160Changes in Jagir Administration

The zamindar uprisings, as well as the developments in the wake of the newly acquired position of the madad-i ma‘ash holders, resulted, in particular, in the dislocation of jagir administration in the province. In the greater part of the province the jagirdar could not manage to collect his due from the peasantry. In the traditional structure of the jagir system there was hardly anything to sustain him against these new (p.127) difficulties. Two new features—jagir-i mahal-i watan and jagir for long tenure—thus developed in the early-eighteenth century, apparently to adjust the jagir system to the new circumstances.

The jagir was normally assigned to the jagirdar in a district with which he had no connection. This was in order to maintain the unity and cohesion of the empire and to prevent the jagirdar from developing permanent links with his jagir mahal. With the same object in view the jagir was subject to frequent transfers. The watan jagir and the altamgha were exceptions to this rule. The watan jagirs originated in settlements with the local chiefs and zamindars who obtained mansabs against the jama of their ancestral dominions. It was a device to absorb the zamindars in, and make them a part of, the Mughal ‘bureaucracy’. It also satisfied the zamindars as they had an opportunity to go up, through their association with the Mughal empire, above the level of the other members of their communities. As a rule the emperor did not interfere in the watan jagir. This privilege was not available to non-zamindars. But as a concession to these mansabdars, Jahangir instituted altamgha, the jagir awarded on a permanent basis, which also served to reinforce the imperial system at lower levels.107

It, however, appears that by the eighteenth century the jagir-i watan was no longer an exclusive preserve of the chiefs, implying an allocation of jagirs in the territories under their zamindaris. In a number of cases, in Awadh at least, the holders of jagir-i watan or, to follow more accurately the contemporary Persian phrase, jagir-i mahal-i watan were not the zamindars of the entire area in the jagirs. The term apparently began to signify perhaps a new development in jagir administration. The jagir that lay contiguous to the homeland of the jagirdar or of which his native place formed a part was called his jagir-i mahal-i watan. The jagirs of Sanjar Khan, Shamsher Khan, Shaikh Sanaullah and Khalil Khan Bazid Khail which they received at the beginning of Farrukh Siyar’s reign are characterized as jagirs of mahal-i watan, since these jagirdars, as we shall see below, came from sarkar Lucknow and their jagirs lay within the territory of the same sarkar. Mahona and Kakori which were adjacent to their existing mahals were also assigned to (p.128) anjar Khan and Shamsher Khan.108 Similarly, the jagirs that Aziz Khan Chaghta of Pargana Shahabad of sarkar Khairabad obtained in 1721 in parganas Pali, Sarah and Bawan of the same sarkar have also been mentioned in the same terms. What is of greater interest is that Chaghta’s jagir

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in pargana Harha and Sandila in sarkar Lucknow too have been characterized as jagirs of mahal-i watan,109 the term watan in this case indicating the entire province of Awadh. In an another case, pargana Gopamau was given to one Anwar-ud-Din Khan of the same pargana as a jagir-i-mahal-i watan. Anwar-ud- Din Khan also held the faujdari of the pargana. Both the jagir and the faujdari were confirmed to him by Muhammad Shah in 1721.110

