75Problem of Jagir Administration and Finance Khafi Khan reports how the nobles were greatly agitated over the deductions from their emoluments for feeding the royal animals (khurak-i dawab), till these were virtually remitted altogether.12 That the new mansabs and jagirs carried little weight is also amply borne out from our sources. We will notice below some more evidence to show how the emperor’s orders for assignment of jagirs and mansabs had become ineffective. The problems of the realization of revenues from the jagirs by jagirdars and their resistance to the principle and practice of frequent transfer of jagirs require a little more attention. Since the inception of the jagir system, the jagirdars encountered difficulties in their jagirs. Even under Akbar, the jagirdars were not expected to realize in full the revenues assigned against their mansabs. In the course of the seventeenth century a number of measures including the Rule of Proportion and the Monthly Scales were taken to adjust the actual collections of the jagirdars (hasil) to their income on paper in the exchequer (jama).13 We cannot say if it would be fair to account for the gap between the jama and the hasil in the seventeenth century in terms (p.25) other than the tendency of the exchequer to assess the revenues at an inflated rate. This tendency which also thrived on the jagirdars’ urge to have a large income, even if on paper, commensurate with their status, must have been a major factor responsible for the gap, in addition to the influx of bullion and the subsequent price rise.14 For the eighteenth century, however, we have some evidence to suggest that the difference between the jama and the hasil had a close bearing on the jagirdars’ ability/inability to mobilize strength to collect the revenues. In this connection it is interesting to note that in some regions of the Mughal empire, at least, the actual yield increased without a corresponding rise in the jama.15 This was a symptom of a decline of imperial control over these regions and proved to be to the obvious advantage of the intermediaries who steadily gained in power resulting in the increase in number and magnitude of their resistance to the jagirdars. The jagirdars’ military power had declined following the reforms in the mansab and jagir systems in the seventeenth century. With a rise in the strength of the intermediaries their position further weakened and they were in greater need of help and protection from the centre. But as almost the entire central power was harnessed against Kam Bakhsh, the Marathas and

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the Sikhs, one uprising following the other, little resources were left to defend the interests of the jagirdars all over the empire.

We can conjecture how in these conditions the jagirdars could have begun to manipulate, first, to cling to their jagirs for a longer period and then to make them their life-term holdings. The genesis of the jagirdars’ resistance to the frequent transfer of the jagirs can be traced back to the days of the Great Mughals.16 With long-term jagirs, the jagirdars may have expected to build local roots by playing one group against another, for instance. A long-term jagir would obviously eliminate the lurking fear of encountering a new set of difficulties each time the jagirdar came to his new jagir.

The rise in strength of the intermediaries further jeopardized the income of the smaller jagirdars who expressed their anguish by (p.26) disregarding the state regulations even in and around the imperial centre. In a number of instances, the local officials of Delhi violated the rules and became responsible for hardships to ‘the traders and wayfarers’.17 Indeed total chaos seems to have prevailed in Mathura, a town not very far from the Mughal centre. The ‘ruffians’, as our source puts it ‘plundered the grain stores and put the town at ransom’. Subsequently, foodgrains became scarce and the price of wheat rose to 5 sers a rupee. The riot may have been confined to the region of Mathura and may have occurred, as our source implies, due to the absence of the faujdar from Mathura,18 but it probably indicated the existence or the beginning of a problem of a much wider dimension. In the following chapters we will notice more instances of this development which impaired local administration.

All this led to an atmosphere of increasing uncertainty which in turn further exacerbated the strains on royal finance. If the chroniclers are to be believed we can presume that the reign of Bahadur Shah began upon a note of relief. ‘Food was in abundance, trade prospered and the opportunities for the artisans, traders and the troopers were so much that they were hardly pressed by the necessities.’19 Thus the emperor, as Khush-hal Rai reports, regulated and stabilized the prices of foodgrains which had been lately fluctuating due to the political disturbances.20 (p.27) Further, strict orders were despatched to the faujdars posted in the vicinity of Delhi, urging them to maintain an uninterrupted and regular supply of a sufficient amount of foodgrains to the capital.21 The extent to which the faujdars carried out these orders is a matter of conjecture. However, within a period of two years, the imperial camp on the emperor’s way back from the Deccan to Hindustan is reported to have been hit by a shortage of foodgrains. This shortage may have followed drought and epidemic in addition to the inter mediaries’ resistance. We have some such references in our sources which are also supported by the rise in the prices of foodgrains in the areas in close proximity to the imperial route.22

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(p.28) The Deccan expedition and the shortage of supply in the royal camp must have drained the treasury. The empire was thus faced with the crisis of money. ‘To sum up’, as Chhabele Das, the agent (vakil) of Raja Jai Singh at the court commenting on the progress of the preparations for the imperial campaigns against the Sikhs in 1711, observed, ‘the battles are fought with army and the provision of army requires money, but money is not seen anywhere. Let us see how God wills.’23

