy people's curiosity, their ambitions to learn, and their desires to be entertained. I submit, however, that the wide cur­ rency of the expressions used in my examples proves that these dis­ tinctions are actually made both by transmitters and by recipients of knowledge. The line between intellectual and pastime knowledge is not hard and fast. The differences I have proposed as the characteristic ones lie in the attitude of the knower, in the accessibility of the knowl­ edge, and in the effects of the knowledge on the knower. Most deci­ sive for the distinction are perhaps the active questioning and intel­ ligent concentration required in absorbing intellectual knowledge, in contrast to the passive reception of pastime knowledge. In addi­ tion, intellectual knowledge usually keeps its "cultural value" for longer periods, perhaps forever, whereas small-talk and pastime knowledge is only of ephemeral value. To give an example of the difference, I may point to a comparison between chamber music and rock 'n' roll music. It is a serious strain to listen to and appreciate a difficult chamber-music composition, at least the first few times; even on repeated hearings, the typical lis­ tener will try to discover nuances in rhythm, in harmony, in coun­ terpoint, which he has not taken in previously, or differences in in­ terpretation by the performers. In contrast, few rock 'n' roll listeners will concentrate on the aesthetic form and patterns of the composi­ tion; the enjoyment they get from listening will not be an intellectual one, and probably not one subject to aesthetic analysis.

The choice of these extremes in musical knowledge has made it easier for us to differentiate between them. Had we chosen an "easy" symphony or a melodious opera and compared it with a popular march or a "cheap" operetta, we might have found it hard or impos­ sible to make the difference stick and to draw a clear line between intellectual and nonintellectual knowledge. Here the reference to the "typical" listeners may not help us any longer in classifying the objects of knowledge and, to do it conscientiously, one would have to resort to an analysis of the "particular" listeners and their at­ titudes to the works presented. For a statistical study designed to show broad orders of magnitude, such resort to individual analysis is quite unnecessary; arbitrary distinctions according to "general opinions" on the aesthetic nature of the artistic offerings would not

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make much difference as far as aggregate quantitative estimates are concerned. For wide ranges of the spectrum between the extremes, the as­ signment to one or the other class will cause few qualms. No one will question t h e judgment that Goethe's Faust, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Dar­ win's On the Origin of Species, and Einstein's General Theory of Relativity are all rather heavy stuff, surely not light reading. There will be similar agreement on putting Erich Segal's Love Story, Jac­ queline Susann's Valley of the Dolls, Grace Metalious' Peyton Place, Zane Grey's The Knights of the Range, and Peter Benchley's Jaws into the category of light reading. The knowledge conveyed by the first group of books is well characterized as intellectual, whereas the books in the second category convey pastime knowledge. The same distinction holds for "general-interest" journals. Magazines like The American Scholar and Commentary supply intellectual knowledge, whereas magazines like The Ladies' Home Journal and True Confes­ sions supply pastime knowledge. Similar contrasts can be shown with regard to knowledge without words. Bach's Goldberg Variations and Berg's Violin Concerto are rather difficult music to appreciate, even by well-trained audiences. On the other hand, John Williams' popular music to the film "Star Wars" and Sinding's piano piece "Rustling of the Spring" are light music, pleasing to the untrained ear and listened to without effort. In the visual arts, Michelangelo's Creation and Rembrandt's Nightwatch demand concentration and exertion on the part of the viewer to be fully appreciated, whereas Maxfield Parrish's September Morn (a young nude coyly covering her female parts) can be taken in (and enjoyed by many) at the briefest glance. The characterization as in­ tellectual knowledge and pastime knowledge, respectively, will hardly incite protests from those who know the works in question.

If we attempt to make estimates of the relative amounts society ex­ pends to produce the different types of knowledge—and we shall try to do so, for example, when we study the expenditures on books and newspapers, radio and television—we shall rely on "expert opin­ ion" in classifying the contents of the presentations in question. This may look like a deviation from the methodological postulate of subjective interpretation, of "accepting" the knower's own evalua­ tions of the knowledge. That postulate, however, does not mean re­ liance on empirical survey research; it involves no more than the construction of "ideal types" of knowers. The investigator makes his distinctions with what I like to call the aid of "imagined introspec-

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tion." He asks himself how he would feel acquiring certain pieces of knowledge if he were the typical person acquiring it. To be sure, the investigator's imagination can hardly be free from the influence of his personal interests and tastes, though he will do his best to study and evaluate "representative" opinions and thus avoid serious biases due to his own background and experience.

Such problems of possibly biased evaluation and classification may arise several times in this study. Thus, when we come to the analysis of the mass media of communication we shall ask ourselves how their offerings are divided among the five types of knowledge which we distinguished, and to what extent the impression gained from "casual observation"—that by far the greatest part is pastime knowledge—is borne out by an examination of the contents. What in official statistics is called "entertainment"—the movies, theaters, operas, concerts, variety shows, etc.—will likewise be divided into intellectual and pastime knowledge, and my decisions may possibly be judged, by my critics, as high-brow or even snobbish. Similar dif­ ferences in value judgment may show up in connection with educa­ tion, since schools and other institutions of education produce knowledge of all five types—not merely practical and intellectual knowledge, as some idealists might prefer.

Workmanlike versus Shoddy Knowledge All knowledge industries, especially educational institutions and mass media of communication, produce sometimes low-quality out­ put. Every one of us who has attended school, or has children attend­ ing school, knows full well that many teachers are ineffective, badly prepared, or without the natural gifts required for good teaching, and that many textbooks are badly organized, poorly written, partly obsolete, and in some respects plainly wrong. Every one of us who reads a daily paper is aware of considerable amounts of misinforma­ tion disseminated in news items, feature articles, and editorials. All of us who listen to radio or watch television know that much of what is offered by these media is in poor taste, deficient in many respects, or downright shoddy. And, as readers of books and book reviews, we cannot fail to be cognizant of the fact that many of the products of the publishing industry are mediocre or even bad, no matter whether they purport to convey intellectual knowledge, practical knowledge, or merely pastime knowledge. How much of the total output of our knowledge industries falls below standards of acceptability, let alone standards of excellence? Important as this question is, I see no way to answer it. Neither the masses who receive the deficient knowledge nor the experts who are OTHER STANDARDS OF QUALITY

160129

appointed to evaluate its quality agree either on the standards by which it should be judged or on the degree to which individual products deviate from any specified standard. The same book that is highly praised by one reviewer is savagely attacked by another. A film is rated as a masterpiece by one critic and as trash by another. A stage play is recommended in one paper as the best of the year while other papers warn their readers against wasting their time seeing such tedious rubbish. Who is to be believed? And do we not know that some of the greatest music played by our symphony orchestras or in our opera houses was roundly rejected at its first performance, by the audiences as well as by the learned critics?

