119Towards Provincial Independence However, Mun‘im Khan’s attempt at encouraging the regional magnates as important officials in the locality is also to be viewed against the background of the cases of the successful defiance of imperial directives by certain domiciled jagirdars.63
The geographic and economic position of the province was the second phenomenon, obviously not peculiar to any one phase of our period, (p.81) which influenced the pattern of the Punjab’s relations with the imperial centre. The Mughal province of the Punjab occupied a central place in the entire region beyond the Sutlej which had an access to the sea or led to Central Asia through trade routes. For a fuller authority over the Punjab, the provinces of Multan, Kashmir and Kabul had to be protected from occupation by hostile forces. The route from Kabul and Kashmir to Delhi passed through the Punjab and the latter had vital commercial links with these provinces, while any zamindar revolt in Multan might well disturb the south-western districts of the Punjab. In a period when the nobles had begun to look for avenues to build their own bases in the provinces the passing of any one of these provinces into the control of a powerful noble was likely to be a serious threat to imperial control of the Punjab. Asad Khan resisted the appointment of Ibrahim Khan, an associate of the wazir,
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to the governorship of Kabul. Prince Jahandar Shah, a friend of Zulfiqar Khan, was governor of Multan throughout the reign of Bahadur Shah while Jafar Khan alias Kamgar Khan, a maternal cousin of Asad Khan, held the governorship of Kashmir until his death on 22 August 1709.64 Interestingly, Asad Khan and Zulfiqar Khan prudently withdrew from the Punjab in Jahandar Shah’s reign when the governors of Multan, Thatta and Kashmir were appointed on Khan Jahan Kokaltash’s suggestion.65 These were no ordinary changes, as Kokaltash was a favourite of the emperor and, having long held the deputy governorship of Multan and Thatta, had developed interests in the region. Since Zulfiqar Khan had high access in the new regime, he managed to secure Gujarat province for his father, possibly to strengthen his own position as viceroy of the Deccan.66
(p.82) Asad Khan’s withdrawal from the Punjab was also forced by the growing realization of his inability to deal with the Sikhs. At whatever cost, the emperor and a host of the nobles, unlike Asad Khan, were for an all out war against the Sikhs. This is illustrated from the appointment of Abd-us-Samad Khan by Farrukh Siyar. Zabardast Khan who had succeeded Asad Khan in Jahandar Shah’s time did not fail to express his loyalty to the next Emperor, Farrukh Siyar.67 Nonetheless, he was replaced by Abdu-us-Samad Khan68 while Saiyid Abdullah Khan, the wazir, secured for himself the provinces of Multan and Thatta.69 For, vigorous military operations were necessary to quell the Sikhs and with Abd-us-Samad Khan who commanded a large Mughal armed contingent, eminent Mughal generals like Muhammad Amin Khan and Aghar Khan were expected to fight. Suppression of the Sikhs is mentioned as the chief objective of Abd-us-Samad Khan’s appointment in the Punjab.70
(p.83) We are not sure if Abd-us-Samad Khan came to Lahore with any additional powers. It is, however, interesting to note that by the time of Farrukh Siyar governorship with extended authority had emerged as a major issue of conflict between the governor and the imperial centre. For over two years Abdus-Samad Khan was engaged in Sikh campaigns and had little time to look after the government of the province.71 By 1715 when Banda Bahadur, the Sikh leader, had been captured and executed, he was relatively free to attend to the administration. In view of the peculiar problems of the province, he asked for greater control over the province. He failed in his bid, since he belonged to a faction at the court openly opposed to the wazir who as governor of Multan and Thatta had his own interests at stake in the region. The wazir tried every possible effort to contain the governor. He even overlooked the cases of violation of imperial rule by his associates who were, in consequence, emboldened to neglect their duties under one pretext or another.72
The wazir also made a bid to place the province in a more amenable hand. Samsam-ud-Daulah, a friend of the wazir and the deputy mir bakhshi, is reported to have advised the emperor to replace Abd-us-Samad Khan by his brother, Muzaffar Khan and to appoint as deputy governor Isa Khan Mein, a powerful
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Ranghar Rajput zamindar of Beth Jalandhar. But for the protest by the family members of Abd-us-Samad Khan, Samsam-ud-Daulah’s scheme would have been carried out. Muhammad Amin Khan resigned from his mansab and ceased to visit the court. Subsequently, the emperor, afraid of losing the support of a powerful group of the nobility, persuaded Samsam-ud-Daulah to withdraw his proposal. Samsam-ud-Daulah, however, managed (p.84) to secure Isa Khan the faujdari of Beth Jalandhar.73 Abd-us-Samad Khan could meet this threat on account of the support of yet another local potentate. Some time in the beginning of 1716 he secured the faujdari of sarkar Beth Jalandhar for his son, Zakariya Khan and selected Shahdad Khan, a powerful Afghan chief of the province, as the deptuy faujdar of the sarkar. Isa Khan resisted the new arrangement and in an encounter with Shahdad Khan he was defeated and killed.74
