225Imperial Control over the Jagir and Local Administration

The Sikh and the zamindar revolts and the consequent confusion disturbed almost the whole administration in the province. The military campaigns against them drew heavily on provincial finance and created an atmosphere of uncertainty among the local officials. This exacerbated the political crisis at the court and was in turn affected by the estrangement between the governor on the one hand and the wazir, mir bakshi and the provincial diwan on the other.

(p.192) Jagir administration was probably the worst hit by the Sikh and zamindar disturbances. As early as 1711, some local officials began to create difficulties for the jagirdars.43 The tendency seems to have been fairly widespread. The big nobles too had to contend with this problem.44

To be sure, the centre did try to maintain its control over the working of the jagir system in the Punjab during the reign of Bahadur Shah. The centre still had control over the offices intended to maintain efficiency in the jagir administration.45 An attempt was made to enforce the rule in the disturbed mahals.46 Some specific measures like the faujdari of the jagir mahals also seem to have been adopted to ensure the payment of revenue from the jagir mahals.47 Encouragement was also given to assign the areas under the jurisdiction of the refractory zamindars to powerful nobles.48 In one or two cases jagirs for long terms also seem to have been given in the parganas in and around the province which were affected by the Sikh uprisings. In the wake of the emperor’s expedition against the Sikhs—Thanesar, Azamabad Talawri, Sadhaura, Shahabad and Mustafabad were assigned possibly on a permanent basis to Mun‘im Khan and a few others who built fortresses and established thanas in these parganas to consolidate their position to counteract the Sikhs more effectively.49

But the extent of success in such efforts is a matter of conjecture. On the contrary, a number of other instances suggest a definite decline (p.193) in the centre’s control over the local administration. In one case the merchants of Lahore who supplied grain and other commodities to the imperial army are reported to have been subjected to pay the rahdari, an illegal cess, twice in 1711. The officials of both the city and the camp markets levied cesses upon them which seemingly resulted in the subsequent slack supply of the provisions to the camp. The imperial order following the merchants’ complaints at the court seems to have had little effect on the officials.50 Another case bears on the sluggish maintenance of the army and the provisions in the forts of the province. According to a report of 27 October 1711, the forts of Taragarh, Kangra, Kotla and Attock did not contain even half the usual armed retainers, and the little provisions these forts had were misappropriated by the fort managers.51

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The impaired imperial control over the province could be reviewed in the light of the developments at the court as well. The civil war in 1712 and later in the reign of Farrukh Siyar the wazir’s endeavour to have his own man as diwan in the province aggravated the problems of the jagirdars. Admittedly the wazir’s endeavour was in keeping with the established Mughal convention, as a number of those jagirdars who were associated with the central administration or were employed in other provinces and had no connections whatsoever with the Punjab, had their jagirs in the Punjab. Saiyid Husain Ali Khan, Mir Jumla, Saiyid Salabat Khan, Nasir Khan, and Sarbuland Khan, for instance, are mentioned among such nobles.52 Since it was the wazir’s responsibility to ensure payment to them from their jagirs, he insisted on his full control over provincial finance. In the existing situation when the governor was an obvious associate of one of his enemies at the court, the wazir’s attempts in this direction were strongly resisted in the province. We have seen in Chapter 2 the disastrous consequences of the conflict between the governor and the diwan for provincial administration. The following cases further illustrate the process. In 1714, the deputy faujdar of chakla Jammu (p.194) misappropriated over Rs 33,000 of the revenue of the jagir of Rai Ghasi Ram and some other mansabdars. Reacting to an emissary (sawar-o-piyada) of the diwan imploring him to hand over the amount, the deputy faujdar further arrogated the revenue of all the parganas in the chakla. Subsequently, Rs 3,000 of the jagir of only Rai Ghasi Ram who had approached the emperor through Mir Jumla was ordered to be restored to him. No prompt action seems to have been taken regarding the rest of the amount.53 In another case the amin of paibaqi in Sialkot who was also a financial assistant (peshkar and diwan) of Ghazi-ud-Din Khan Ghalib Jang misappropriated the revenue of the jagirs of the walashahis.54