The conclusion is cogent: we have no infallible judges of the merits of works of art, scholarship, and even "scientific" research. We cannot accept the judgments of arbiters, be they appointed cen­ sors or self-appointed "cognoscenti." I shall not undertake to evalu­ ate the superior or inferior quality of any knowledge disseminated by institutions or media and to assign cardinal indices, numerical ratings or letter grades. I may in some instances vent my idiosyn­ crasies, display my prejudices, show my respect for some intellec­ tual achievements and my disrespect for others. But I shall not be so bold as to say what portion of our educational offerings is worthless and what percentage of the output of the print media or electronic media ought to be regarded as a dead loss.1

UNWANTED KNOWLEDGE

When I included "unwanted knowledge" in my scheme of classifica­ tion, I was not thinking of the required subjects taken by unwilling pupils at schools and colleges. What these pupils dislike is not the knowledge but rather the effort of acquiring it. Thus, when I de-

1 Strangely enough, some of my critics have complained about my disregard of the

quality of the information conveyed, for example, by advertisements, especially the

commercials on radio and TV. "Does the information contained in them really out­

weigh the misinformation?" asks Joseph A. Kershaw in a review of my 1962 book in

Public Opinion Quarterly, vol. 27, no. 3 (Fall 1963), p. 508, and he chides me for sim­

ply adding the money costs of the advertisements regardless of their "positive or

negative" contribution to the listeners' judgments in spending their incomes. At the

same time he scolds me for distinguishing the intellectual and pastime character of

the knowledge conveyed by phonograph records, although in these statistics I had

some guidance from the industry's classification of "popular," "classical," "jazz" and

"other" releases. I remain unconvinced; I shall not judge the truth value of advertise­

ments and other literary communications or the aesthetic value of artistic communi­

cations, but I shall make an effort to categorize knowledge according to type and sub­

ject matter where it is possible.

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QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

scribed what I think is unwanted knowledge, I spoke of knowledge "usually accidentally acquired and aimlessly retained," though out­ side the interests of the knower.

Wanted by Some, Unwanted by Others The existence of such unwanted knowledge will hardly be contested by anybody who has his radio or television program rudely inter­ rupted by long-winded commercials, or who has to wade through pages of advertising in his newspaper or magazine in order to find the end of the story that began on an earlier page. Some of the jingles which advertise the wonderful qualities of this or that product on the radio or TV may stick to the musical memory of some unhappy listeners like wads of chewing gum to the shoe soles of unhappy pedestrians and resist all efforts to remove them. The inclusion of this unwanted knowledge in an economic study of the production of knowledge is justified by the very large expenditures incurred in the process. Of course, this knowledge is not unwanted by everybody; there are always a few of the recipients who want it as practical in­ formation aiding their decisions about what to purchase and where. It is unwanted knowledge for the majority of listeners because they either have already absorbed it or do not care. Incidentally, that those for whom it is "wanted" knowledge are small minorities is not an argument against its dissemination. Help to a few may well jus­ tify a minor inconvenience to many. The trouble with this class of knowledge lies in the difficulty of estimating the proportions of the recipients who want and those who do not want to receive the messages in question. Assume, for example, that several thousands of people are at a large airport, some waiting to board a departing plane, others waiting for an incoming plane bringing the relative or friend they plan to meet. The loudspeaker announces in short intervals the airlines, flight num­ bers, and origins or destinations of landing or departing planes. Only between 100 and 300 persons are interested in any one announce­ ment, whereas thousands of others are uninterested, disturbed, and perhaps annoyed listeners to many messages which are not for them, although they are impatient to hear the one about "their" plane. The ratio of wanted to unwanted announcements received may be 1 to 100, which means that each message is unwanted by 99 per cent of those exposed to it. Yet, for the 1 per cent, the information is crucial, and there seems to be no technique available by which this small minority can be reached and the unwilling recipients spared. Since the recipients of the unwanted knowledge know the importance of the information to the small minority, they tolerate the stream of for

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them irrelevant and annoying messages. Perhaps, though, they re­ sent that the loudspeakers in the departure hall blare out the arrivals of incoming planes, and that the loudspeakers on the arrival side have to disseminate to people meeting their expected parties all of that unwanted knowledge about departing planes. Technology could provide for more discernment in the transmission of knowl­ edge to presumably interested recipients.

Nuisance Commercials as the Price of Desired Gifts There may be advertisements in newspapers and magazines, or on radio and television that are unwanted by virtually all readers, lis­ teners, and viewers, respectively, but which are inserted by adver­ tisers in the hope that they may hit at least a few potential buyers and thus attract some new customers and reinforce the loyalty of old ones. It is conceivable that the particular knowledge is unwanted by all recipients but, after all, it is its supplier who wants it dissemi­ nated and who pays for it. We cannot be sure the advertiser's hopes are justified, but we have reason to presume that he has duly consid­ ered the uncertain benefits and the certain costs of his decision to advertise. On this presumption, one may conclude that advertise­ ments are, by and large, regarded worth their cost by those who pay for them. The nuisance to the unwilling recipients of this knowledge is a "third-party effect," or, in economic jargon, an "external dis­ economy"; but it is possible that this injury or cost imposed on them is offset by a benefit in the form of a lower price, or even zero price, of the medium or of other, desired pieces of knowledge transmitted by the medium. For example, the newspaper or magazine may be sold at a much lower price than would be possible in the absence of revenue from advertising; likewise, highly desired musical or theat­ rical presentations on radio or television could not be offered with­ out charge to listeners or viewers were it not for the payments the advertisers make to the broadcasting stations.

The described examples of unwanted knowledge are communica­ tions addressed, so to speak, "to whom it may concern," but they are so widely distributed that they reach many who are quite uninter­ ested. Fortunately, our memories are quite selective and most mes­ sages which we see or hear but do not care to take notice of drop out of our memories almost instantaneously. If not retained but for sec­ onds or minutes, they are in the nature of noise, audial or visual, un­ desirable but not producing "unwanted knowledge retained against our will." If the noise is loud, we resent it, but it produces no knowl­ edge. Only if the message is "aimlessly retained" for a time does it represent unwanted knowledge.

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NONCOMPREHENDED KNOWLEDGE

The distinction, which I made in the preceding discussion, between unwanted knowledge and mere noise suggests similar questions re­ garding noncomprehended and only partly comprehended mes­ sages. Had a noncomprehended message better be regarded as knowledge or only as noise? A message fully comprehended but not retained in the memory for any length of time was designated as mere noise; if retained, though unwillingly, it was called unwanted knowledge. What about a mes­ sage not comprehended but nevertheless retained in the memory for a significant length of time? If it is sheer gibberish, or in a foreign language which the recipient does not understand, or in the form of a code which he cannot decipher, but if he nevertheless retains it, deliberately or aimlessly, should this noncomprehended sequence of sounds or visual signs be regarded as noise or as knowledge? I have concluded that it merits the designation "knowledge." Indeed, great importance may be attached to knowledge encoded by a transmitter in a form unintelligible to an intermediary who passes it on to a third party who can decode it.2 An imaginative reader will quickly think of spy stories in which the spy wants to send a secret message to some agent through an in­ termediary who is not supposed to know the decoded information and must commit it to his memory in the form not comprehensible to him. The sequence of sounds he has to learn, retain, and finally to reproduce for the appointed ears is surely knowledge to all parties including the noncomprehending middleman.