The evidence suggests that the jagirdar wanted his jagir in or around the place of his origin. In the existing situation of widespread zamindar revolts and a growing realization of the emperor’s inability to assist local officials adequately in administering the territories under their jurisdiction, the jagirdar felt that he had to meet the threat to his jagir on the score of his own strength. This was evidently the success over the centre by the forces of decentralization, which was nourished steadily by the economic strength of the region. The choice before the imperial authority was either to lose the disturbed territory to the rebels, and in some cases even to the jagirdars when they could perhaps ally with the rebels as well, or to keep imperial unity intact by making certain changes in the system. For, whatever the changes in their position the power of the jagirdars, unlike that of the zamindars, was always regarded as emanating from the emperor’s authority. The jagirdar’s urge was, therefore, conceded to. It was believed that on account of his biradari and the social ties in the region the jagirdar would be able to muster sufficient strength to overawe the zamindar. This probably also explains the policy of simultaneously awarding mansabs to certain members of his biradari, to bring them also in direct contact with the centre. The mansab of Samsher Khan at the accession of Farrukh Siyar has been mentioned by Shivdas as 2500/2000 and (p.129) 200 sawar mansabdar-i biradari.111 Since the words biradari and barawurdi when written in Persian styles resemble each other very closely, there is a possibility of mistaking one for the other. But the word biradari here could not be mistaken for barawurdi and the phrase misinterpreted as indicating merely the nature of the sawar rank. For Shivdas who reports this is not very particular about indicating the nature of the sawar rank as to whether it was barawurdi or du aspa sih aspa.112 In the same passage he gives the mansab of Khalil Khan Bazid Khail as simply du hazari hazar (2000/1000). Secondly, in the context of Shamsher Khan’s promotion, his 200 sowar mansabdar-i biradari are clearly distinguished from his usual sawar rank.113

The mansabdar-i biradari were apparently deputed with the chief of the biradari. How they were paid and where they were given jagirs is not known to us. It can, however, be presumed that they, if not paid in cash, were paid from the revenues of their own regions.

The rise of the Indian Muslims as a power group in the nobility at the Mughal court may also have encouraged these developments in administration. The Mughals promoted the indigenous elements with a view to creating a new group

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as a counterpoint to ambitions of the khanazads. But while the Indian Muslims were encouraged because it was believed they could be easily contained, yet they aspired, in contravention of existing practice, to have their jagirs like zamindaris in and around their own homelands. Their demands became more insistent as their difficulties in realizing the revenue in the alien districts increased. When the emperor conceded their aspirations, he must have been aware of the fact that the emerging pattern of jagir administration was not in the long-term (p.130) interests of the empire. Absence of interest in the locality together with the frequency of transfers often resulted in the jagirdar’s indifference to the problems of the development of his jagir mahal. At whatever cost, the jagirdar’s chief concern was to realize his dues from his jagir. But so long as the imperial checks through officials like faujdars, news-writers, chaudhuris and qanungos operated effectively, the conduct of the jagirdar and his agents was watched over and his immediate benefit could not prevail over the interests of the empire. In the wake of the gradual decline of the imperial checks, control over the jagirdar’s oppression of the peasantry slackened which in turn added to the strength of the zamindars.

The jagir for the indigenous noble in his watan mahal, together with mansabs for his kinsmen, who commanded his contingents at various levels, were thus means to enable him to counter effectively the threats to the empire. However, under the prevailing circumstances the jagir-i mahal-i watan jeopardized stability instead of being an asset to the mechanics of imperial control in the province. Most of these jagirdars, on the strength of their being local men, seem to have obtained services in or around their respective watans and then sat idle in their homes, hardly attending to their business. This is what was reported to Farrukh Siyar in 1715, about the big and small mansabdars of the sarkars of Lucknow and Khairabad.114 Some of them remained in their jagirs and collected revenue even after they were physically disabled and were of no value to Mughal service.115

The practice of jagir-i mahal-i watan which developed in part in response to the jagirdar’s urge to have his jagir, like a zamindari, in or around his watan inevitably encouraged the tendency of holding the jagir over a long period. The practice of frequent transfer would at best be enforced within a given region. At any rate the frequent transfer was now of greater detriment to the empire. Assignees of mahal-i (p.131) watan thus held their jagirs virtually on a permanent, and sometimes, hereditary basis. Shamsher Khan and Sanjar Khan retained their jagirs till 1719.116 Anwar-ud-Din Khan maintained his jagir and faujdari in Gopamau for at least nine years. The case of Shaikh Khairullah and the mansabdars of Lucknow and Khairabad also bespeak a tendency to defy the principle of transfer of jagirs. The following incident further illustrates the circumstances in which the principle and the practice of the transfer had to be given up. 462,280 dams from Harharpur and Ranipur and some other villages in pargana Fakhrpur, sarkar Bahraich, were assigned to Saiyid Jafar Ali. But the