In the context of these two cases it may be noted that in 1714 the faujdari of Jammu was held by Zakariya Khan and that Mir Jumla on whose intervention Rai Ghasi Ram could regain his money was a close associate of the governor. The walashahis, on the other hand, were associated with Samsam-ud-Daula who made a bid to dislodge Abd-us-Samad Khan from the Punjab.55

The difficulties of the jagirdars sometimes arose out of the conflict between the jagirdars’ agents on the one hand and the imperial officials associated with the pargana administration on the other. In 1716, for example, the amils of the jagirdars of parganas Bahlolpur lodged a complaint against the office of the amin of paibaqi stating that even after they had submitted Rs 240—at the rate of Rs 10 for each lakh of dams of the jagir—the clerk (p.195) in-charge (mutasaddi) of the office did not release the mahals assigned to the jagirdars. As the faujdar of the pargana expressed his inability to take any action in this regard, the matter was referred to the court.56

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Sometimes the jagirdars also caused the local officials’ difficulties. The jagirdars do not seem to have appreciated the nature of the local problems and often resented military moves against the local ‘disturbers’. Such moves, seldom being successful, were feared to cause further dislocation, depriving them even of the little they managed to collect from their jagirs. This is illustrated from an incident of 1715. As the trading caravans were the principal targets of the Sikhs, and the other turbulent peasants and zamindars and the settlements on and around the roads were seriously affected, a number of thanas were established on the imperial highway (shahrah) in 1715 with a view ‘to ensuring and facilitating the collection of revenues.’ The faujdars of the adjoining parganas and the chakla were ordered to assist the thanadars whenever needed. But when one such thanadar approached a faujdar for assistance, the faujdar refused to help and asked for a fresh and unequivocal order from the centre, as ‘in the case of his assisting (the thanadar)’, the faujdar stated, ‘the jagirdar may lodge complaints with the court’.57

In this connection we quote extensively, an observation of a contemporary chronicler on the state of the working of the jagir system in the Punjab. The chronicler, Mirza Muhammad, was very closely associated with the Mughal administration and his observation provides an insight into the nature of the problems of the jagir administration. The passage clearly brings out the political context in which the local officials and the zamindars defied the imperial regulations. Mirza Muhammad, an amil of khalisa had come into conflict with the amin of paibaqi and Mir Muhammad Husain, an Iranian, who had secured the support of the local magnates against Sabha Chand, apparently a local man. The office that implied control over jagir or khalisa was still sought after and was evidently profitable, but only for those who could muster up sufficient strength to collect the revenue.

(p.196) In the middle of Zi Hijja 1130 [end of October, 1718], the chubdar

(mace-bearer) of Nawab Inayatullah Khan came to me and said, ‘You have

been given the service in Dardak alias Rahon mahal; go to Rai Bhog

Chand’. The next morning, therefore, I rode to the Rai’s who was the

peshkar of the khalisa. It became known that I had been appointed the

amin faujdar of [the villages yielding] 4,200,000 dams which were

earmarked for the khurak-i dawab from the jagir of Nasir Khan and the

other nobles58 in pargana Dardak alias Rahon in Bist Jallandhar and which

had been ruined due to the excess of the displaced amil. In addition, [the

villages yielding] 10,00,000 dams from the same mahal and 8,00,000 from

pargana Chandandurg in Rachnao Doab were added to these. I thus

received a sanad for 60,00,000 dams in all in the first ten days of

Muharram [13–22 November].59

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[Subsequently, Mirza Muhammad left for Dardak] On my way, Desraj chaudhuri, Nawal Rai qanungo of pargana Dardak and Nanhe Khan and some other jama‘adars (petty commanders of troops) came and met me. On Monday I left Machhiwara and then crossed the river Sutlej by boat. All along the way, the zamindars came to welcome me. At a distance of about 4 miles from Rahon, Fath Chand son of Nigahi Jatt who is a big zamindar (zamindar-i-umda) and notorious for his recalcitrance came along with hundred sawars and met me.

I set to work and unfortunately came into clash, over 27,00,000 dams of khurak-i dawab from the jagir of Nasir Khan, with Mir Muhammad Ali, the amin of paibaqi in the Doab who had come to seize in escheat the mahals of Nasir Khan [following his death in November, 1718]. The clash lasted for about twenty days and the ill-fated zamindars, having seen the confusion because of the two conflicting orders [from the court] took to defiance. I [then] enlisted an army and thought of restoring order. The abovementioned Mir therefore could not do any damage to the [village of these] dams, carried out the other work relating to the dams of the late Nasir Khan and left for his residence in Hoshiarpur in the beginning of Rabi I [second week of January, 1719].