The messenger carrying in his head a nondecoded message is not the only example of a possessor of noncomprehended or only partly comprehended knowledge. The soprano singing German Jieder by Schubert and Schumann in a recital in a concert hall or salon may be another case of a person having memorized sounds which she fails to comprehend fully but undertakes, more or less successfully, to re­ produce for a more, or even less, understanding audience. I remem­ ber a singer who learned to perform a song in Japanese without knowing the meaning of the words. And surely many of us are aware of the fact that thousands of people of all ages, as members of reli­ gious congregrations, know prayers and hymns in Latin or Hebrew which they have learned, have committed to memory, and faithfully reproduce on specified occasions, without comprehending precisely

2 Specialists in infonnation science make fine distinctions between data, signals,

infonnation, and knowledge. These distinctions probably have their place in the

analyses in which they are used. They are not relevant for my purposes.

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(or even vaguely) what they know. Yet it surely is part of their stock of knowledge. I see no good reason for creating a special class for noncomprehended or partly comprehended knowledge. It may fall into any of the five classes enumerated in my scheme. It may be practical, in­ tellectual, pastime, spiritual, or unwanted knowledge. The fact that it is not fully, if at all, comprehended by the knower may not be as­ certainable by an outside observer. Hence, a statistical investigation attempting to assess the part of noncomprehended knowledge in the total stock or distribution of knowledge does not seem to be feasible.

RESTRICTED OR FORBIDDEN KNOWLEDGE

In the introductory chapter of this book, I casually referred to the widespread tendency of publicists to speak of knowledge as a good thing of which never too much can be had; at the same time it has been argued that there are some kinds of knowledge the dissemina­ tion of which "ought" to be restricted or forbidden by authorities, governmental, religious, or parental. In other words, some knowl­ edge has been deemed to be bad—either for those who acquire it or for others, who may suffer some ill effects of acts by those who have acquired it. The motivation to restrict the acquisition or dissemina­ tion of "dangerous" knowledge is, accordingly, either of the sort "don't read this book and don't look at these pictures, because it's bad for you (for your mental or physical health)" or of the sort "these publications and pictures should not be read or viewed, because they will lead those exposed to them to actions injurious to others."

The Victims of Dangerous Knowledge Who are these "others," who are to be protected from the effects of possible acts by recipients of dangerous knowledge? One may think of a variety of possible victims: innocent people suffering from acts of violence incited by exposure to such knowledge; men in power (in government, church, or public institutions) who may suffer from acts of disobedience or violence induced by the dissemination of an­ tisocial (or antiestablishment) knowledge; groups in society who may suffer from prejudice, intolerance, or acts of repression fostered by biased, derogative, or hate-inspiring expositions of knowledge, warranted or not; people whose property, health, or life may be jeopardized by armed forces in war or revolution and by terrorist bands who have learned to exploit new technological knowledge for making and using more destructive, more deadly weapons; un-

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known numbers of people in the future who might be attacked by escaped microbes or other organisms produced in experiments of gene-splicing (DNA recombinants), organisms against which the life sciences may be unable to develop effective mechanisms of protec­ tion; unknown portions of the members of future generations who might be incurably deformed as a result of gene mutations induced by still only vaguely known ecological developments (atmospheric or other) in the course of searching for, or applying, novel tech­ nologies. All these actual or hypothetical dangers ascribed to the creation and dissemination of various kinds of knowledge have been widely discussed, and most of them taken very seriously, in scientific, aca­ demic, political, juridical, and journalistic quarters. They have given rise to proposals or adoption of measures designed to suppress or re­ strict pornographic, subversive, and heretical communications, and to regulate research and teaching in astronomy, anatomy, nuclear physics, biophysics, genetics, demography, and various other social sciences. I cannot afford the space for discussions of all sorts of for­ bidden, restricted, or discouraged knowledge, but I shall single out for special attention two broad categories: allegedly unwholesome knowledge, which may wreak its presumed injuries on society gradually, and inflammatory or explosive knowledge, which may have its presumed destructive effects in a sudden burst or outbreak.

Unwholesome Knowledge The two major candidates for restriction (or suppression if this were possible) as unwholesome knowledge are subversive communica­ tions and obscene communications—more concretely, dissident and pornographic literature, graphics, and films.

The authorities have been zealous in their attempts to stop the dis­ tribution of such presumably dangerous knowledge, dangerous chiefly because it might undermine the authority of the authorities concerned. Their attempts have been only partly successful. The most draconic punishment of producers and distributors of subver­ sive literature has not completely silenced the dissidents nor stopped the political underground press in countries under authori­ tarian regimes. Likewise, even the harshest measures by church au­ thorities, state legislatures, and local police have not stopped the under-the-counter sale of pornographic books and magazines.

This is not the place to discuss the constitutional, legal, political, and philosophical issues concerning freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The point to stress is that in most countries, even where

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guarantees are written into their constitutions, the governments do not honestly believe in these freedoms. It is easy to understand why a ruler, desiring to stay in power, is determined to silence those who speak out against him in the hope of subverting his regime. It is not quite so easy to understand why governments are so hostile to the production and distribution of pornography. Where secular and re­ ligious authorities collaborate, attempts of the former to suppress pornography can be understood as a scheme of mutual assistance: the state helps enforce the teachings of the church and expects the church in return to support the power of the state. But why should the state continue to enforce the churches' ban on recreative sex where the state has become largely independent of the church? The explanation is possibly in terms of a cultural lag: popular beliefs cul­ tivated during thousands of years do not disappear when the direct control exercised by the expounders and persistent reinforcers of these beliefs declines or disappears. Large and highly vocal groups continue to demand that the state protect its citizens, especially the younger ones, from sinful knowledge which encourages them to seek sexual gratification for pleasure instead of procreation.

To be sure, there are also other motives behind the opposition to erotic realism and pornography. There is, for example, a widespread belief that masturbation is unhealthy3 and, hence, that any reading matter or pictorial presentation that stimulates sexual self-grati­ fication conveys unwholesome knowledge. The theory that in­ dulgence in solitary sex is unhealthy has been contradicted and re­ futed by psychologists and physiologists but still dominates the thinking of the masses. Hence, there is a strong popular demand that the health of the people be protected from exposure to titilating, sexually arousing pictures and reading matter.4

3 The Oxford Dictionary gives "self-abuse" as the meaning of masturbation.

4 I suspect that the two major groups who want to ban pornography, the one be­

cause it incites "sinful" conduct, the other because it incites "unhealthy" conduct,

overlap so extensively that they are in effect only one group. That is to say, among

irreligious people—persons who care little about religion, sin and salvation—

probably few can be found who want to censor or prohibit pornography. This state­

ment should not be taken as an argument against religion or religiously inspired

opposition to the distribution of "filth," "smut," and "hard porn." It is intended, in­

stead, to encourage research on the sources of the popular pressures for the prohibi­

tion of pornographic materials. The techniques of survey research could adequately

provide the answers. We ought to know whether the attribution of unwholesomeness

to this sort of knowledge is conditioned by religious, physiological, psychological, or

criminological beliefs. After we find out, the various hypotheses can be examined

with greater clarity and honesty than is possible when the arguments are confounded.