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Saiyid could not get hold of his dams, as Ihtisham Khan, another jagirdar in the pargana whom he had replaced in these villages, resisted his appointment and appropriated the income for himself. Subsequendy, on 14 May 1714, the local diwan, Gobind Das, was directed by the centre to look into the irregularities and help the Saiyid in obtaining his assigned dams. The order, however, had little effect. Taking force to be the order of the day, the Saiyid then made a bid to resolve his own difficulties. He made up for the loss he suffered at the hands of the stronger by his excesses on the weaker in the pargana. 250 bighas in tappa Gondai which were held in madad-i ma‘ash by one Bibi Saira and six others were subsequently misappropriated by him.117

The long-term jagir, or rather the modification of the principle of frequent transfers of the jagirs, came to be accepted even in the cases of ordinary (other than mahal-i watan) jagirs in the northern provinces. In 1713, eight parganas in Bundelkhand, suba of Allahabad, were assigned to Muhammad Khan Bangash. In 1720, he received two new parganas, Bhojpur and Shahabad, which are referred to as ‘in addition to his eight parganas in Bundelkhand’. Again, in the late 1720s and the early 1730s in the context of his conflict with the Bundelas, we have references to his jagirs in Bundelkhand.118 In another instance, in the early years of Muhammad Shah’s reign Qamar-ud-Din Khan, the wazir, was given a jagir in sarkar Moradabad which he retained till at least 1745, the year of the imperial campaign against the Rohilla chief of Anola. Again, at (p.132) the beginning of Muhammad Shah’s reign, Murtaza Khan is reported to have received the sarkars of Benaras, Jaunpur, Ghazipur and Chunar as part of his jagir. In 1738, when Burhan ul-Mulk was appointed to the governorship of Allahabad, these sarkars were still part of the jagir of Murtaza Khan.119 It is very likely that Murtaza Khan retained his jagir in these sarkars till his death (1748). Further, sometime in the reign of Farrukh Siyar, the pargana of Ghiyaspur, in suba Bihar, was assigned to Sher Afgan Khan which he retained till his death in the 14th R.Y. of Muhammad Shah (1143/1732–33).120 It may be noted that none of these cases represents that of a jagir-i mahal-i watan. From watan as jagir perhaps to jagir emerging as watan? Our sources, however, do not allow us to generalize on these lines for the entire Mughal empire.

If on the one hand the tendency of the jagirdar to violate the principle of transfer in jagir and to convert it into a permanent holding was a result of the decline of the centre, it also showed, on the other, the strength of the region where such tendency got constant nourishment. This tendency did not have a bearing on the growth of any regional and local affiliations, as it was not confined only to the holders of the jagir-i mahal-i watan but also extended to the jagirdars from outside. Nonetheless, there is some, evidence to suggest that a (p.133) process of regionalization coincided with eighteenth-century political and administrative decentralization.120a

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The economic strength of the region followed a long course of growth in the wake of a developing cash nexus in agriculture in the seventeenth and the earlyeighteenth centuries. The level of monetization was evident in the fact that in the eighteenth century not only the revenues and the related offices, but also some other government positions which had no direct connection with the revenues, began to be valued in money. Offices like faujdari and even subadari were held on ijara, apparently with the guarantee (mal-zamini) of the mahajans. In the fact that ordinarily the jagirdar preferred to farm out his jagir there is some evidence to show the increasing importance of traders, money-changers and the money-lenders. What is more significant is that even the amils of the jagirdars normally began to be characterized as revenue farming amils (ummal-i ijaradar)121

