73The Nobility Towards the last years of Aurangzeb’s reign (1658–1707) the older problems of conflict between imperial authority and certain groups of the nobility began to reappear, though in a very different form. In a number of cases, the nobles began to seek avenues to build their fortunes in obvious disregard of the principles defining their powers and positions.4 Aurangzeb had to constantly warn his nobles against the consequences of a tendency among them to flout Mughal norms and royal prerogatives.5 Bahadur Shah (1707–12) thus inherited a difficult situation. Moreover, a large section of the nobility, particularly that which had supported Prince Muhammad Azam, his erstwhile opponent in the contest for the throne, was uncertain and apprehensive.

Bahadur Shah tried to solve the problem by encouraging some new elements and by imposing certain constraints on the ambitions of the dominant sections of the nobility, as well as by extending some concessions to some of them. In accordance with the usual tradition, he appears to have decided to give mansabs to the nobles with a liberal hand,6 more so because Prince Muhammad Kam Bakhsh, another claimant to the throne, was still to be dealt with in the Deccan. A change is, however, also discernible in Bahadur Shah’s attempt to tackle the dilemma of the nobility. He showed restraint in promoting the interests of the members of the old and the established families (khanazads) and favoured high positions for the relatively new and obscure elements in the imperial service. He did not accept the high claims of the two powerful groups of the nobility—led by Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan, Iranis, on the one hand and by Chin Qilich Khan (Nizam-ul-Mulk), a Turani, on the other—for the office of wazir (chief revenue minister) and other special privileges. He (p.22) appointed as wazir Mun‘im Khan, an Indian born Turani, who was outside the charmed circle of the privileged groups and had not held a high position at the time of Aurangzeb’s death. After Mun‘im Khan’s death (28 February 1711) Bahadur Shah did not appoint any eminent noble to the office of the wazir, even though both Zulfiqar Khan and Chin Qilich Khan reasserted their claims. Instead, Prince Azim-ush- Shan was allowed to control and supervise affairs of the wizarat with Sadullah

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Khan, a Kashmiri Indian, to practically carry on the work.7 It is significant to note that Chin Qilich Khan and a number of the other Turanis resigned their mansabs and decided to live in retirement, protesting at the neglect of the old nobles and the rise of the new nobles to high position.8

In this connection the appointments and promotions of the Indian Shaikhzadas who find little mention in the better-known Persian histories of the period are significant. Shaikh Ilahyar of Bilgram who joined the imperial service through Prince Azim-ush-Shan seems to have held an important position under Bahadur Shah. Later in 1715 in the reign of Farrukh Siyar he rose to a rank of 6000 zat with the high sounding titles of Mubariz-ud-Daulah, Rustam Zaman Khan.9 In another instance, Ruh-ul-Amin Khan of Bilgram is reported to (p.23) have entered state service through Mun‘im Khan, the wazir, with only sixty horsemen and foot soldiers. Soon, however, he became a close associate of the wazir and on his (wazir’s) recommendation obtained a mansab of 6000/2000.10 Further, a number of Indian Afghans appear to have risen in favour with Prince Azim-ush- Shan in Bahadur Shah’s reign. Some of them from Awadh were among those who sided and died with the prince in the Civil War at Lahore in 1712.11

Bahadur Shah’s appreciation of the problem of the nobility and the efforts he made remained within the limited confines of some of the experiences of his predecessors. In the demands and protestations of the old nobles he saw the reappearance of the ambitions and pretensions of some of the sections of the nobility, namely, the Turanis and also the Iranis. The solution of the problem, the emperor believed, lay in the statement of the loyalty of the nobles to his person which he thought he could do by bringing to the fore the relatively obscure sections.

The old families seem to have appreciated the emperor’s concern and tried to meet the threat they saw to their fortunes, by reiterating their loyalty to the emperor. It is significant that the contemporary Persian chroniclers have portrayed the rise of the non-Turani-Iranis in terms of a conflict between the khanazads and the umara-i jadid (new nobles). The use of the term khanazads for the Turani-Iranis, which asserted the age old servant-master ties between them and the emperor, and the term or adjective of jadid (new) for the others, which emphasized the notion of the upstart, are to be specially noted in the context of both the emperor’s emphasis on loyalty to his person and the Mughal system. The khanazad position or long tradition of service involved an assertion of trustworthiness and loyalty to the salt, and legitimized their claims to privileges. These attributes—loyalty and trustworthiness—assume (p.24) special importance in a milieu in which the noble was theoretically in the position of a slave (banda) of the court (dargah).

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However, the disaffection was no longer limited to one or the other family group of the nobility. It involved both the organization and the emoluments of this institution, namely, mansab and jagir systems, and thus the whole nobility as well as lower sections of the Mughal officials were affected. The problem of the nobility was closely linked to a number of challenges that the Mughal state began to encounter from the zamindar and peasant uprisings. The threat from these uprisings, however, assumed a serious form in the wake of the widening gap between the emperor on the one hand and the nobility, the core of the empire, and the petty revenue assignees and the madad-i ma‘ash holders on the other.