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Obscene Knowledge and Pornography This may be the place to clarify the semantic relation between obscenity and pornography.5 Both words have come to be used to denote the reactions of readers, viewers, or listeners: obscene is what offends them, pornographic is what arouses them sexually. These are highly unsatisfactory word usages because they refer to entirely per­ sonal responses. What is offensive to some may be acceptable or even pleasing to others; what is sexually arousing to some may leave others cool. It depends on family background, religious attitudes, education, experience, intelligence, age, and other factors, including mood and other momentary conditions, whether a given description of sex acts, sex fantasies, or sex organs leads to a person's sexual arousal. To rely on the personal sensibilities of juries and judges, police officers and magistrates is to let judicial decisions be deter­ mined by subjective states of mind rather than objective facts. If definitions are to be "nonloaded" they have to remove the emotional connotations of the words "obscenity" and "pornography"; these words have to be defined, not in terms of effects on, or reactions of, people, but in terms of what they are: descriptions of matters related to certain human functions normally performed in privacy.6

Whether pornography has a psychological effect on a particular reader or viewer in his capacity as an appointed or self-appointed arbiter or censor is one thing; it is quite another thing whether por­ nography has objectively observable effects on masses of readers or

5 The etymology is clear. Obscene is derived from the Latin preposition ob (or obs}

and caenum, which means dirt; pornography from the Greek words pome, which

means harlot, and graphos, which means drawn or written. Thus, obscene means

dirty, but is used chiefly to mean indecent, grossly offensive. Pornography means lit­

erally "description of the life, manner, etc. of prostitutes and their patrons." (The

quoted words are from the Oxford English Dictionary.)

6 An official commission, reporting in 1970, tried to solve this terminological prob­

lem in a different way: "Some people equate 'obscenity' with 'pornography' and

apply both terms to any type of explicit sexual materials. Other persons intend differ­

ences of various degrees in their use of these terms. In the commission's report, the

terms 'obscene' or 'obscenity' are used solely to refer to the legal concept of prohibited

sexual materials. The term 'pornography' is not used at all in a descriptive context

because it appears to have no legal significance and because it most often denotes ef­

fect. The report uses the phrases 'explicit sexual materials,' 'sexually oriented mate­

rials,' 'erotic,' or some variant thereof to refer to the subject matter of the commission's

investigations; the word 'materials' in this context is meant to refer to the entire range

of depictions or descriptions in both textual and pictorial form—primarily books,

magazines, photographs, films, sound recordings, statuary, and sex 'devices'."Report

of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, September 30, 1970 (New York;

Bantam Books, 1970), p. 5, note 4.

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viewers as members of society, for example, inciting them to engage in patently antisocial actions, such as rape or child molestation.7 Only the second question should matter in deciding whether the legislature ought to prohibit or penalize the dissemination of por­ nographic knowledge. The question whether a causal relationship exists between exposure to pornography and engagement in sexual assault cannot be answered by merely anecdotal "evidence" and ex­ pert impressions (prejudice). The answers must be sought in empiri­ cal research, and they have thus far been negative.8

The widespread belief regarding supposedly injurious effects of pornography on private or social conduct has been characterized as a "patriarchical hysteria" and illuminated by the following observa­ tion: "We know of no case where any juror or judge has admitted that he found material erotically stimulating or a stimulus to irregu­ lar conduct; on the contrary, the expression of concern is always that someone else or some other class of people will be corrupted."9 This observation is quite astute in recognizing that the would-be censor, proscriber, and avenger of pornography regards himself as guardian of society against the weaknesses of other people, who, less virtuous or fortitudinous than he, would, by reading or viewing erotic and sex-oriented materials, develop into dangerous criminals. The quoted comment, however, is poorly formulated in that it speaks of a stimulus to "irregular conduct." What is irregular to some may be regular or even wholesome to others. To be relevant to public policy, the fears and warnings should be of rape, child molestation, torture, killings—not of deviant sex practices among consenting adults.

'Needless to say, "abnormal sex acts" between consenting adults are neither in­

jurious to society nor encroaching on the freedom of any of its members. That many

persons judge such conduct to be a sinful or disgusting abomination does not make it

antisocial.

8 "In sum, empirical research . . . has found no evidence to date that exposure to

explicit sexual material plays a significant role in the causation of delinquent or crim­

inal behavior among youth or adults. The Commission cannot conclude that exposure

to erotic materials is a factor in the causation of sex crime or sex delinquency." Re­

port, p. 32. A dissenter from the majority report preferred to rely on authority. Among

others, he quoted St. Paul and J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. See Report, pp. 616 and 637, respectively. The majority of the commis­

sion had guarded itself against such dissenting views: "It is no longer necessary to

rely on expert opinion alone. Several empirical studies are now available to inform

discussion regarding the relationship between erotic material and antisocial behavior

among minors." Report, p. 258. The same conclusion was reached regarding adults.

9 Quoted from Peter Michelson, "An Apology for Pornography," in Douglas A.

Hughes, ed.,Perspectives on Pornography (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970),p. 63.

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QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

Erotic Knowledge and Intellectual Freedom In arguing the case for freedom of speech, of the press, and of the reading, listening, and viewing public, we probably should make some distinctions among different media of communication: books, magazines, sculptures, pictures, motion-picture films, burlesque shows, so-called live shows (live sex shows), and television. The case for freedom is strongest when the allegedly unwholesome knowledge is transmitted through the printed word, especially in books. No one whose sense of propriety is offended by erotic litera­ ture or explicit description of sex has to read the "obscene" books. If adolescents acquire such books, perhaps we ought to welcome the chance that they may develop an appreciation of books and join the small "elite" of book readers. The case is not so strong for pornographic articles in magazines, and much weaker for entire magazines devoted to explicit sex, espe­ cially because of their multimedia approach—the marriage of words and pictures, so much more appealing to those who like to avoid the effort of reading but are prepared to do a little of it when lured by salacious or erotogenic pictures. Still, the case for freedom is stronger than that for governmental restriction, especially because the restrictions cannot be enforced except in a brutal police state. In the case of motion pictures, one may argue for an exclusion of chil­ dren and youngsters, a restriction that can be enforced without undue cost in resources and freedom. No strong case can be made for antipornographic restrictions in theatrical performances—the stage, burlesque shows, and live shows. Youngsters can be kept out with­ out much difficulty, and prudish adults can stay away.