The rupture between the centre or the wazir and the governor is also illustrated from the wazir’s abortive attempt to replace Abd-us-Samad Khan by Mir Jumla.75 As a result of these developments, Abd-us-Samad Khan grew apprehensive and began to plan, strengthening (p.85) his position in the province. This probably constituted the first major stage in the breakdown of the existing pattern of relationship of the Mughal centre with the Punjab.76
Our sources record a number of cases that show the governor’s utterly disrespectful attitude to the centre. In one case, the waqaiʿnigar of Jammu who had long been transferred is reported to have refused to hand over the charge to the deputy of the waqaiʿnigar, at the instance of the governor.77 In an another instance, the diwan expressed his inability to maintain the provincial treasury, as the revenue realized from the parganas was either misappropriated by the governor or was sent off to Kabul.78 In a third instance, the governor tried to shirk his responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in those areas of which he had perhaps wanted but failed to obtain the faujdaris.79
Abd-us-Samad Khan’s attitude to the questions of the successor and the left-over assets of Isa Khan is yet another example of how the governor threw the centre’s directives overboard. Isa Khan held a rank and in accordance with the rules his property was escheated. But the confiscated property of the deceased, instead of being deposited at the office of the diwan, was reportedly seized by Shahdad Khan, the governor’s protégé. Again, the son, the officials of the estate (peshkar and mutasaddi) of the deceased were ordered to be escorted to Delhi. But (p. 86) the governor, as it was reported on 10 August 1716, refused to hand them over to the stewards (sazawals) of the diwan.80
The governor thus made attempts to extend his control over the office of the diwan. The diwan, as we can presume, was no longer adequately assisted by the centre in the performance of his duty, it is not surprising then that he also tried to act as independently as the governor. Sometime in the beginning of 1717 the
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diwan spent up to Rs 15,000 from the revenue of the Salt Range, which was according to regulations, reserved for the emoluments of the soldiers and local officials of Kabul. He had also begun to neglect his duties and held the kachahri only once a week. However, the diwan of the Punjab, unlike his counterpart in Bengal, could not afford to act on his own discretion. He lost his position in the province and was summoned to the court.81
Since Abd-us-Samad Khan also had the backing of his faction at the centre, Saiyid Abdullah Khan, the wazir and Samsam-ud-Daulah, the deputy mir bakhshi could not dislodge him from the province altogether. Yet they made consistent efforts to contain him by keeping their own henchmen in control of important offices in and around the Punjab. Among the significant provincial offices we know of, only the faujdaris of Jammu and Beth Jalandhar could be placed under the charge of the governor’s men.82 Diwans of the province, faujdars of Gujarat, Sialkot and (p.87) Emanabad, qiladars and kotwal of Kangra and Lahore, all were in one way another associated with the wazir or Samsam-ud-Daulah.83
The wazir retained the governorship of Multan and governed it, through his deputies, throughout the period of his ascendancy.84 He seems to have taken utmost care in choosing his deputies and assured himself of the absence of any association between them and the governor of the Punjab. It was only after the death of Saiyid Abdullah Khan, when ‘Turani’ nobles commanded supreme authority at the court that Muhammad Amin Khan, a supporter of Abd-us-Samad Khan, the governor of the Punjab, was appointed the governor of Multan.85 Abdus-Samad Khan deputized for him in Multan. Earlier he had succeeded in securing for Muhammad Amin Khan, the governorship of Thatta, but only for a brief period of about five months (16 June 1716–11 (p.88) November 1716). For the rest of the period Thatta was under the governorship of Raja Ajit Singh and subsequently Muhammad Azam Khan and Mahabat Khan, all associates of the wazir.86 The wazir, also tried to replace Nasir Khan, the governor of Kabul, by one of his own associates, Aizz-ud-Daulah, Khan-i Alam. The arrangement, however, did not work successfully and Nasir Khan had to be recalled to Kabul. After his death, however, the wazir managed to appoint Sarbuland Khan as governor of Kabul.87 The governorship of Kashmir was initially given to Sadat Khan with Muhammad Azam Khan as his naib. With Inayatullah Khan’s return to power in 1716–17, Kashmir came into his possession and remained so for the rest of this period.88
The wazir’s endeavour to contain the governor assumed the guise of establishment of institutional order, but the factional politics at the court gave it a strong personal dimension. In 1719 when the wazir was at the height of his power, he plotted to eliminate Abd-us-Samad Khan along with his other associates, such as Muhammad Amin Khan and Nizam-ul-Mulk. Husain Khan Khweshgi, an Afghan chief of Qasur, was promised a rank of 7000 zat and the governorship of the Punjab, if he prevailed over and killed Abd-us-Samad
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Khan.89 Subsequently, Qutb-ud-Din Khan, the amil of Abd-us-Samad Khan’s jagir in and around Qasur, was killed in an encounter and Husain Khan with an army of about 9000 devastated the villages in the parganas of the jagir of the governor. In an encounter with the governor at Chhoni, 97 kms from Lahore, Husain Khan was ultimately defeated and killed.90
