213therefore, likely to inhibit rather than facilitate the emergence of new regimes.

Many of the policy programs described in this chapter are designed to increase collaboration, both between industry and universities and between different ﬁrms. In J.-E. Bergkvist et al.

214this sense, policies seem to be inspired by innovation systems research emphasizing the importance of dealing with fragmentation and bringing actors together. This is evident in both the second- and third-generation innovation policy.

It is reasonable to assume that collaborations can increase the productivity of ﬁrms in an established regime. In the encouragement of collaborations across ﬁrms, there is an inherent assumption that innovation is primarily a matter of dealing with transaction costs, helping ﬁrms to understand each other, build trust, etc. An alternative, and complementary, point of view would however be to regard innovation as processes of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942) whereby values are created and distributed in novel ways. The Schumpeterian perspective implies that innovation is largely a matter of conﬂicts rather than mutual understanding (Juma, 2016). An illustration of this is Uber’s entry into the taxi industry, which caused considerable turbulence across the world. The ﬁrm’s efforts to circumvent, alter, or inﬂuence regulations in the industry have been highly controversial (Laurell & Sandström, 2017 and generated strikes in many countries. One can speculate as to what the effects of an innovation program for collaboration would have been in this case. Previous research has identiﬁed a collection of factor conditions that are likely to contribute to institutional change (Battilana et al., 2009; Garud & Karnoe, 2003). Institutional change is often required for the successful emergence of a new technology (Geels, 2004) and actors pursuing such efforts are frequently referred to as institutional entrepreneurs. These are more likely to succeed when there is widespread discontent with the current order of things and when they operate at the intersection of different ﬁelds or industries.

Our illustrations above have in common that they provide various forms of support to an established industry. In this sense, the conditions for institutional entrepreneurship are reduced by these policies. Institutional entrepreneurs are likely to be left outside a collaboration program as these programs are built upon the idea of collaboration rather than confrontation. Through a process of regulatory capture, innovation programs will therefore in many cases be captivated by established interest groups and thereby sustain their power rather than paving the way for new directionality in the regime. As pointed out earlier, innovation policies can broadly be categorized as either providing support or proactively dealing with resistance. The political and economic logic of these two categories would imply that supporting policies receive more attention. Supporting policies in the forms of various R&D-support and innovation grants are associated with a concentrated and comparatively visible utility, while the costs are distributed across the entire population. Conversely, it is usually politically costly to remove barriers and deal with resistance from vested interest groups. The beneﬁts of doing so are increased levels of entrepreneurship, more new ﬁrms, and potentially also new technologies being developed. Generally speaking, lost opportunities are hard to quantify as they, by deﬁnition, never materialize (Sandström et al., 2019; Potts et al., 2016). When looking at the examples described in this chapter, few policy documents or descriptions explicitly deal with resistance. On the contrary, it is assumed that the Third-Generation Innovation Policy: System Transformation or Reinforcing. . .

215main challenges to be addressed seem to be competence development and collaboration between established actors. There is, therefore, an apparent risk that these policies sustain an established socio-technical regime rather than paving way for the emergence of a new one. The discussion above can be applied not only to national innovation efforts, but also to policies at the E.U. level. Large shifts in policy at the E.U. level are beyond the direct control of ﬁrms within a regime in a certain country. In Geels’ (2004) model, these shifts can in this sense be conceived of as changes on the landscape level. Actors within a certain regime are, therefore, likely to accept these policies and align themselves with them rather than trying to inﬂuence them to their favor. As large, established ﬁrms are usually more resourceful, we would expect them to be more likely to beneﬁt from such changes in policy.

6 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have explored how contemporary innovation policies may affect the economy’s ability to achieve system transformation. Drawing upon Geels’ (2004) model for socio-technical transitions and applied literature on institutional theory and political economy, we have highlighted some of the mechanisms that may lead innovation programs to sustain rather than displace an established sociotechnical regime. Empirical illustrations of ongoing and recent innovation policy initiatives also point to some of these mechanisms.

Socio-technical transitions usually require a process of creative destruction across several parts of the economy. New competencies may be required, institutions need to be altered, and at times the industry giants may be toppled by entrant ﬁrms or by large ﬁrms in related industries. A focus on established industries and national borders along with efforts being directed primarily to large ﬁrms rather than entrepreneurial ventures implies that existing competencies may be reﬁned with this model, but they are—in principle—less likely to be overthrown with such a setup.

A similar logic can be observed with regard to the need for institutional change.