The case against pornography is strongest in television broadcast­ ing, because in this medium it is practically impossible to keep it from children and immature youngsters. Moreover, if there is not a multiplicity of TV channels available, unwilling adults without suf­ ficient strength of character may be exposed to what they do not choose to view but have to view because they cannot bring them­ selves to turn off their TV. The public's demand for pornographic materials has been enor­ mous, and supply, whether permitted or prohibited under the laws of the countries at various periods, has sought to meet the demand. This has been true in all civilized societies from antiquity to the present. The Register Librorum Eroticorum, compiled by Rolf S. Reade (Alfred Rose) and published in London, 1936, lists more than 5,000 English, French, German, and Italian titles, not including "the vast amount of ephemeral erotica in the shape of pamphlets, draw-

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OTHER STANDARDS OF QUALITY

ings, photographs, films, postcards, and the like, which have formed the stock-in-trade of the commercial pornographer since Victorian times."10 The size of the pornographic business at the present time will be discussed in Volume V. The belief that repressive actions by government (Federal, State, or local) can be effective is utterly naive; such actions lead to waste of public funds, neglect of really impor­ tant public services, and infringements of the freedom of the press that is essential to a free society. The well-meaning fighters for chaste and clean morals had better learn to recognize that "erotic realism and pornography . . . fulfill certain functions and answer basic needs in the human psyche."11 Prior to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the dissemination of explicit sexual materials had been re­ garded as protected by the Free Speech Guarantee of the Constitu­ tion except when they were found to (1) appeal to the prurient inter­ est, (2) exceed the standards of candor in the representation of sexual matters, and (3) be "utterly without redeeming social value." In a decision in 1973, a work was defined as criminally obscene if, taken as a whole, it was found to (1) appeal to the prurient interest, (2) por­ tray sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner and (3) be lacking in any serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. "Pat­ ently offensive" were representations of ultimate sexual acts, mas­ turbation, excretion, and lewd exhibition of genitalia. The other criteria were to be assessed in terms of "community standards"— though it was not said whether community referred to a geographic subdivision of the United States or the country as a whole. These criteria allow judicial assessments to be determined by the degrees of prudishness and bigotry of the particular juries.

It is well known that unquestionably scientific treatises, such as the Kinsey Report or the studies by Masters and Johnson, have been bestsellers, not because of the scientific character of the findings, but because of the sexual stimulation which most of their readers ex­ pected from these works. The enormous popularity of such literary masterpieces as John Cleland's Fanny Hill, D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, and Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer—all of which had been banned in English-speaking countries until the 1960s—is not due to the graphic pictures of social conditions at var­ ious times or places which they provide, or to the excellence of their

10H. Montgomery Hyde, A History of Pornography (London: Heinemann, 1964),

pp. 14-15. The number of titles has probably been multiplied many times between

1936 and 1975.

11 Hughes,Perspectives, p. 15.

171QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

140

style, but rather to their erotic contents.12 As far as the local commu­ nity standards are concerned, the correlation between these and re­ ligious attitudes is probably so close that one must wonder how supporters of the separation between church and state can accept the primacy of local sensibilities over freedom of the press.

Reflection on the criteria by which legitimate pornography is separated from illegitimate pornography raises several hard ques­ tions. Regarding the deference to community standards despite evi­ dent regional differences in the degree of liberation from Victorian fig-leaf mentalities, one must ask why the same knowledge of par­ ticular subject matters deemed to be harmless in New York should be condemned as unwholesome and dangerous in Tennessee? (Are inhabitants of Memphis more easily incited to rape?) Regarding the attestation of scientific value of a work that includes explicit de­ scriptions of sexual matters, one must ask why such descriptions are less unwholesome to the reader if they are offered with an appropri­ ate admixture of scientific jargon and statistical tables than if they are served unblended? (Is the same total of erotic content less harm­ ful if taken with scientific soda water than if taken straight?) Regard­ ing the attestation of artistic value of a sexually explicit drawing, one must ask whether the implicit incitement to acts dangerous to innocent victims is really reduced by the picture's artistic design. (Can many of the rapists and child molesters distinguish between great art and vulgar illustration?) If pornographic knowledge were to constitute a "clear and present danger" to society, its suppression could be justified; but there has been no conclusive evidence to that effect.13 To rule on the legiti­ macy or illegitimacy of sex-oriented literary or pictorial presenta­ tions on the basis of arbitrary standards of tastes, morality, sensibil­ ity, enlightenment, and similar subjective criteria is incompatible with the principles of a free society. Those who dislike pornography can avoid the offensive books, pictures, and magazines. Those who like it should not be barred from reading and viewing what gratifies their tastes and desires. Incidentally, we may remember that the types of knowledge distinguished in the classification scheme pro-

12A literary masterpiece, James Joyce's Ulysses, was also among the forbidden

works in England as well as the United States because of the "obscenity" of certain

passages and of its "coarse" language. It was only in 1933 that the American courts

legalized its imports, publication, and sale. I did not include the work with the three

mentioned in the text, because its appeal to the reader was not due to the explicitness

of the language, though the notoriety of its "illegality" may have contributed to the

sales volume.

13 This is the essence of the dissenting opinion of Judge Frank in the 1956 case of

Philip Roth, the author of Portnoy's Complaint.

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posed for this book are basically characterized by the knower's own attitude toward the knowledge he acquires or possesses. If the prin­ ciple of subjective evaluation of the stock and flow of knowledge is applied also to the appraisals of its quality, the judgment that par­ ticular kinds of knowledge are unwholesome to him is reserved to the knower; it is none of the business of the authorities.

Inflammatory or Explosive Knowledge Whereas subversive and pornographic knowledge are feared by the authorities and by public opinion chiefly as unwholesome, as poison slowly debilitating the body politic and society at large, other areas of knowledge are feared for their possibly inflammatory or explosive effects. Indeed, only if acquisition and dissemination of any kind of knowledge can be shown to constitute a clear and present danger will a believer in the freedoms of speech, research, and teaching concede that restrictions are at all legitimate. The first of three examples offered here of interferences with aca­ demic research and teaching is highly questionable on precisely this ground. Some members of the academic community, chiefly stu­ dents but also some professors, have tried, through intimidation by a variety of means, to discourage genetic research on suspected race differences in mental ability. The discouragement of such research is defended because its findings, however tentative, could reinforce ra­ cial prejudice and might be used in support of prejudicial racial policies.14 But why should such prejudices be feared since "error of

14 The following quotation from an editorial on "Social Determinism and Behav­

ioral Genetics," by Bernard D. Davis, Science, vol. 189 (26 September 1975), p. 1049,

may help us understand the background of the controversy:

Unfortunately, the idea of genetic diversity has encountered a good deal of resist­

ance. Some egalitarians fear that its recognition will discourage efforts to elimi­

nate social causes of educational failure, misery, and crime. Accordingly, they

equate any attention to genetic factors in human behavior with the primitive

biological determinism of early eugenicists and race supremacists. But they are

setting up a false dichotomy, and their exclusive attention to environmental fac­

tors leads them to an equally false social determinism.

Ironically, this opposition parallels that of theologians a century ago: both saw

the foundations of public morality threatened by an implication of evolution. But

neither religious noi political fervor can command the laws of nature. One might

accordingly expect scientists, knowing this very well, to encourage the public to

accept genetic diversity—both as an invaluable cultural resource and as an indis­

pensable consideration in any approach to social equality....

