222Conflict between Mughal Officials and the Chiefs, c. 1714–1748
In 1712–15, the Mughals exploited the differences between the chiefs and the Sikhs to their advantage and succeeded in suppressing the movement under Banda. This, however, did not minimize, let alone obliterate, the basic differences the Mughals themselves had with the chiefs. The chiefs seem to have been aware of the fact that it was largely through their help and cooperation that the Mughals could meet the Sikh challenge. They thus tried to buttress their position by using their own strength and the weakness of the Mughals. Kangra and Kumaon were the only two exceptions to the general trend of insubordination among them.32 But there is little evidence to show if even these
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two chieftains remained loyal to the Mughals beyond the first decade of Muhammad Shah’s reign.
The chiefs’ endeavour to cash in on the weakness of the Mughals to their full advantage is perhaps best illustrated in the activities of the chiefs of the Jammu hills. The chief of Nurpur who had lately helped the Mughals against Banda Bahadur was reported on 22 September 1717, to have built a strong thana and mobilized the other zamindars of the hills against the faujdar of chakla Jammu.33 In an another instance, Anand Dev, the chief of Jammu, and Dhrub Dev, the chief of Jasrota, jointly commanded a campaign against the Mughals in November 1720.34 This was in spite of some serious differences between them (p.189) which the Mughals had recently tried to exploit.35 By 1723–4 during a Kashmir expedition of Abd-us-Samad Khan, the governor of the Punjab, they began to act as independent rulers and took possession of the parganas adjoining the mountain valley. On his return from the expedition, Abd-us-Samad Khan intended to chastise the chiefs, but he was prevented, as a contemporary chronicler informs us, from doing so because of the demise of his wife.36
In the meanwhile, the chiefs intercepted trading consignments and plundered even the presents that were sent to Abd-us-Samad Khan from the governor of Kashmir. Subsequently in 1726, the Mughals, under the command of Abd-us- Samad Khan and Zakariya Khan, set up some strong garrisons in pargana Bhau which had so far been in the jagirs of the chiefs. In a battle which lasted for over three days and ended in the victory of the Mughals about 3000 retainers of the chiefs were killed. In the arrangement that followed, the faujdari of Jammu was given to Adina Beg Khan and pargana Bhau was taken away from the control of the chiefs.37
By expressing their allegiance to the Mughals, the chiefs, however, only sought a respite to reinforce themselves. They looked for an opportunity to throw off their obeisance to the Mughal Emperor. In the wake of Nadir Shah’s invasion of Hindustan and the subsequent disturbances, they again revolted, this time never to submit.38
Under the circumstances, the Mughal governor had either to accede to the chiefs’ ambitions or to cow them down with a heavy hand. The chiefs were too strong to be easily subdued for a long period, and (p.190) though there are instances of individual arrangements with them, we have no evidence for any new arrangement made by the governor with the chiefs or for that matter with any other category of zamindar in the Punjab. Indeed, an arrangement with the Punjab chiefs within the imperial framework had become exceedingly difficult. Mansabs could not gratify them even in cases when they had administrative assignments in their territories. The Ghakkar chief of pargana Bahlolpur who had a mansab of 2000/200 and the faujdari of the pargana in the name of his minor son, paid no heed to the petitions of the local officials, even though he was
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repeatedly directed by Delhi to chastise one Kamal, apparently another Ghakkar zamindar of the pargana, who had ravaged the jagir mahals and dispossessed several gumashtas of the jagirdar in the pargana. And perhaps, the Ghakkar chief’s defiance of Mughal authority came into the open when on 16 March 1716, he was reported to have arbitrarily appointed Kamal as the deputy faujdar.39 In another case, on 14 October, some relatives of the chief of pargana Dadyal who had shares in the revenue of the khalisa lands in the pargana and also in other adjoining parganas, were reported to have put the parganas to ransom.40 In yet another case the settlement with the chief of Jasrota broke down within a period of over four years.41
The personal position of the governor seems to have had a bearing on the relationship with the local potentates. There emerged in Awadh a kind of stability in the provincial government’s relations with the zamindars, since Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang, the governors of Awadh in the last two phases of the period of our study, effected a change in the existing arrangement with them. On the contrary, Abd-us-Samad Khan and Zakariya Khan, the governors of the Punjab, pursued a policy of total supression of the rebels. The difference in their approaches may partially be explained in terms of their different political equations. In the following chapter, it will become clear that Burhan-ul-Mulk and Safdar Jang took virtually independent decisions relating to provincial matters, while Abd-us-Samad Khan and Zakariya Khan could not dissociate fully from court politics, notwithstanding their power in the province. Abd-us-Samad Khan and Zakariya Khan (p.191) were associates and close relatives of Qamar-ud- Din Khan, the wazir, who favoured an all-out war against the insubordinate local elements. This equation also added to the breach between the governors of the Punjab and Samsam-ud-Daulah who, as we have noticed earlier, advocated a policy of readjustments with the zamindars.42
But the individual governors’ position and policies alone did not determine the course of political formations in these provinces. Awadh did not encounter the problems which constantly shattered the economy of the Punjab in the eighteenth century. A large part of Awadh and the areas in its neighbourhood registered growth through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enriching the different privileged local sections. There was a uniformity of purpose in the movements and disturbances which involved them; the zamindars, the revenue grantees and the jagirdars all struggled to augment their share in the surplus, and establish their own domains in the region. The governors used their weaknesses to their advantage, established their hegemony and simultaneously attempted to integrate their interests with those of the local and the regional groups by acting independently of the centre. On the contrary, the decay in the Punjab, beyond the control of the governors, steadily engulfed the province. With the possible exception of the instances of the rebellion of the chiefs, there seems to be chaos and the cases of revolts, disturbances and violation of the imperial regulations which involved the local elements as well as the local
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Mughal officials appear to have been directionless, desperate bids to survive. The problems of administration indicated the economic malaise which afflicted the province.