303technology in the form of digitalization was transforming the sectors; strong and gritty institutional entrepreneurs within the sector were working hard on deregulation through proactive strategies and pressure toward key institutional actors; and a zeitgeist favoring market solutions accompanied a negative perspective on bureaucracy in general and toward Televerket’s lack of customer service in particular. The key actors in this deregulation process were the incumbent government monopoly on telecommunications, Televerket, and the entrant, the private for-profit firm Comvik, which was part of the Kinnevik Group, a large and resourceful family enterprise.

The seeds of deregulation in telecommunications had already been planted in the 1970s. On one hand, this was due to new investments in mobile technology; on the K. A. M. Eriksson and R. Nykvist

304other, it was due to new pro-markets ideas. Such ideas gradually entered mainstream thought, not least through the 1974 and 1976 Nobel Prizes in Economic Sciences, awarded Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, respectively. These two economists helped the neoliberal avantgarde of the 1970s find mainstream acceptance for its ideas during the 1980s (Offer & Söderberg, 2016; Westerberg, 2020). In the 1970s, the future head of the Kinnevik group, Jan Stenbäck, was working in the United States and inspired by neoliberal ideas. One of Kinnevik’s enterprises was the telecommunications company Comvik, which despite a de facto monopoly over telecommunications by Televerket, had been given permission to deliver telephone services to private companies in the 1950s. The company was then named Företagstelefon. In the early 1980s, Comvik launched its first automatic net for mobile telephony 3 months before Televerket launched its own. This led to the first of three battles between Comvik and Televerket regarding equal rights to compete on the market for mobile telephone communication. This subsequently resulted in the opening up of the Swedish telecommunications market. Battle 1: Automatic Versus Manual Switches Televerket had a de facto monopoly over the telecommunications market. The launching of Företagstelefon in the 1950s had been an exception to monopoly policy. At that time, Företagstelefon (later Comvik) was given permission to use the kind of manual switches that were available at the time. In the 1980s, Televerket claimed that Comvik could only use the manual switches of the 1950s since the deal had been about using those switches. Comvik, which wanted to use the new and more effective automatic switches that Televerket also used, claimed this was a way of ostracizing Comvik from a market Televerket wanted for itself. Comvik solved the problem temporarily by using an automatic switch but with a person manually pushing a button every time a switch was to be made. Televerket, however, was not happy with this solution and claimed Comvik should use purely manual switches or it would be stripped of permission to use the telephone net. Comvik now began a proactive institutional campaign at many levels of society—including politicians, state officials, and media—to lobby for its right to use automatic switches. Articles were written in media; letters were sent to politicians and officials, and a request to resolve the case through court was also made. In late 1981, after an intense and proactive nonmarket activity at many levels, the government granted Comvik permission to use automatic switches. Televerket had been relatively inactive in terms of nonmarket activity during the battle, mostly evolving in defensive activity toward Comvik’s proactive attacks. Battle 2: More Frequencies In the mid-1980s, Comvik requested more frequencies in the public telephone net to expand its service. At the time, it had 36 frequencies and wanted 60. The request was sent to Televerket since it was the official market regulator. However, Televerket, which itself had 180 frequencies, considered itself biased and thus delegated the decision to the government. Televerket did, however, recommend that the government not give Comvik more frequencies since it claimed the public net would not be able to handle more frequencies. Comvik disagreed and claimed that Televerket’s advice to the government was just another way of restricting Comvik’s ability to compete in the telecommunications market.

305Public-Steering and Private-Performing Sectors: Success and Failures in the. . .

After another round of Comvik initiating nonmarket activity toward key institutional actors at all levels of society including media, politicians, public officials, academics, and the legal profession, it was granted 14 more frequencies in 1987 and hence ended up with 50 frequencies in total. Televerket remained passive and defensive in its nonmarket activity because it was content with the status quo and therefore did not have as much incentive as Comvik to be proactive, or even present, in this debate. Battle 3: AIX-Switches In the early 1990s, Comvik wanted to buy the new advanced AIX switches from Televerket’s long-time collaborator Ericsson. Ericsson was a pioneer in telecommunications technology and had closely collaborated with Televerket since the early twentieth century. Since Ericsson was a private company operating on the market, Comvik was surprised that it denied its request to buy AIX switches and immediately suspected Televerket of pressuring Ericsson not to sell to its competitor Comvik. Again, intense and proactive nonmarket activity at all levels of society was initiated by Comvik, eventually leading to a court decision that obligated Ericsson to sell its product to Comvik.

In 1993, shortly after the third battle between Televerket and Comvik, the telecommunications monopoly was dismantled. Televerket was transformed from a monopoly and state agency into a state enterprise, with the new name Telia,