To be sure, in behavioral genetics premature conclusions are all too tempting,

and they can be socially dangerous. Moreover, even sound knowledge in this

field, as in any other, can be used badly. Accordingly, some would set up lines of

defense against acquisition of the knowledge, rather than against its misuse. This

suggestion has wide appeal, for the public is already suspicious of genetics. It

173142

QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it" (Thomas Jefferson)? Is there really a clear and present danger of a violent outburst, a violent confrontation apart from one organized by the very same people who oppose the controversial opinion? The ac­ tual danger is not of a violent response by those who may be per­ suaded by the findings presented by the unpopular researchers, but of violence threatened by groups unwilling to tolerate statements of disliked opinions—statements they may not even have read but which they prefer to have suppressed rather than combatted by rea­ soned argument. The second example of proposed restrictions on scientific inquiry relates to "recombinant DNA" research. (DNA stands for dioxyribonucleic acid.) A set of safety guidelines for the conduct of feder­ ally financed experiments "involving recombinant DNA molecules" has been formulated, but a coordinated effort is being made to obtain federal legislation imposing guidelines on all such research, or even to stop it altogether. The fear is that the techniques may be usable for genetic engineering, deliberate modification of the genes of complex organisms, including man. Another fear is that new microorganisms may be developed in the course of experimentation and might "es­ cape" and attack the human body, which is not constituted to defend itself against them.15 Such fears are exploited by sensation-seeking journalists and popularity-seeking politicians. Biological re­ searchers are still hopeful that they will be able to prevent the enactment of unduly restrictive regulations.16

recognizes that earlier, pseudoscientific extrapolations from genetics to society

were used to rationalize racism, with tiagic consequences; and it has developed

much anxiety over the allegedly imminent prospect of genetic manipulation in

man. . . .

15 An appeal for a temporary moratorium on experimental DNA research was

signed by a group of scientists that included James D. Watson, who had shared a

Nobel Prize for his work on the structure of DNA. He later conceded that "The vision

of the hysterics has so peopled biological laboratories with monsters and super-bugs

that I often feel the discussion has descended to the realm of a surrealistic nightmare."

Quoted from The New York Times, Sunday, July 31,1977.

16 Several lessons of history should warn against exaggerated optimism of progres­

sive scientists. To secure a sober judgment of the strength of prohibition!sm in teach­

ing and research we need not go back to the trials of Galileo; it suffices to recall that

during the lifetime of most of us the teaching of biological evolution was forbidden by

law in some States of this country, and that we can always count on some excessively

cautious scientists to lend their support to the prohibitionists. Even Isaac Newton de­

cided against publishing some of his findings because he thought that some knowl­

edge was not to be communicated "without immense damage to the world." See Betty

Joe Teeter Dobbs, The Foundations of Newton's Alchemy or The Hunting of the

Greene Lyon (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1975), p. 195. The fact that Charles

174OTHER STANDARDS OF QUALITY

143

The third example of proposed restrictions on research, develop­ ment, and dissemination of knowledge is probably the best known, best documented, and perhaps also the most reasonable. It stems from the fear that mankind has been developing the technology to destroy itself, and that only the strictest control over that technology can prevent the final catastrophe. When research and development concerning the hydrogen bomb was ordered, some of the most dis­ tinguished physicists—Robert Oppenheimer most notoriously— argued against that undertaking. When the United States had the monopoly of knowledge of this most destructive of all weapons, it did its utmost to prevent or delay the spread of that technology to other countries. Yet it did not take very long before four other coun­ tries had developed their nuclear technology and the capacity to produce hydrogen bombs. As long as only the largest and most pow­ erful countries possessed the bombs, one could hope that the princi­ ple of mutual deterrence would save the world by keeping each of the bomb-owning countries from ever considering a "first strike." However, as the number of countries with the capacity to make their own bombs increases, reliance on the principle of mutual deterrence becomes questionable. But the worst of all dangers lies in the possi­ bility that terrorist groups might come into possession of atomic bombs. They could hold up the world for ransom and, in order to appear credible and be sufficiently feared, they might put their bombs to use. Proliferation of the knowledge to make nuclear devices for nonpeaceful purposes is regarded as the greatest threat to humanity. Here, then, is a case where knowledge is of immense danger to na­ tions and to civilization.

Darwin delayed by twenty years the publication of his most important theories on

natural selection is indicative of the inhibitions of a scientist whose findings may

subvert the teachings of the authorities.

175CHAPTER 7

NOTIONS OF NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE

Is THERE SOMETHING that should be called negative knowledge? If so, what is it?

Accepted Knowledge Negated by New Knowledge Some who have suggested the term "negative knowledge" want it to mean erroneous knowledge, or knowledge which has proved false or will prove false when properly tested.1 Others have used the term in a different sense, namely, to refer to knowledge that negates proposi­ tions previously or potentially held, by themselves or by others. These are just two of a much larger family of notions that may some­ how deserve designation as negative knowledge. I shall first intro­ duce, and then discuss, several members of this family: erroneous knowledge, contradicted knowledge, contradicting knowledge, ob­ solete knowledge, alternative knowledge, rejected knowledge, in­ adequately supported knowledge, questionable knowledge, uncer­ tain knowledge, vague knowledge, illusive knowledge, confusing knowledge, and knowledge fertile of negative predictions.

Frank Knight, the well-known philosopher-economist, once quoted approvingly a humorist's dictum to the effect that "It ain't ignorance that does the most damage, it's knowing so derned much that ain't so."2 If I know, or believe I know, something that in actual fact is not so, my knowledge is erroneous, or "negative." But on whose authority or on what evidence can I say that "in actual fact it is not so"? Eitheryou know better and consider my knowledge false or I myself will find out later that I was in error. In the first case we are faced with two inconsistent knowledge claims; in the second, with a prediction that I "shall find out" or, alternatively, a postdiction that my previous knowledge-belief was in error. If we think that the term "negative knowledge" helps characterize these situations or sequences, we have to choose which of the two contradictory pieces of knowledge better deserves to be called negative: the previ­ ous one, which at one time I considered a (positive) part of my stock

11 am indebted to Kenneth Boulding for an interesting correspondence on this

point.

2 Frank H. Knight, "The Role of Principles in Economics and Politics," American

Economic Review, vol. 41 (March 1951), p. 5.

176NOTIONS OF NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE

145

of knowledge, or the new knowledge claim, which contradicts or negates the previous one. If the negation eliminates a part of my stock of knowledge, perhaps it should be called negative. Is not my stock of knowledge reduced now that I have to discard a part of it? Does not the new knowledge, which negates the previous one, com­ pel me to make a subtraction from the minuend (the quantity to be diminished), and, therefore, does it not constitute the subtrahend, the negative magnitude?

Disproved and Suspended Knowledge This, admittedly, is sheer quibbling. It does, however, lead to the question whether accepted knowledge becomes nonknowledge when it is successfully contradicted or whether it merely becomes another kind of knowledge. If something that has long been regarded as true knowledge is eventually shown to be false, it is not erased either from the memories of those who have believed it to be true or from the written or printed records in our collections and on our li­ brary shelves. If the disproved fact, event, or theory belonged, for example, to the systematic body of knowledge called physics, it will be moved into another file, kept in the department of history of physics, another systematic body of knowledge. Seen from this angle, contradicted knowledge is not negative knowledge but only knowledge moved into another file. It may go into a file for historical knowledge or ob­ solete knowledge, or, perhaps, if many are not convinced by the dis­ proof, it may go into a file for "pending matters." It has happened that some of the relegated pieces of knowledge have been moved back into an active file, not only from the pending file but also from the obsolete file.