Subsequently I dismissed the additional retainers and began the assessment and collection in the mahals of [khurak-i dawab] without altercation. But since it was learnt from a note from the court that the mahals of Nasir Khan had been (p.197) assigned to Sarbuland Khan, the governor designate of Kabul, and that he was exempted from the khurak-i dawab, [my] heart was heavily dejected.60 Owing to this, the zamindars of the mahal also did nor submit.

I then had no concern in pargana Dardak, save 25,00,000 dams and this trivial work suited the other [as well]. Still I had to encounter great trouble [lit. much headache] and was extremely anxious due to the termination of the crop season, untimely assessment and collection and the diabolical act of the zamindars. Then the letter of the vakil and dear brother that had been despatched on 24 Safar [5 January 1719], reached on Thursday. It stated that in lieu of the transfer of the dams of the [khurak-i dawab] of the late Nasir Khan which were assigned to Sarbuland Khan, Nawab Inayatullah Khan had appointed me the amin, darogha and faujdar of Bajwara and Hoshiarpur along with the remaining 25,00,000 dams of the [khurak-i dawab] [of Dardak], and that the [appointment order] sanad would follow.

[My] heart was thus greatly relieved, but it was learnt from the following letters that before the appointment paper reached the diwan-i a‘la for his signature, Inayatullah Khan had been transferred from the office of

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khalisa-o-tan and appointed khan-i saman.61 After his transfer Rai Bhog Chand took the related paper to the diwan-i a‘la. But since the preparation of the sanad and its submission for the signature [baiz: a mark on public writings by a principal officer] and seal of Nawab Qutb-ul-Mulk, Raja Ratan Chand had withheld it and was asking for ta‘ahhud [guarantee] and Rai Bhog Chand was trying to get it through.

Till the end of the month [Rabi I/beginning of the second week of February] each letter that came [from Delhi] contained the same. I was therefore greatly dejected, for whatever Ratan Chand does not want is impossible to carry through, and my temperament did not allow me to [simply] remain the amil of 25,00,000 dams. Further, due to the transfer of Nawab Inayatullah Khan, even there was no hope that this would be confirmed.

… In the middle ten days of Rabi I, a strange incident took place in Rahon. Summary of that [incident] is as follows. When I left Shahjahanabad for Rahon, an Iranian person, Mir Muhammad Husain by name, also left for that direction in connection with the office of the amil of 4,00,00,000 in pargana Dardak, the jagir of the emperor’s brother-in-law, Saiyid Salabat Khan. We were together for two manzils [stations]. Since he was in a hurry, he then parted from me and reached Rahon two days in advance of me. Incidentally, the same day, it was learnt that he had been replaced by someone else in the pargana. The aforesaid Mir could not take the charge.

(p.198) A few days later, the deputy of the amil and following him, the amil himself whose name was Sabha Chand, arrived. Since the day of his dismissal, the Mir had repeatedly written to Salabat Khan [promising] an increase in [the amount of] the ta‘ahhud and told the people that the sanad confirming his appointment would reach soon. Sabha Chand, therefore, considered the Mir a source of disturbance for his own authority and asked him to leave the town. But the Mir paid no heed to his entreaties. Sabha Chand got annoyed over this and sent his army against the Mir. The Mir’s retainers who were all new, retired aside and the army of Sabha Chand captured the Mir and carried him to their chief. The Mir was greatly humiliated and some of his goods were plundered.

[When] Shaikh Abd-ur-Rahman, the qazi of the town learnt about it, he rushed to Sabha Chand’s house, condemned him for what he had done, released the Mir and took him to his own house. The Mir prepared a mahzar under the seals of the qazi and the local notables about his humiliation and plunder of his effects. Sabha Chand also realized the sordidness of his act and came to the Mir to apologize. His apology, however, was not accepted.