(p.89) By the beginning of Muhammad Shah’s reign, the governor of the Punjab was almost completely estranged from the centre. The congratulatory letters from the wazir to Abd-us-Samad Khan on the latter’s victory over Husain Khan Khweshgi91 were simply to allay the apprehensions of the governor. The wazir regarded Abd-us-Samad Khan and also Nizam-ul-Mulk as the instigators of the revolts by the old nobility (khanazads) in the Punjab and the Deccan respectively.92
We have no evidence for any open revolt of the nobility in the Punjab, but Abdus-Samad Khan had tried to obtain a degree of independence from the centre in administering the province. This engaged his attention to such an extent that he could not give more than a lukewarm response even to the imperial farman sent to him after the death of the wazir’s brother, Husain Ali Khan, urging him immediately to reach the court and help the emperor overpower the wazir, Abdus-Samad’s arch enemy at the court. Abd-us-Samad Khan probably was still apprehensive of the strength of the wazir. He therefore thought it more prudent to remain in the province and consolidate his authority.93 A portion of the letter (arzdasht) he sent in reply to the farman explaining his inability to arrive at the court, shows the nature of the relations that were to evolve between the Mughal centre and the suba of the Punjab:
… the army that was raised for the purpose (suppression of Husain Khan
Khweshgi) clamoured for their pay that came to over Rs 4,00,000. This old
slave repeatedly asked the diwan for the amount and gave the qabz (pay-
bill) for it under my own seal, [but] he did not accept it nor did he pay the
sum. Had the diwan released the sum from the imperial treasury this slave
would have been free from [the responsibility of] the pay of the people who
were recruited (p.90) to the service of His Majesty and reached the
victorious imperial camp. [This slave] thus could not help staying behind. If
an imperial order is issued to the diwan regarding the payment of the
amount after taking the qabz under the seal of this slave, this devoted
servant would finish (the work of) the pay of these people and rush to the
miracle-performing court. In future, either this slave [himself] would pay
back [the sum] in cash from the revenue of the jagir or the imperial
mutasaddis would deduct proportionately from the jagir of this slave.94
The governor made his departure for the court virtually conditional upon the emperor’s order to the diwan for payment. Whether his condition was fulfilled or not is unknown to us, but Abd-us-Samad Khan did not miss the opportunity to
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witness the final eclipse of the power of the wazir. On 16 November 1720, Abdus-Samad Khan along with his son Zakariya Khan arrived at the court and exchanged the customary rich presents with the emperor during their threemonth stay in Delhi.95 It is interesting to note that his statement of the financial difficulties in his arzdasht is not supported by the quantity of presents he offered the emperor during his stay in Delhi. He exaggerated his difficulties chiefly to secure the office of the diwan in his own name; Abd-us-Samad Khan seems to have succeeded as no diwan separately appointed by the centre is mentioned in the sources we have used.96
By 1721, the governorship of the Punjab involved not only the highest executive and military power in the province but also an unchecked (p.91) control over the provincial finance. However, the governor’s clash with the wazir and the provincial diwan and his defiance of imperial rules on a number of occasions impaired the imperial power in the province. The governor’s action set the example for the others. The fact that it was the governor’s conflict with only a faction at the court and that throughout the period of his estrangement with this faction, the governor remained loyal to the person of the emperor97 did not minimize the magnitude of the problem. The emperor was no longer the centre of the court. He was a mere member or at best a leader of a faction. Abd-us- Samad Khan’s loyalty to the emperor was motivated by a desire to protect himself, and also to mobilize the emperor against the opponent faction. Indeed, the emperor also became a party to the process of the breakdown of the imperial structure. The emperor was not only involved in the factional fight of the nobility, but also became directly responsible for the violation of the timehonoured conventions that had governed the centre-province relations. In 1716 he sent an important order (hasb-ul-hukm) to Abd-us-Samad Khan through his (Abd-us-Samad’s) associate at the centre, namely, Muhammad Amin Khan.98
The case of the Punjab also shows how the problems of the province and the governor’s attempts at an acquisition of additional powers were tied to the old nobles’ ambitions in Bahadur Shah’s time. Initially, in the wazir, Mum‘im Khan’s efforts to associate the local elements in provincial administration there seems to be some reason why the governor asked for the extended powers of faujdaris and other local offices. It may be mentioned here that Mun‘im Khan had governed the Punjab as Prince Muhammad Muazzam’s (Bahadur Shah) deputy and was thus familiar with the problems of the province in 1710. Yet, even then Mun‘im Khan’s efforts were largely intended to be a check on the governor, Muhammad Asad Khan and his son, Zulfiqar Khan who had resented his rise to the office of the wazir, totally thwarting (p.92) their claims. Later in Farrukh Siyar’s time too, the fact that the governor did not belong to the faction of the wazir added notably to the former’s difficulties. Only two important faujdaris— Jammu and Beth Jalandhar—appear to be in control of the governor.
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