Knowledge Losing Relevance Not all obsolete knowledge consists of erroneous, contradicted, dis­ proved knowledge; an even larger part may simply have lost its rele­ vance or timeliness. Most of such now irrelevant knowledge was, at one time, true knowledge, neither erroneous nor irrelevant; but it re­ lated to circumstances that no longer exist. Much of it was practical knowledge, useful in guiding decisions and actions of a certain pe­ riod. To give examples, knowledge of market conditions in, say, 1952, was of value to some businessman of the time, knowledge of technology important to an entrepreneur and producer, knowledge of highway conditions to a freight carrier, and so forth. Today, all this once timely knowledge is obsolete; it is irrelevant to busi­ nessmen, producers, and freight carriers of our day. However, there

177QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

146

may be records of such obsolete knowledge in various documents, and it may be also in the memories of a few living persons. If some­ one wishes to call it negative knowledge, he is free to do so, but such nomenclature hardly contributes to our understanding of the types of knowledge.

Alternative Knowledge: Acceptance Pending The reference to the logical opposites, contradicting knowledge and contradicted knowledge—which induced me to the quibble about which of the two had a better claim to the designation "negative"— presumed a rather simple situation: the successful negation of an er­ roneous proposition. In many instances, however, we are faced with alternative hypotheses with no strong clues as to their relative truth or probability values. To know that something is either this or that or both constitutes knowledge, to be sure, but it is not sure knowledge—and it is not negative knowledge either. The hope, typical in such instances, is that one day, sooner or later, we shall find out; but for the time being, things are not settled and we must be satisfied that the knowledge of two or more possibilities is preferable by far to no knowledge at all.

Demoted Sciences There is a great deal of rejected knowledge, possibly rejected for­ ever, and no respectable scientist would dare to hold out any hope for its restoration or vindication. Among once widely accepted sci­ ences, or systematic bodies of knowledge, which are now repudiated and in utter disrepute, are astrology, demonology, necromancy, and studies of supernatural phenomena. Astrology, defined in the Oxford Dictionary as the "practical ap­ plication of astronomy to the prediction of events, natural and moral," was classified as Natural Astrology, concerned with the foretelling of natural phenomena, and Judicial Astrology, concerned with judging the occult influences of the stars upon human affairs (Astromancy). Is this "negative" knowledge? Webster's calls it a "pseudo science." It is no longer taught in universities; and most of us smile at quaint acquaintances of ours who believe it highly sig­ nificant that I was born under the sign of Sagittarius and that one ladyfriend is a Virgo and another a Libra. I have sometimes been scolded for my ignorance in these matters, which means that this is a body of knowledge taken seriously by many of our contemporaries and even (or, rather, consequently) by newspapers and magazines catering to the masses. Knowledge of the influences of the stars upon human affairs is un­ scientific (which may not say much since the same adjective is used

178NOTIONS OF NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE

147

to downgrade systematic knowledge of unquestioned truth or prob­ ability) and almost certainly erroneous. None the less, systematic knowledge of astrological beliefs, for example, a history of astrology, or anthropological and sociological studies of astromancy, cannot reasonably be denied the status of scientific research projects (in the international sense of science). They may be good science or bad sci­ ence; for example, the historian may have relied on poor translations of foreign documents, or the anthropologist may have misinter­ preted his evidence or overlooked the availability of relevant data. Still, the research and the findings, and the knowledge derived from the analysis, are scientific and positive, no matter how irredeemably erroneous are the beliefs which the investigator set out to study.

Controversial Knowledge Claims These considerations suggest comments on some fields of knowl­ edge or ignorance regarded as science, pseudo science, semiscience, or nonscience, depending on which of the protagonists or an­ tagonists you consult. Think, for example, of extrasensory percep­ tion (ESP) or parapsychology. The convenient operational definition of science as any systematic body of knowledge studied (researched, taught) at several reputable universities would give research on ESP the status of science—centers for ESP research exist at several toprated universities—were it not for the heated arguments of a highly respected and very vociferous opposition. Much of the evidence for the defense has been exposed as untenable, in some instances even as downright fake. But not all evidence has been toppled and, al­ though the "prosecution" considers it weak and doubtful, the de­ fense has not conceded defeat and continues to hold its ground. To call research on ESP and parapsychology erroneous knowledge, or negative knowledge, would be to take sides in an ongoing scientific controversy, largely on the basis of sympathy and respect for par­ ticular members of the academic establishment.

If some quixotic champions of "scientific method" should protest and pronounce that the burden of proof is on those who make posi­ tive knowledge claims, not on those who contest them, one may rule them out of order. The notion that only empirically verified proposi­ tions are accepted in a science has been found wanting (see above, Chapter 5). Indeed, an overwhelming portion of the propositions ac­ cepted in nearly every empirical science is unverified and even unverifiable: they certainly cannot be verified on the basis of observa­ tion or observation statements.3

3 According to Sir Karl Popper, theories are "never empirically verifiable." Karl R.

Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London- Hutchinson; New York: Basic

Books, 1959), p. 40. Even the neopositivist Rudolf Carnap retracted his early tenets

179QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

148

This recognition disposes of another candidate for the class of negative knowledge: inadequately supported knowledge. None but analytical knowledge—logical inferences from formal definitions, conventions, and postulates—is really supported by unquestionable evidence. There are degrees of confidence with which one accepts knowledge that has "proved its mettle,"4 and degrees of significance of sentences judged by rules of correspondence between theoretical postulates regarding "unobservable entities" and sentences with "terms designating observables."5

Questionable Knowledge One may see a difference between inadequately supported knowl­ edge and questionable knowledge; the difference is at best one of degree, not a difference of kind. All empirical knowledge is ques­ tionable. The "principle of permanent control"—the recognition that all empirical knowledge is uncertain and the willingness to consider its potential modification or rejection—has been regarded as the sign of a truly scientific attitude.6

Vague Knowledge Knowledge may be vague. To know something only vaguely is not the same as to recognize the essential uncertainty of any part, or all, of empirical knowledge. Uncertain knowledge, incomplete knowl­ edge, and vague knowledge are rather different things, although in some instances and to some extent vagueness may be due to the un­ certainty and incompleteness of knowledge. More often, however, vagueness is due to inadequate comprehension by the knower or to inadequate exposition on the part of those who communicated their knowledge to him. I have discussed these possibilities in the preced­ ing chapter. Vague knowledge may be more or less useless for pur­ poses of making decisions and taking actions, but it is nevertheless not without value where the knower's major concern is intellectual satisfaction, entertainment, or salvation. This too has been pointed out earlier: clear and accurate knowledge may be essential to a per-

regarding verification and confirmation: "It was clear that the laws of physics could

not possibly be completely verified...." and "we must abandon the earlier view that

the concepts of science are explicitly definable on the basis of observation concepts."

The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap1 edited by Paul A. Schilpp (La Salle, Illinois: Open

Court, 1963), pp. 57 and 59.

4 Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 33.