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At last, a week later, the sanad under the seal of Salabat Khan replacing

Sabha Chand by the Mir arrived. The Mir mustered up his army and

decided to take revenge while Sabha Chand asserted that ‘I am [still] in

office and that the sanad of the Mir is fake.’ [Sabha Chand] therefore did

not remove his army nor did he withdraw his hand from the work and both

sides were prepared for a fight. No offence was, however, committed by

either side till the news of the revolution [deposition of Farrukh Siyar]

came on 10 Rabi I and both [Sabha Chand and the Mir] became

dispossessed.’62

Mirza Muhammad’s observations and the incidents noted above typify the apathy and non-cooperation among the local officials and further illustrate how the conflict among the high nobles percolated down to the province and the locality. The deputy faujdar of pargana Wazirabad in one instance offered strong resistance to an attempt by the provincial diwan to assess and collect the details of the existing revenue situation (tumar-i jama) of the pargana.63 In another case, the sazawal (steward) who had gone to pargana Kathua in chakla Jammu to enforce the imperial regulations in the mahals of the khurak-i dawab encountered similar resistance from the faujdar. For over a fortnight, the sazawal looked in vain for a meeting with the faujdar and eventually when he protested he heard improper words from the peshkar and was driven out of the office of (p.199) the faujdar. ‘Such was the plight of the slaves of the emperor.’64 Within a few days, a petty commander of the retainers jama‘adar) of the faujdar is reported to have taken away over 1200 animals from the villages of the jagir of Iwaz Khan. The faujdar distributed them among his own soldiers.65 In yet another incident in chakla Jammu, the bakhshi waqai‘nigar of the chakla, due to the non-cooperation of the sawanihnigar (news-reporter) and the faujdar, was reported to be in trouble in discharging the duties of his office. Neither was the question relating to the waqai‘ and dak, as the arzdasht of the bakshi waqai‘nigar of 30 Shaban 1128/8 August 1716 records, referred to him nor did the commanders of the retainers and the other mansabdars deputed with the sawanihnigar come to his office. The despatches of the sawanihnigar, as he alleged, contained false details about the working of his office. Subsequently, the sawanihnigar was dismissed, but Zakariya Khan, the faujdar remained unpunished.66

There are also cases of violence and armed clashes amongst the local officials to the obvious dislocation of the system of ‘checks and balances’. In an instance the gurzbardars (macebearers) who had come from Delhi to collect from the diwan the papers relating to the khalisa mahals came to blows with the diwan. They even threatened to get the diwan dismissed.67 In another instance, an Afghan commander of pargana Sialkot, along with his 35 supporters, was killed in an encounter with the amil of the pargana. The amil in this specific case seems to have been supported by the kotwal, for the severed heads of the Afghans were put on display in the office of the kotwal (chabutra-i kotwali). The faujdar of the

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pargana seems to have shown the least concern. On the contrary, in July 1716 he had himself misappropriated Rs 2,50,000 out of Rs 6,00,000 of the rabi collections from the pargana.68

The faujdar’s indifference to the problems of other local officials and even the transgression of certain regulations by him was a logical reaction to what he received from the provincial diwan. His own resources were insufficient to meet the expenses of his armed retinue and the demand for an additional amount was hardly entertained by the diwan. In May 1715, (p.200) for instance, the deputy faujdar of Jammu had to give away the elephant, the horses and other items of his personal establishment to his soldiers against their pay-claim which had accumulated to a total of Rs 30,000.69 The growth of a tendency among the local officials to make their fortunes at whatever cost is to be also seen in this perspective. The problem, however, did not begin or end with a change in the attitude of the diwan. Even the macebearers from Delhi could threaten to get him dislodged. We have seen earlier how in 1717 the diwan of the province lost his job in the province in an attempt to solve the difficulties of local administration.

The local officials’ total disregard for imperial regulations is perhaps best illustrated in the breakdown of the time-honoured rule of transfers, a device through which the Mughals had maintained the centralization of their administrative set-up. The local officials, in some cases, flagrantly defied the order of their transfers while in some other instances, the transferred or dismissed officials became a major source of trouble for the new appointee.70

The breakdown of the institution of communication (waqai‘ and sawanih) which we have seen above had a strong bearing on the problems of derelictions at local level. Sometimes the centre’s ignorance of the local problems was appalling. If there were any imperial orders following the cases of offence by the local officials, their associates and supporters both at the court and at the local level tried to prevent the news from reaching Delhi or at least they twisted it to suit the interest of the offender. Orders for transfer of the existing official and the appointment of an (p.201) associate could be secured on the strength of misinformation.71 In some cases, the imperial orders following complaints against the local officials seem to have never reached the relevant local authorities.72