The ijara was not a new phenomenon in the revenue history of the Mughals. We have evidence for its widespread practice in the seventeenth century. We also have indirect evidence for the practice of ijara among the officials of Aurangzeb. An order of the reign of Aurangzeb lays down that the amins and karoris of the khalisa lands should not farm out villages, in the pargana entrusted to them, to any of their relations, to government servants and to the chaudhuris.122 These orders notwithstanding, revenue farming continued to be practised throughout the reign of Aurangzeb. Among government officials, however, it seems to have remained confined mainly to rural and revenue officials. In the time of Farrukh Siyar, people like Ratan Chand, a trader by caste, seem to have appreciated that ijara was a sequel to an expanding network of money economy. As ijara was then partly officially encouraged and patronized, its practice became extended to non-revenue officials as well. In 1714, the paibaqi mahals in sarkar Lucknow were farmed out to Saiyid Ahmad Khan, the deputy faujdar of Lucknow. In spite of the collection of the full amount from the mahals, Ahmad Khan, as was reported to the emperor on 27 April 1715, paid not (p.134) a single dam to the treasury.123 According to another report dated 27 March 1717, the sair mahals in pargana Kheri were taken on ijara by the kotwal of the pargana.124

In the wake of long-term jagir there arose the ijara for long-term as well. In the vicinity of Awadh, in the Moradabad-Bareilly region, Ali Mohammad Khan Rohilla held for life the ijara of the jagirs of the wazir, Qamar ud-Din Khan and the others. On similar terms, Murtaza Khan farmed out his jagir in the Benaras region to Mir Rustam Ali Khan.125 In the event of the absence of a mechanism of checks either evolved through the mutual consent of the concerned parties or imposed by the political authorities, ijara also tended to develop into a hereditary possession.

While the decline of imperial organization at the centre created some problems for the provincial government, the dislocation of political relationships in the province led to greater trouble. The provincial government in Awadh was gravely disturbed by the agrarian uprisings at a time when factional politics at

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the court had assumed serious proportions. These uprisings extended from the earlier years and reflected a larger social problem, namely, the conflict between the central government and the regional and local elements in Mughal India, but they took a serious turn in extent and intensity at a time when the zamindars felt they would be able to dictate terms to Mughal authority.

These zamindars who were the powerful leaders of the dominant clans, took full advantage of economic growth in the region and on the strength of their links with their kinsfolk among the peasants resisted the imperial rule which defined their political position as well as validated their share of the produce. When the state tried to resist, the zamindars mobilized their people, raised an army, fortified their strongholds and rose up in arms against the Mughals. They also attacked the zamindars and the peasants who did not belong to their castes and the latter were compelled to help and seek help from the Mughals.

(p.135) Whenever they held sway, the madad-i ma‘ash holders also became victims of their raids. We may, however, note, that the madad-i ma‘ash holders, even though the ideologues and the symbols of the empire, by themselves were a source of trouble for the Mughals. Since the beginning of the Mughal rule, the Muslim theologians and a’immadars had had an uneasy relationship with the state. In the course of the seventeenth century, they steadily gained in strength and acquired a privileged position, particularly, in Awadh. Even after they had forfeited their claim to it, they enjoyed ‘the revenue free grant’, together with zamindaris, sometimes at the expense of the old landholders. The state promoted their interests and also overlooked these violations particularly in Aurangzeb’s time. But the local officials who encountered the difficulties that these privileges engendered, did not approve of the concessions that were extended to them by the centre.

The Mughals made certain changes to strengthen the position of the jagirdars to enable them to meet the threat from the region to the centre. But ironically these changes threatened to further subvert the mechanics of royal absolutism and brought the government face to face with new problems. These changes had been in response to a tendency which had lately begun to gain ground and revealed the strength of the region against the centre. The principle and practice of frequent transfer which was intended to reinforce the centralization of all powers in the hands of the emperor was never convenient to the jagirdar. Now that the inability of the centre, as it was represented in the position of the faujdar, thanadar and the other officials in the region, was increasingly exposed, the jagirdar refused to comply with the emperor’s order of his transfer. The jagirdar was not sure if he would be able to take over his new jagir. It had now become clear that unless he had support from the local magnates, he could not realize the revenues of his jagir. And the jagirdar could think of such a support only when he had jagir in and around his watan or else he was allowed to hold it for a long term and establish local ties. Some jagirs, thus, tended to emerge into

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virtual zamindari holdings, in particular, in areas where land still promised rich dividends to its possessor.

The condition in the Punjab was worse. While the development at the court alienated the governor from various central and provincial authorities, the government was here faced with enormous internal threats.