5 Carnap, The Philosophy of Rudol/ Caniap, p. 8.

6 Felix Kaufmann, Methodology of the Social Sciences (New York: Oxford Univer­

sity Press, 1944), p. 53.

180149

NOTIONS OF NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE

son who relies on it for practical action, but most knowledge is not of this type, notwithstanding the contrary opinions of pragmatists, be they active practitioners or thinking philosophers.

Superstitions Some of my friends are particularly negative when it comes to superstition. For them, superstitions are false beliefs, errors, nega­ tive knowledge. I grant them that superstition is defined as errone­ ous and useless knowledge, but just which of a person's beliefs are superstitions is a matter of judgment. We know that many people, indeed, millions of people, act on the basis of knowledge which they believe to be valid and true but which we believe to be invalid or false. They may despise us for our disbelief, whereas we may con­ descendingly smile at, or seriously disapprove of, their naivete, cre­ dulity, blind conviction. Let us recall that "one man's superstition is another's religion," that "one religion is as true as another," and that "superstition may be defined as constructive religion which has grown incongruous with intelligence."7 In these circumstances, the distinction between superstitions and religious beliefs becomes a matter of arbitrary judgment. I have ac­ cepted knowledge of God and salvation as spiritual knowledge and am willing to admit certain kinds of superstitions under that head­ ing. Profane or mundane superstitions, not concerned with sacred beliefs, but earnestly believed with great conviction, constitute prac­ tical knowledge if the believers' decisions and actions are based on them. Some industries flourish thanks to superstitions. Large quan­ tities of amulets and charms are purchased by people who believe in their power to avert accidents, disease, or other dangers.

Beliefs in the curative powers of certain drugs and patent medi­ cines, despite warnings and condemnations by highest medical au­ thorities, are knowledge acted upon by thousands of people. The prescription of supposedly effective, though probably poisonous, cancer cures, such as laetrile, is undoubtedly based on "knowledge of controversial probability value." If legislatures often side with the believers in knowledge claims which have been scientifically re­ jected, they may be motivated by (a) a sentiment for personal free­ dom ("everybody has a right to his foolishness"), (b) a feeling that the supposedly wrong ideas may after all be true, and (c) an inkling

7 The first of these three quotations is of (to me) unknown origin; the second is from

Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, Part 3, section 4; the third, from John Tyn-

dall, "Science and Man" inFragments of Science, quoted from John Bartlett1Familiar

Quotations, edited by Christoper Morley (Boston; Little, Brown, 1950), p. 543.

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QUALITIES OF KNOWLEDGE

that the majority of the voters may reelect legislators who let the people act on their beliefs or on particular beliefs.

I realize that the subject of superstition merits more discussion from several angles. From the point of view of my work, however, there is little or no reason to pass judgment on the knowers' or be­ lievers' warrants for their beliefs or knowledge. For my purposes, knowledge is what people think they know. Whether or not I agree with them is irrelevant for my study.

Illusive Knowledge The next item on my agenda relates to illusive or deceptive knowl­ edge, and I select optical illusions as my example. The subject of visual illusions is very old: the ancient Greeks wondered why the moon looks bigger near the horizon than it does high in the sky— even in our day different explanations coexist.

A favorite example is that of two parallel lines of equal length that are made to look different after different "arrows" are drawn at their ends.8 The tentatively accepted theory posits an acquired mental ability, named "size constancy," which enables the brain to reinter­ pret the relative sizes of images on the retina of the eye. The brain can apply alternative interpretations about what sort of object the eye perceives. The unconscious rule of size constancy enlarges or reduces the perceived image. The mind's interpretations of the eye's perceptions may lead to corrections as well as to illusions. Can we always decide with assuredness whether the knowledge acquired from our "experience" is correct or illusive? Evidently not. Illusive knowledge is surely not negative in any meaningful sense.

Confusing Knowledge Perhaps I have failed, in connection with some of the types of knowledge discussed, to differentiate sufficiently between current flows of knowledge—messages, information—and stocks of knowl­ edge, knowledge recorded or remembered. If a subclass of "confus-

8 This is the Muller-Lyer illusion, called after Franz Miiller-Lyer, who showed it in

1889:

\

B

/ )

Λ

<

A

)

Line A looks shorter, probably because it is interpreted to be closer to the viewer than

line B. Recent research on visual illusions has been done by Richard L. Gregory,

Bionics Research Laboratory, University of Edinburgh. (Cited from a feature article by

Boyce Rensberger, "What Optical Illusions Do to the Brain," New York Times, Janu­

ary 23,1979, p. C3.—See also the interesting article by Edmond L. Wright on "Illusion

and Truth," Philosophy and PhenomenoIogicaI Research, vol. 39 (March 1979), pp.

402-432.

182NOTIONS OF NEGATIVE KNOWLEDGE

151

ing knowledge" is recognized as one of the class which some may regard as negative, one should probably intimate that it is more likely a new piece of information than an old part of the knowledge stock that may be confusing. There are so many possible causes of confusion that any attempt at enumeration would be futile. Inconsistencies, contradictions, am­ biguities, gaps, mutilations, technical noise, linguistic deficiencies, equivocations, and other sources of semantic noise are all possible causes of confusion. Some confusions may be attributable to the in­ formation source, the encoding and transmitting processes, others to the receiving and decoding processes and to deficiencies in the background knowledge of the message recipient. The problems al­ luded to in these expressions are treated in the theory of communi­ cation, on which more will be said in a later volume of this work.

Excluded Possibilities and Negative Predictions I am coming to the last item on my agenda for the discussion of knowledge types qualified by the adjective "negative."

Karl Popper had shown that the conclusions to which theoretical knowledge can lead are eventually in the nature of prohibitions or exclusions that "forbid" the occurrence of certain kinds of events. A positive prediction tells that only one of several possibilities will be observed. Following Popper's reasoning, Friedrich Hayek, in a methodolog­ ically important article, stated that some sciences can provide the basis for specific positive predictions, excluding all but one of a large number of possibilities, whereas other sciences may at best select a few alternatives as the most likely outcomes, and thus exclude the rest.9 In some disciplines, however, even this may be outside the investigator's capacity to predict; he may have,to confine himself to select one event, or a few, that cannot occur under the conditions specified. Such negative predictions, specifying what cannot occur or is most unlikely to occur, but allowing a very large number of possible outcomes to be realized, can be very important. To know that what others expect to result from certain actions will in fact not happen is the economist's most significant achievement, and to disseminate this negative knowledge may be his greatest con­ tribution to society. Frank Knight expressed the same view: "I do wish to stress the importance of negative conclusions, particularly in relation to ac-

9 Friedrich A. Hayek, "Degrees of Explanation," Bntish Journal for the Philosophy

of Science, vol. 6 (1955), pp. 209-225.

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tion, the advisability of not doing things that will make matters worse, and the fact that principles of economics do have in a high degree this unromantic sort of value."10

Conclusion Having reviewed the various meanings and connotations attached to the expression "negative knowledge," I conclude that some of the types of knowledge to which it may refer can be given a negative, others a positive, evaluation; but in view of the semantic diversity, it is wiser to avoid using the term.

10 Knight, "The Role of Principles," p. 5.