It was under these circumstances that the jagirdars in the Punjab began to farm out their jagirs to the mahajans. The widespread practice of ijara indicated an atmosphere of uncertainty and apprehension that compelled the jagirdar to give up his cherished right of collecting the revenue from his jagir mahals directly through his agents. And since the mahajans were local men, it also created a local interest in the maintenance of jagirs. With the mahajan ijaradars, however, there emerged some new problems. The mahajans had some inherent conflicts

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with the different categories of landed elements which seem to have sharpened when the mahajans, as ijaradars, exploited the zamindars and peasants (ri‘aya). In 1717 two mahajan ijaradars who had taken the jagirs of three jagirdars in pargana Wan on ijara were reported to have arrogated the customary perquisites of the zamindars and qanungos, ravaged the village and carried off the goods and animals of the ri‘aya.73 The ijaradar had to be oppressive because ijara in the prevailing circumstances, in the province was normally fixed at a much inflated rate. On 11 March 1716, an ijaradar of the khalisa mahal in the town of Wazirabad was reported to have unlawfully levied half a rupee as rahdari on each of the two hundred horses of the revenue of suba Kabul which were being taken by the traders to Delhi. In reply to the protest of the traders over the levying of the prohibited cesses and (p.202) other excesses on the ri‘aya, the ijaradar said that ‘he had paid Rs 70,000 to the imperial coffers and that there was nowhere any check on the excess’.74 In an another instance the faujdar of pargana Attock farmed out the sair mahal in the pargana for Rs 50,000 a year while the collection (mahsul) from the sair did not exceed Rs 20,000 a year.75

It appears that in some cases, if not often, the ijaradar expressed his resentment against over-assessment, since it implied a greater gap between the stipulated sum and the paying capacity of ijara mahal and also added to his difficulties in collecting the revenue. The ijaradar of Wazirabad probably referred to this gap between the stipulated ijara amount and actual paying capacity when he stated that there was no check on the excess. Again, if the mahajans, as town-based money-lenders and traders, had differences with the zamindars and the peasantry, a substantial number of them being Khatris must have had caste ties with most of the qanungos who had, in turn, their own stake in keeping the rural tax payers satisfied.

The administrative difficulties in the Punjab, in contrast to those of Awadh, continued to increase even after the first two phases of the period of our study. The Sikhs and the zamindars, of course, constituted the major source of problems in the province. Zulfiqar Khan did utilize the differences between the Sikhs and the big zamindars as well as the latter’s internal differences to the advantage of the Mughal state. However, the Mughal victory over the Sikhs was not due to any change in the administrative and social structure of the empire. The reconciliation with the chiefs and some other categories of zamindars solved the problem only temporarily. It appears that the Mughals began to accommodate a larger number of Khatris into imperial and provincial administration, but the favour thus shown to the Khatris had only a marginal bearing on the Sikh movement. Since the time of Guru Gobind, a fundamental change seems to have occurred in the composition of the Sikh community. The Sikh uprisings had largely assumed the character of an agrarian movement that encouraged and further aggravated the conflict between the agrarian communities on the one hand and the Mughal ruling class, the merchants and the other (p.203) urban communities on the other. The ruthless execution of

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Banda in 1715 could not contain the movement. Since then the Sikh movement became essentially a movement of the dispossessed and impoverished zamindars and peasants.

The revolts by the zamindars of almost all categories in the Punjab clearly suggest that the problem was of a bigger and certainly a different magnitude as compared to such uprisings in Awadh. It seems that an arrangement with the landed magnates was difficult to work out, even if the provincial government favoured a policy of maximum integration of the local elements, with the administration. The silting of Sindh, the disturbances and instability beyond the western borders of the Punjab and devastations of the province by Nadir Shah and Abdali told heavily on the economy of the region. The revenues declined by over 37 per cent; the fall in the income from trade and the urban centres was very substantial. We may also estimate the extent of the decline of the urban centres from the cases of ijara from Attock, the gateway to the Punjab from the north-west, and Wazirabad, the town which developed in the seventeenth century on the Chenab and was known for its boat-building.75a