Under the circumstances, the emperor was compelled to take certain steps which provoked discontent and rancour among yet other sections of the nobility and state functionaries. It has been pointed out earlier that Bahadur Shah’s failure also stemmed from his inability to come out of the frame of the previous traditions. This is also illustrated from his orders discriminating against the Hindus on religious grounds in the wake of imperial campaigns against the Sikhs. On suspicion of some Hindu clerks’ sympathy with the Sikhs of Banda, he issued an order requiring all Hindu officials to shave off their beards to prove their loyalty to Mughal authority. Simultaneously, the Hindu waqai ‘nigars (newsreporters) were ordered to be replaced by the Muslims.24 It is not unlikely that Bahadur Shah took these steps in a desperate bid to mobilize the khanazads for a Sikh expedition. That these orders further alienated the emperor from the nobility and the other officials is, however, beyond doubt.

(p.29) Further in view of the financial difficulties, certain promises seem to have been left unfulfilled. Ghazi-ud-Din Khan, the governor of Gujarat, received nothing against the emoluments of 4000 soldiers of the army which he had temporarily raised to realize the revenue from the local zamindars. The amount had been sanctioned by the emperor over two months earlier. On 13 September 1711, Imad-ud-Din Khan complained that he was still to receive the amount of Rs 10,000 which were ordered to be paid to him in advance as loan (musa‘ada).25

Thus, the imperial order tended to carry little weight even with the state functionaries at the centre. Much worse, in this context, was the order to control promotions and the award of new mansabs. On 31 May 1710, Hidayat Kesh Khan, the chief news writer was directed to refrain from accepting, making entry of and issuing a memorandum (yaddasht) for any new mansab or promotion (apparently to the new elements) without confirmation from the offices of the bakhshis (heads of military departments). This was to be done even if the candidate carried an order with the special signature of the emperor.26

The directive was purportedly to regulate the mansab system. But it also had a bearing on the nobles’ (in this particular case certainly the old nobles) urge for extended powers. The offices of the bakshis were still with the khanazads. A greater control of the bakshis over the grant of mansabs would imply a check over the emperor and also over his queens who were ‘recklessly’ awarding favours to the ‘upstarts’. Another order intended to set right the administration

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could not be implemented, as it affected the position of (p.30) the khanazads. It had to be withdrawn for the same reason later in Jahandar Shah’s reign.27

Thus was the beginning of the widening gap between the Mughal emperor and the different sections of the state officials. Till this point, however, there was no substantial change in the relationship of the province with the imperial authority. The nobles in charge of the provinces were content with a few additional offices under their control in the province. It was a measure of Bahadur Shah’s success in that his successor, Jahandar Shah immediately after his accession to the throne received arzdashts (letters of obeisance) along with plenty of treasures and precious presents from the chiefs, the governors and the other nobles posted in the provinces.28

Yet, in Bahadur Shah’s time some unmistakable symptoms of the decline of the imperial edifice could be noticed. Cracks had appeared in the emperor-nobleother officials relationship. The emperor attempted to mend these but without changing or modifying the rules governing the existing structure of the relationships. None of the measures he took to straighten the administration could rectify the structural flaw of the existing framework in which power and authority, in a large measure, depended on the individual achievements and the capabilities of the emperor. The emperor calculated that the loss incurred to the prestige of the empire following military failures against the local ‘disturbers’ could be compensated merely by an exaggerated demonstration of the myth that he was the source of all power and patronage. He thought that he would restore the imperial aura by emphasizing his authority and ostensatious display of pomp and eclat at the court.29 This is also illustrated from the way he decided to deal with the growing power of the Sunni Muslim theologians. Of late, they had acquired some strength which occurred from their privileges as madad-i ma‘ash holders. But Bahadur Shah did not touch the rules governing their holdings. Instead, he followed the example of Akbar and invited the ulama to debate with them to emphasize his supreme position in (p.31) religious matters.30 Against the nobles, he seems to have been concerned more with his prerogatives. At best, he tried to streamline the central official structure, while the problem had its roots in the dislocation of the relationships at the local level which sustained this structure.

Again, the developments of Bahadur Shah’s own time, namely the Deccan expedition, the Rajput problem and the Sikh uprisings imposed serious constraints on the emperor’s efforts. In the sixteenth century Akbar had been enormously assisted by favourable circumstances in his success against the pretensions of the Chaghtais and the Mirzas. The Mughal empire was still growing then. With prospects of expansion and avenues unfolding increasingly, Akbar could easily venture to enlist the support of the other sections, e.g., the Iranis and the indigenous elements to bolster his position without thwarting the legitimate claims of the older nobility. With little scope for further expansion

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after 1707, the mechanism to keep the state machinery intact and in effective working order had to be sought much beyond the contours of territorial and military adventure. Further, multiplying financial difficulties, in the wake of famines and recurring rural disturbances, did not allow the emperors, in our period, to take adequate stock of the situation. Their individual failings as compared with those of their predecessors further aggravated problems in our period. The following details of the second phase of our period provide ample illustration of the extent to which developments at the centre were interconnected with those in the periphery.