But our evidence is limited and the question needs further investigation. We may still note the changes in the caste composition of the zamindars and speculate what direction Punjab political history could have taken were it free from social and economic flux. Isa Khan gained prominance only in the late seventeenth century. The Ain refers to the Mein as the dominant zamindar caste only in three parganas, namely, Talwan, Muhammadpur and Nakodar in sarkar Beth Jalandhar whereas the major part of the sarkar seems to have been in the control of Isa Khan in the early-eighteenth century. It was in recognition of his de facto position in the sarkar that Jahandar Shah conferred on him a high mansab and appointed him faujdar of the sarkar and Lakhi jungle. In the reign of Farrukh Siyar he was considered by Samsam-ud-Daulah for the deputy governorship of the province. The Bhattis are recorded as the zamindars of Qasur in the Ain while Husain Khan, a Khweshgi Afghan, was the most prominent zamindar of the pargana in our period. In pargana Dadrak where Khori Wahas, according to the Ain, (p.204) were the dominant zamindars, one Fateh Chand Jatt is mentioned as a zamindar-i umda in our period. The Jats, the Ghamans and the Chimahs shared the zamindaris in pargana Sialkot in the late-sixteenth-century, but the Salharias are noted as a major zamindar caste in our period. It is also significant that our sources mention a Ghakkar as the faujdar and zamindar of pargana Bahlolpur whereas the Jats had constituted the only dominant zamindar caste in the pargana in 1595.76 Again, it is not without significance that a Bhatti zamindar was in control of the parganas in the region stretching from Hasan Abdal to the bank of the Ravi during the governorship of Zakariya Khan.

The zamindars who find a prominent place in the records of our period may have displaced the dominant zamindars of the time of the compilation of the Ain. It is also not unlikely that they acquired wealth and power, together with the

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erstwhile dominant castes in the course of the growth in seventeenth century. They may thus have strived for recognition and legitimate intermediary position in their respective areas. There was a possibility of their responding favourably to the offers extended to them by the Mughals, who still commanded an exalted position in the existing power structure. The cases of Isa Khan and Husain Khan Khweshgi who so readily responded to the ‘instigations’ of Samsam-ud-Daulah and the Saiyids, for instance, substantiate this point. We may presume that in a different economic context with a different policy and in a different political equation of the governor with the court, these zamindars could have grown into a substantial social base of a new subadari.

The presence of substantial and effective outside elements as jagirdars or their agents in the province may also be considered when we examine the factors restricting the prospects of the growth of the new subadari into a virtually independent nawabi rule in the Punjab. The erstwhile structure of the jagir system under the formal jurisdiction of the centre was retained both in Awadh and the Punjab in our period. But in Awadh, as we shall see in the following chapter, the governor (p.205) brought the system virtually under his control by dispensing with the agents of the jagirdars and also by reducing to the minimum the number of the large sized jagirs of the big nobles. By the 1740s the entire province of Awadh was divided into small jagirs assigned to over 500 insignificant officials and military men, quite a considerable number of whom were in the service of the governor himself. On the other hand, the jagirs in the Punjab till the end of our period were very large in size, assigned to powerful nobles, in addition to the revenues earmarked for the imperial hospitals and kitchens and for the imperial armies posted in Kabul and on the western borders of the Punjab.77 This implied constant outside interference in the province, even when the centre as such was weak and the governor had virtual control over the office of the provincial diwan.

We are not in a position to make any broad generalizations on the evidence of the merchants’ cooperation with the Mughals in the latter’s campaigns against the Sikhs and the rise of some Khatris to high position. The Mughals tried to consolidate their power in the Punjab through the trading community. The Mughals may not have recognized the economic advantages of the absorption of the Khatris into the imperial service; they appear to have appreciated its political implications. As the crisis enveloped the region and the threat to the Mughal power increased from the peasants, its dependence grew on the Khatris and the other trading communities. But the decline in trade and the consequent slump in agriculture resulting in the fury of the zamindars and the peasants having been directed against the towns weakened the merchants. Even earlier the Sikhs under Banda Bahadur raided the caravans and the trading centres. Thus, the new policy, if we are historically permitted to call it so, only marginally

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and temporarily reduced the magnitude of the political and administrative malais in the province.